2
Note 2. Page 5.
An important and salutary improvement in the law of libel, especially in the case of newspapers, was effected in 1843, by statute 6 and 7 Vict. c. 96. Till then the TRUTH was inadmissible as a justification on a criminal prosecution for libel—the rule being that the greater the truth the greater was the libel—by which was meant its greater tendency to a breach of the peace. Now, however, the defendant may defend himself against an indictment or information, by pleading that the charge was true, and that it was for the public benefit that it should have been published; but he must specially state in his plea the particular facts by reason of which it was for the public benefit. If such plea, or evidence in support of it, should be false or malicious, the act allows that circumstance to be taken into consideration in awarding punishment. A serious amount of fine, imprisonment, and hard labor, may be inflicted for publishing, or threatening (with intent to extort money) to publish, a false and malicious libel. In civil proceedings a defendant may plead that he was not guilty of actual malice or gross negligence; and offered to publish, or published, a full apology, in which case he may pay money into court by way of amends; and in all actions of defamation he may show an apology, or offer of one, in mitigation of damages. This statute does not extend to Scotland.
Troilus and Cressida, i. 3.
The great increase of business alone, is the cause of the accumulation of arrears—especially in the Queen's Bench, which is almost overpowered by the enormous pressure of its criminal business. All the three superior courts have recently adopted post-terminal fittings, to enable them to despatch their arrears; an act of Parliament having been passed (stat. 1 and 2 Vict. c. 32) for that purpose.
If the reader will refer to vol. i. p. 490, he may see how the disabilities here alluded to arose, and affected the case. The doctrine of "adverse possession" is founded on the anxiety of our law to secure quietude of title. It gives every reasonable facility for the assertion of just rights against wrongful possessors of property; but with equal reasonableness fixes a limit to immunity from the consequences of negligent acquiescence under usurpation, considering it, in a word, better policy to protect a person in possession, than to encourage a struggle for it among strangers. Vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt, is the maxim of the common law, on which also the statute law has often acted, and recently with great effect, by stat. 3 and 4 Will. 4, c. 27, (passed on the 24th July 1833.) By its provisions, many of the most subtle and difficult questions concerning the nature of "possession" are got rid of; and the period of twenty years from the commencement of the rights of possession, fixed as that within which alone an action or suit in equity for the recovery of lands must be brought—unless a party was, when his right accrued, laboring under the disability of infancy, coverture, insanity, or absence beyond seas: in any of which cases an extension of ten years is allowed: but it is expressly provided, that however numerous such disabilities may have been—however long and uninterruptedly they may have lasted—forty years shall be absolutely the limit within which the action or suit must be brought from the time of the right first accruing. If the statute "once begin to run," as the lawyers say, "nothing can stop it." The above constitute some of the boldest and best of the great alterations recently effected in our English system of real property law. A far longer period than the present one was requisite to constitute "adverse possession" at the time mentioned in the text.
See post, Chapter V., Preliminary Note.
"[Greek: 'Anthropinos]," signifies in this place, (1 Corinth. x. 13,) says a commentator on this memorable passage of Scripture, "such as is suited to the nature and circumstances of man; such as every man may reasonably expect, if he consider the nature of his body and soul, and his situation in the present world."
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Note 8. Page 54.
It might be inferred, from a somewhat loose statement in an English law treatise, that in a case like that of Mr. Aubrey—viz. of possession of property in entire ignorance that it belonged to another—a Court of Equity would protect against the rightful owner's claim for the mesne profits. Such, however, is by no means the case. Mr. Titmouse had recovered at law—by the superior strength of his title, and without requiring any assistance whatever from a Court of Equity; the mesne profits, therefore, were absolutely his—and any interference, by a Court of Equity, to deprive him of them, would have been an act of direct spoliation. Such a notion, therefore, is utterly destitute of foundation. If Mr. Titmouse had been compelled to seek the assistance of a Court of Equity in order to prosecute his claim, and had clearly been guilty of negligence or fraud; it is possible that some terms might have been imposed upon him, with reference to the mesne profits to be wrung from his
