Reason and Mystery in the Pentateuch
Aaron Streiter
Reason and Mystery in the Pentateuch
Copyright © 2017 Aaron Streiter. All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in critical publications or reviews, no part of this book may be reproduced in any manner without prior written permission from the publisher. Write: Permissions, Wipf and Stock Publishers, 199 W. 8th Ave., Suite 3, Eugene, OR 97401.
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The contributions to this study of Rabbi Mark Dratch, Professor Heinrich W. Guggenheimer, and Professor Steven T. Katz are gratefully acknowledged.
Reason and Mystery in the Pentateuch
Aaron Streiter
The present study, addressed to traditionalist Jews concerned with theology, presents a fact, discusses the response it necessitates, and explains why a counter-response offered by some traditionalists is antithetical to traditionalism, and therefore without value to it.
The study defines traditionalist Jews concerned with theology as those Jews who believe that God revealed to the Jewish people, through Moses, at Mount Sinai, two works: the Pentateuch (the Written Law), revealed as a text, whose two major components are a sacred history, primarily of the Jewish people, and a codex, binding on the Jewish people; and the Mishnah (the Oral Law), an elucidation of the codex revealed orally, transmitted orally for generations, then redacted as a text; and that, as a result of divine decree and the diligence of Jewish traditionalists, the two works have been transmitted without corruption through some thirty-five hundred years, from the moment they were Revealed to the Jewish people at Mount Sinai to the present.1 When the two works are considered together – as they must be, because they were revealed together, and are therefore equally sacred - they are called a single work, the Torah.
The belief is encapsulated in the following affirmation:
This is the Torah that Moses presented before the Israelites (Deuteronomy 4:44), according to God’s word through Moses (Numbers 9:23).2
The affirmation, recited whenever the scroll containing the Pentateuch is displayed during communal services, is taken as literal truth. Thus, to Jewish traditionalists it is axiomatic that some thirty-five hundred years ago, at Mount Sinai, God Revealed Himself to the Jews, and gave them the Torah, a work identical to the work they still study.
Moreover, they regard both the purpose and the value of the work as axiomatic. The purpose is to provide Jews, to whom God feels especially bound, a comprehensive guide to sacred history, and to conduct. And the work is uniquely valuable, because, as its Author alone is perfect, it alone is perfect.
That being the case, to traditionalist Jews it is in addition axiomatic that nothing can be more important than constant, exhaustive study of the Torah. For nowhere else can they locate themselves in history, or learn what God demands of them.
(Throughout the present study, traditionalists means traditionalist Jewish commentators, and traditionalism means Jewish traditionalism.)
The fact central to the study is that, in a significant number of instances, perhaps even typically, as regards both sacred history and codex, the plain meaning of the Pentateuch is impossible to understand; basically because, whenever God, so to speak, wants to, He uses language to preclude understanding; in the sacred history by describing events in language that supports, often, perhaps even typically, a multitude of equally plausible meanings, and in the codex by mandating law in language that supports, often, perhaps even typically, equally plausible but irreconcilable mandates, usually two of them.
In the opinion of the present study, traditionalism necessitates two related responses to the fact above: that, in a significant number of instances, perhaps even typically, inquiry can prompt only plausible speculation, not certainty: that is to say, not truth, defined as the position that exists in the mind, or in the will, so to speak, of God; and that a counter-response to the fact that derives from a view of reality antithetical to that of traditionalism, when focused upon a theological question that, though not (except in one opinion, regarding a specific group of laws in the codex) interdicted, perforce yields nothing of value to traditionalism.
That the fact central to the study exists cannot be attributed to errors in the text of the Pentateuch, because it was revealed by the only Author who is, axiomatically, incapable of error, or to defects of transmission or editing, because it is axiomatic that God intended, and traditionalists have therefore perforce assured, that it never be marred by corruption. That is to say, to traditionalists the fact central to the present study must bespeak the intent of the Author to embed in the Pentateuch, in a significant number of places, perhaps even typically, the motif of mysterium, of incomprehensibility. And, as He is perfect, He must have written a perfect book; and that has always been, and always will be, the book traditionalists study and revere.
That a God who is essentially incomprehensible should have done that is not, as a theological matter, problematic to traditionalists; and neither are two related responses necessitated by what He did: to acknowledge that, often, perhaps even typically, the Pentateuch precludes not inquiry, but certainty about the conclusions inquiry prompts; and to be, at the minimum, wary of a counter-response to the fact derived from a view of reality antithetical to that of traditionalism. Traditionalism encourages almost unlimited inquiry, and tolerates even inquiry rooted in the view of reality noted that is antithetical to its own; but stipulates, in the opinion of the present study, that often, perhaps even typically, the conclusions prompted are of value only as plausible speculation; a stipulation that applies to all inquiry about the Pentateuch except inquiry about a specific set of laws that either must not, or may not (opinions differ), be thought about, but that, as regards a theological question of no moment to traditionalism, in the opinion of an esteemed modern traditionalist and of the present study, is valueless because perforce vain, or—the equivalent word—futile.
That traditionalists have accepted the freedom of inquiry noted, and, as a theological matter, the stipulation noted, is evident. That they have, as a practical matter, accepted the stipulation, is not evident. Traditionalists discuss without hesitation virtually every event in sacred history recorded in the Pentateuch, and every law in its codex. And all of them affirm, as theologians, that because God is impenetrably Other, His book must be, in some significant measure, perhaps even typically, impervious to understanding. As a practical matter, however, they typically presume that little, if anything, is beyond their understanding, and therefore typically explicate, with apparent confidence, virtually every word of the Pentateuch. Their deference to mysterium notwithstanding, they typically trust their minds to understand, more or less completely, God’s book, without much noting that their conclusions are often, perhaps even typically, perforce nothing more than plausible speculation.
But that trust may hinder, rather than promote, understanding. If mysterium is not only a theological fact, but, as will be shown, at the minimum a significant impression, and perhaps even a pervasive impression, that must result from a productive encounter with the Pentateuch—if, that is to say, it is a dictum almost never asserted explicitly in the text, but an unavoidable conclusion often, perhaps even typically, implicit in its language—traditionalists should be persuaded to