Commander and Partisan: Makhno’s Campaigns against Denikin, January–May 1919
January is the coldest month in Ukraine, with temperatures below zero and the bora, a northeasterly wind, bringing heavy snowfalls. January in 1919 was not only cold1 but was also marked by a continuation of the political and military realignment of forces – as described in the previous chapter – in the struggle to secure Ukraine in the coming spring. This was a process in which Makhno, and his followers, aimed to play a key role. On 4 January, despite the fact that Russia and Ukraine were at least on paper now separate countries, the Revolutionary Military Council (Revoliutsionnyi Voennyi Sovet or RVS) unilaterally took the important military decision to constitute a Ukrainian Front, with Soviet forces having already captured Khar’kov the day before over ineffectual protests from the Directory in Kiev.2 On 16 January Petliura mounted a coup to gain control of the Directory, and, ignoring earlier diplomatic feelers to Moscow and under pressure from his French sponsors, declared war on Soviet Russia.3
By this time Denikin’s Volunteer Army consisted of over 80,000 men, of whom perhaps 30,000 were tied down in the rear, protecting his communication and supply lines from partisan raids.4 From the first weeks after Skoropadskii’s downfall and the withdrawal of the armies of occupation of the Central Powers, cavalry units of the Volunteer Army had begun probing along the Don and the Kuban rivers into Makhno’s region. Denikin anticipated that the partisans would be engaged in fighting the Petliurists, but in fact, after the brutal struggle for Ekaterinoslav, that front was quiet, and the White cavalry met with unexpectedly stubborn resistance from the outgunned partisans. In January the makhnovtsy moved many of their troops to the southeast and gained control of much of the area eastwards towards the Sea of Azov. The front stretched for over 90 kilometres to the north and northeast of Mariupol’, protecting the anarchist ‘liberated zone’ and even cutting into the Donbass.5
As the Whites increased in power and influence, the idea of an alliance between the partisans and the Bolsheviks, on the face of it in the interests of both sides, began to emerge.6 The Red Army did not come into actual contact with the insurgents until February, when Dybenko’s division arrived from the north at Sinel’nikovo, east of Ekaterinoslav. In fact, according to F. T. Fomin, a former member of the Cheka who was then at the front in charge of counter-espionage for the Bolsheviks, the first contacts had taken place earlier in the winter. Gusev, then Makhno’s chief-of-staff, visited Fomin in his railway carriage at Khar’kov station, and asked him to pass a proposal for a formal alliance to the Ukrainian RVS. In exchange for weapons and supplies the Bolsheviks would gain the advantage of a coordinated command over a vital sector of the front.7 Gusev claimed that the insurgent forces numbered about 10,000, but communist intelligence estimated only 4,000 infantry and about 3,000 unarmed men.8 A few weeks later, in mid-February, the Soviet estimate of Makhno’s strength was only 6,700 men.9 Whatever their actual numbers, Makhno’s forces were stretched thin, and even in a war of movement could not have withstood a determined assault by Denikin’s numerically superior forces. Indeed, in late January and early February, the makhnovtsy only just managed to defend Guliaipole in a series of increasingly desperate actions against the Whites.10
The RVS, chaired by Antonov, discussed the proposed alliance. Denikin’s advance presented a serious threat, and the RVS could not afford to turn away help. One opinion was in favour of breaking up the anarchist army and incorporating the troops into other units as reinforcements, thus minimising the anarchists’ disruptive influence. The second view, which prevailed, was that the Red Army could safely absorb the insurgents as an integral unit, so long as political commissars were assigned to them.11 The decision to conclude an alliance on these terms – permitting Makhno’s forces to stay together – was a key moment in determining the events that followed.12 As we shall see, the distinction between military and political integrity was understood quite differently by the two sides.13 Indeed, by relying on Makhno’s brigade to hold an important sector of the front, the RVS risked exactly the kind of rupture in the heat of battle that in fact occurred in June 1919. By assigning political commissars – who were often low calibre cadres – to Makhno’s units, the Bolsheviks also risked alienating the ideinye anarkhisty who exercised a strong influence on the insurgent army. In addition, the makhnovtsy received the Bolshevik commissars with hostility, as representatives of city-dwellers who stole grain.14
Throughout the negotiations, the makhnovtsy remained politically active. In January they had captured 100 railway wagons of wheat, totalling 90,000 pudy, from Denikin, and sent them (with some coal as a bonus) to the workers of Moscow and Petrograd, a major propaganda coup that was even reported in Izvestiia.15 On 23 January the anarchists convened their first regional congress at Greater Mikhailovka, to discuss, among other things, counter-measures against the twin threats of Petliura and Denikin.16 Such congresses, it must be remembered, were considered to be the highest form of democratic authority in the political system of the Makhno movement, and involved peasants, workers and soldiers, who would take decisions back to village and local meetings.17 Makhno took the opportunity presented by this congress to establish firm control over various local, small-scale atamany such as Fedir Shchus, who had been arbitrarily robbing and murdering people in the area, and with whom he had been in conflict.18
In early February Makhno accepted Antonov-Ovseenko’s command.19 The Bolsheviks assigned his units to serve as the Third Brigade in the Trans-Dnepr Division under Dybenko and alongside Grigor’ev, an ataman known for his vicious pogroms.20 Ataman Grigor’ev came from a family of kulaks in Podolia, and had fought in both the Russo-Japanese and Great Wars, rising to the rank of captain.21 He was cunning and dangerous, although ‘untrained and unskilled’ as a commander. His political views were opportunist in the extreme: he supported in turn the Rada, the Hetmanate, the Directory, and then, after January 1919, the Bolsheviks.22 In 1918 he started to gather local partisan groups together, and by February 1919 controlled a force of 23,000 men with machine-guns and artillery. After he turned against the Directory, the Red Army’s commanders reached a tactical agreement with him and like Makhno, he retained control of his troops, under Red Army command. The most striking difference between the two partisan leaders was one of ideological consistency. Grigor’ev had few scruples about who he aligned himself with; he was an adventurer, anti-Semitic, xenophobic, and a hater of landlords.23 Makhno, on the other hand, was driven by a political philosophy, which guided his practice: he punished anti-Semitism, he refused to cooperate with the White Guards, he was guardedly hostile towards Ukrainian nationalism. He cooperated with the Bolsheviks but mistrusted them. Perhaps the Red Army commanders should have anticipated problems mainly from the unpredictable Grigor’ev, but in the event, both of the atamany proved dangerous in equal measure, and the military situation in April and May 1919 was too confused to allow Bolshevik strategists time to analyse their allies.
Antonov may have feared the possibility of an alliance against Soviet power by the two unruly guerrilla leaders, but this turned out to be both politically and temperamentally unworkable. In fact, the makhnovtsy joined the Red Army on conditions that were unfavourable to the Bolsheviks. The insurgents were to keep their internal organisation, their black flags and their title of povstantsi.24 They were to receive arms and supplies on the same basis as nearby communist units. In return, they had to accept the assignment of commissars to each regiment.25 The last two points were the cause of bitter recriminations, and eventually of the first rift between the mutually suspicious new allies.
Part of the difficulty in bringing the two forces together was that Makhno’s ideas of insurgent organisation were an attempt to resolve the contradiction between anarchist principle and military necessity. The two key points were mobilisation and discipline. Nominally, all Makhno’s soldiers were volunteers, and they were all eligible for positions of command, either by election or by appointment. But so-called ‘voluntary mobilisation’ was also practised, and the evidence is mixed as to why and how the rural and peri-urban poor joined up with Makhno.26 Possible motives include but are not limited to an ideological commitment to anarchism, a desire for loot and land, adventurism, or simply