2
The time within which a petition against the return of a member of Parliament must be presented, has, for the last two centuries, been a fortnight after the meeting of Parliament, or the return of the member. This still continues the limited period. See stat. 2 and 3 Vict. c. 31, § 2. The allusion in the text, therefore, is to the day after that, beyond which a petition could not be presented; and if Gammon, on or after that fifteenth day, had paid money for their votes to the members of the Quaint Club, he might have done it with impunity, as far as concerned the perilling Mr. Titmouse's seat. The legislature has lately, however, made great exertions to put down the system of bribing; and by statute 5 and 6 Vict. c. 102, passed on the 19th August 1842, has invested the House of Commons with very formidable powers for that purpose. If petitioners on the score of bribery, fearful of the strength of the case which may be brought against themselves on the same ground, agree with their opponents to abandon the charge of bribery, and compromise the matter, the committee may nevertheless inquire into the whole matter, and report the result to the House. And by the fourth and fifth section of that act, a petition complaining of bribery may be presented at any time after the first fourteen days of the meeting of Parliament, and within three calendar months next after some one or more of the alleged acts of bribery shall have been committed; and the inquiries of the committee are limited to acts of bribery committed within three months before presenting the petition. The entire system of election law has been also remodelled by several very recent statutes, as will be explained in the next note.
3
For this purpose each party, attended by their counsel, agents, and political friends, immediately withdrew to separate rooms, to fix upon the eleven names which they would strike off. Having done this, they met in a third room, before an officer of the House; and struck off name by name alternately, till the thirty-three were reduced to eleven.—This process was called "Knocking out the brains of the Committee:" for as each party's object was to get rid of a decided and known political opponent, the abler and more eminent he was, the greater the necessity for getting rid of him. Those left were the more obscure members of the House.
4
The process of forming an election committee, as described in the text, fell several times under the author's personal observation—in his professional capacity—as late as till within the last five years, [this note being written in 1845.] It was prescribed by a statute, which since its enactment has been repeatedly amended and re-enacted, known by the name of "The Grenville Act," (stat. 10 Geo. III. c. 16.) It was long regarded as a very masterly and successful mode of securing an impartial committee. Thus speaks of it, for instance, Mr. Justice Coleridge, in a note to his edition of Blackstone's Commentaries, (Vol. i. p. 187, note 31:)—"This statute is justly celebrated for the wisdom and utility of its provisions. One of its principal objects is, to secure a fair election of petition committees." This eulogy was penned in the year 1825; but even admitting it to have been then justified by the working of the system, its defects became subsequently the object of universal regret and reprobation. For some years subsequently to the passing of the Reform Bill, this constitution of election committees—depicted in the text with rigorous fidelity—led to intolerable abuse, and merited scandal and reproach. In the year 1844, after a previous ineffectual remodelling of the system, was passed statute 7 and 8 Vict. c. 103, entitled "An Act to amend the law for the trial of controverted elections of members to serve in Parliament," (passed 9th August 1844,)—which created an entirely new system for the selection of these committees—of which the following is an outline.—At the beginning of every session, the Speaker appoints a "general Committee of Elections," consisting of six members, who must be approved of by the House—and then their appointment continues to the end of the session. A list is then made of all the members of the House, liable to serve on election committees, which is referred to this general committee; and they select from it a certain number, not exceeding twelve, whom they deem qualified to act as chairmen of election committees; and who are thereupon neither liable, nor eligible, to serve as private members of such committees. This body is called "the Chairmen's Panel." The remaining members of the House, liable to serve, are then divided into five panels, of equal numbers; and the order in which these five panels are to serve, is decided by lot, openly, by the clerk of the House, at the table.—All election petitions are then referred to the general committee, whose duty it is to select from the five panels, according to the order in which they may have been drawn, FOUR members, who are to serve as a select committee to try the petition referred to them, in the order in which that petition may happen to stand in the list of petitions—which is to be framed according to the provisions of the Act in question. On the same day on which the general committee thus choose the private members of the committee, but without knowing who have been so chosen, the members of the chairmen's panel select one of their number to act as chairman of the select committee; returning his name to the general committee, as soon as the latter shall have informed the chairmen's panel that the four members have been chosen. When all these arrangements have been completed, the parties in attendance are called into the House, and the names of the chairman and the four members read over to them; whereupon they withdraw, and this committee of FIVE then proceed, in due course, to try the petition. If, through illness, or other allowed excuse, the number should be reduced from five to less than three, the committee is dissolved—unless the parties choose to go on with two members, or even ONE, who in such case will lawfully constitute the committee.—Such is the scheme, devised with anxious ingenuity, which has recently been adopted by the legislature, for the all-important purpose of securing impartial election committees. That it is a vast improvement on the system described in the text, seems certain; but what will be its practical working, time alone can show.
