Welch declared. «All you have to do is tap into that well. I don’t like to use the word efficiency. It’s creativity. It’s a belief that every person counts.»
Not surprisingly, Welch embraced the largest corporate quality initiative ever undertaken. For years, he had been skeptical of the quality programs that were the rage in the 1980s. He felt that they were too heavy on slogans and too light on results. That was before he heard Lawrence Bossidy telling about the benefits he was reaping from a quality initiative he had launched at AlliedSignal. Bossidy had borrowed the Six Sigma program from Motorola and reported that the company was lowering costs, increasing productivity, and generating more profit.
A Six Sigma quality level generates fewer than 3.4 defects per million operations in a manufacturing or service process. GE is running at a Sigma level of three to four. The gap between that and the Six Sigma level is costing the company between $8 billion and $12 billion a year in inefficiencies and lost productivity. To make the ideas take hold throughout GE required the training of so-called master black belts, black belts, and green belts. Welch launched the effort in late 1995 with 200 projects and intensive training programs, moved to 3,000 projects and more training in 1996, and implemented 6,000 projects and still more training in 1997. In 1998, Six Sigma delivered $320 million in productivity gains and profits, more than double Welch’s original goal of $150 million. «Six Sigma has spread like wildfire across the company, and it is transforming everything we do,» boasted Welch.
Show and Tell
The success of the program was evident in 1998 at Boca Raton, where Welch kicked off each year with a meeting for the top 500 executives. That year, 29 managers spoke about their Six Sigma projects describing how they used new ideas to squeeze still more profit out of the lean machine that is GE. One after another explained how quality efforts cut costs and mistakes, enhanced productivity, and eliminated the need for investment in new plant and equipment.
William Woodburn, who headed GE’s industrial diamonds business, was one of the 1998 heroes at Boca. In just 4 years, Woodburn had increased the operation’s return on investment fourfold and halved the cost structure.
Employing Six Sigma ideas, he and his team have squeezed so much efficiency out of their existing facilities that they believed they have eliminated the need for all investment in plant and equipment for a decade. Some 300 other managers from GE have visited the plant to learn directly how Woodburn has done it.
But the main event was Welch’s wrap-up comments. Even though GE had just ended a record year, with earnings up 13%, Welch wanted more. Most CEOs would give a feel-good, congratulatory chat. But Welch warned the group that it would face one of the toughest years in a decade. It’s no time to be complacent, he said, not with the Asian economic crisis, not with deflation in the air.
Then, the ideas tumbled out of him for how they can combat deflation. «Don’t add costs,» he advised. «Increase inventory turns. Use intellectual capital to replace plant and equipment investment. Raise approvals for price decisions.»
Roses and Champagne
Welch was uncommonly conscious of the signals and symbolism of leadership. His handwritten notes sent to everyone from direct reports to hourly workers possessed enormous impact, too. Moments after Welch lifted his black felt-tip pen, they were sent via fax direct to the employee. Two days later, the original arrived in the mail.
They were written to inspire and motivate as often as to stir and demand action. In 1996, for example, Woodburn turned down a promotion from Welch that would have required a transfer because he didn’t want to move his teenage daughter out of school. Welch spoke to Woodburn on the phone and within a day sent a personal note to him.
«Bill,» wrote Welch, «we like you for a lot of reasons – one of them is that you are a very special person. You proved it again this morning. Good for you and your lucky family. Make Diamonds a great business and keep your priorities straight.» To Woodburn, the note was an important gesture. «It showed me he cared about me not as a manager but as a person. It means a lot.»
Or consider how Welch became involved in the excruciating details of the tubes that go into GE’s X-ray and CAT-scan machines. In the mid-1990s, Welch, who spent 15% to 20% of his time interacting with customers, heard some complaints about the poor quality of the tubes. The product was averaging little more than 25,000 scans, less than half what competing tubes were getting.
To fix the problem, Welch reached two levels down into the organization and summoned to corporate headquarters Marc Onetto who had been general manager for service and maintenance in Europe. His orders were simple and direct: «Fix it,» Welch demanded. «I want 100,000 scans out of my tubes!»
For the next four years, Onetto faxed weekly reports direct to Welch, detailing his progress. Back would come notes from Welch every three to four weeks. Some would nearly growl for greater progress; others would flatter and cajole. The experience astonished Onetto. «I was just running a little business here, about $450 million in revenues, and I was so amazed that he could find the time to read my reports and then even send me back notes,» he said. Since then, Onetto’s team has created versions of the tubes that average between 150,000 and 200,000 scans. The improvements added about $14 million in productivity benefits to the division last year.
Not everyone saw that side of Welch. Some rank-and-file employees, for example, grumbled about the unrelenting pressure on them to perform. «No matter how many records are broken in productivity or profits, it’s always ‘What have you done for me lately?» ’ said Stephen Tormey, who negotiated the United Electrical Workers contract. «The workers are considered lemons, and they are squeezed really dry.»
Other critics have questioned whether the pressure Welch imposed led some employees to cut corners, possibly contributing to the defense-contracting scandals that have plagued GE or the humiliating Kidder, Peabody bond-trading scheme of the early 1990s that generated bogus profits.
Stick and Carrot
Few would dispute that Welch was seen as a demanding executive who aroused a mixture of awe and fear. Aware of the daunting effect he can have on people, Welch worked hard to counter that image. Not long ago, recalled human relations chief William J. Conaty, one manager who had to make a presentation before Welch was so apprehensive he was shaking. It was the first time he had met Welch, who was passing through St. Louis. «I’m so nervous,» the manager confessed to Welch. «And my wife has told me she’ll throw me out of the house if I can’t get through this presentation.»
At day’s end, when Welch was back on the corporate plane, he immediately arranged for a dozen roses and a bottle of Dom Perignon to be delivered to the man’s home. He then wrote a note to the wife: «Your husband did a fantastic job today. We’re sorry we put him and you through this for a couple of weeks.»
Welch set precise performance targets and monitored them throughout the year. And each of Welch’s direct reports received from Welch handwritten, two-page job evaluation at the end of every year. Attached to the detailed notes were his jottings from a year earlier, with new comments written in red pencil: «Nice job.» «Still needs work.»
Every bonus, and every stock-option grant to Welch’s 20 or so direct reports came with a candid talk about performance. «There are carrots and sticks here, and he is extraordinarily good at applying both,» said a senior VP. «When he hands you a bonus or a stock option, he lets you know exactly what he wants in the coming year.»
Welch skillfully used rewards to drive behavior. Welch demanded that the rewards a leader disbursed to people be highly differentiated. Although GE set an overall 4% salary increase as a target in 1998, base salaries could rise by as much as 25% in a year without a promotion. Cash bonuses could increase as much as 150% in a year. Stock options, once reserved for the most senior officers at GE, have been broadly expanded under Welch. Now, some 27,000 employees get them, nearly a third of GE’s professional employees. Unlike many companies that hand out options as automatic annual grants, Welch did not want GE’s program to be perceived as a «dental plan.» So everyone who received options didn’t get them every year.
Welch has been a major beneficiary of stock options. Yet few things energized Welch as much as reviewing