be dictated by furthering their own influence or power’. There was a lesson there for everyone. ‘Perhaps some of the people and particularly the young soldiers thought that when you get to Afghanistan [the people you come across] are either good people or enemy. This made them appreciate that it is actually far more complex than that.’
Nonetheless, the Paras’ reporting of Zaifullah’s activities and attitudes had emphasised his unsuitability in the brave new world of good governance and accountability that they were there to promote. The stories also added evidence to the dossier piling up against his patron, Asadullah Khalid. Although the Canadian Foreign Minister’s candour concerning the Kandahar governor was interpreted in the media as a blunder, his remarks could not be ignored. Four months after the Paras left, Khalid was sacked and Zaifullah was fired with him.
The Paras got back to KAF to a warm welcome from Major General Lessard. For a while Sohil Laram III was talked of as a model influence mission. But long-term success required continuity of commitment and energy. The British were replaced in Hutal by soldiers drawn from Portugal’s contribution to the ISAF force. There had been some uncertainty about the date of their arrival following discussions about the terms and conditions of their deployment. The Portuguese had requested the same standards of comfort that they were used to in KAF. They included canteen-quality food and an ice-cream machine. They also wanted air-conditioning units for their accommodation and a cash dispensing machine. The requests were all rejected.
On 24 April the Portuguese arrived in Hutal. ‘B’ Company under Stu McDonald were there to conduct the handover. The new arrivals went to the now almost completed FOB. The Portuguese commander announced that he and his men belonged to a crack unit, a claim that was met with some surprise by the Paras. ‘They were overweight, sweaty and wore very tight uniforms,’ said one. ‘They did not look like serious soldiers.’ The commander sought confirmation from McDonald that the Paras patrolled in vehicles. McDonald replied that they patrolled on foot. The commander said that they would be operating mounted patrols as they were ‘only a company strong’. McDonald pointed out that the Paras were only in Hutal in company strength themselves.
Later that day a convoy arrived bearing the Portuguese stores. The Paras watched them unloading the containers. ‘When they cracked the first one open it was full of booze,’ said one surprised onlooker. That night the newcomers strung up lights and held a party. In the morning the Paras waited at their base to formally hand over to their replacements. At the appointed hour no one had appeared. After twenty minutes, a platoon commander arrived who seemed the worse for wear from the previous night’s revelry. McDonald left ‘with a twinge of sadness…we genuinely felt we were making a difference in the latter stages’. At least some of the local people would agree with that assessment. As always in southern Afghanistan, the question was: how long would it last?
A successful influence operation brought its own satisfaction, but so too did a good fight. It was a prospect that the soldiers looked forward to. No one joined the Parachute Regiment who did not relish the chance of combat. The news that they were to be sent on a risky daylight mission to grab a Taliban commander who had so far eluded the grasp of special forces snatch squads was very welcome.
The operation required exhaustive planning and crisp timing and coordination if it was going to come off. The target was Haji Sultan Agha, code name ‘the Hobbit’. The ID mugshot issued to the troops revealed that, unlike his Tolkien namesake, he had a glossy black moustache and grey beard, thick eyebrows and warm brown eyes. His guru-like appearance belied his reputation as the number-one bomb-maker in the Zari district, a bucolic stretch of vineyards and poppy fields that lay along the Arghandab river near Highway One. His activities had placed him on Regional Command South’s wanted list.
The task was given to ‘A’ Company, who had finished their tour of duty in Hutal and were in a holding pattern following the decision to suspend search operations in Band-e-Timor. The RCS planners were hoping that their luck would change with Operation ‘Sur Kor’ (‘Red House’). Specialist teams had launched several missions to collar the Hobbit and his men, who were believed to build the IEDs that were found constantly along Route Fosters, a track that led south off Highway One into the Green Zone.
The raiders had been dropped at a distance from their targets and tabbed in on foot, hoping to surprise them. Instead, when they reached the target compounds their quarry had disappeared. Once they found a group of males of fighting age still in their beds. But there was nothing to link them to any insurgency activities and the conclusion was the men had received a tip-off in time to clean up any evidence.
The Paras’ plan was based on boldness rather than stealth. According to Jamie Loden, ‘the idea was that we were going to go in in daylight and instead of putting down some way off to give them loads of warning time, we were going to land right on top of them and give them no chance of getting away’.
The hope was that they would be able to catch the Hobbit in the act of making his bombs. Intelligence reports said his IED factory was in a compound, one of a cluster that lay by a fast-flowing irrigation canal in the middle of some vineyards not far from Route Fosters. The location was named ‘Gold’. Three hundred and fifty metres to the west lay compound ‘Silver’, which was also believed to be connected to the Hobbit’s operation. Beyond that was ‘Bronze’, home to the band’s wives and children.
The site presented many practical difficulties. Landing on top of the target sounded like a good, if potentially dangerous, idea. The Taliban had so far managed to shoot down only one helicopter in southern Afghanistan, but it seemed only a matter of time before their luck improved. The immediate difficulty, though, was the terrain, which made landing a Chinook very difficult. The land to the south of the compound was more promising, but it was bounded by a canal. It was 6 feet deep and 5 wide and there was no question of even the most athletic soldier being able to jump across it burdened with body armour, weapon and the usual mountain of kit.
The only way across was via three footbridges which it was prudent to assume were mined. Clearing the route would take time, giving the Hobbit and his men the chance to escape. The pathways leading away from the compound were sheltered by trees which gave good cover. The problem facing Loden and his men was ‘how were we going to isolate these three compounds simultaneously to prevent anyone getting away and also land relatively close, given the limitations we had on landing zones?’
Finding a solution was complicated by the restrictions that the different elements taking part in the action placed on their men. Like almost every major operation in Afghanistan, Sur Kor was a multinational effort. The political benefits of having many nations engaged in the coalition to stabilise Afghanistan were often cancelled out by the military disadvantages as each contributing country imposed its own caveats on what its troops would and would not do.
In this case it was the British who were causing difficulties. The policy of the joint force command that controlled the RAF, army and navy helicopters was different to that of the pilots, who Loden had always found to be ‘fantastically willing and wanted to do everything we wanted’. British helicopters, though, were providing only part of the lift. Another two Chinooks were being supplied by the Dutch. Their commanders were willing to let their pilots land as close as physically possible to the compound walls.
The British imposed another condition on daylight assault operations. They insisted on especially thorough surveillance. These preparations took time, delaying the start. In the leaky atmosphere of KAF this was plenty of time for news of the operation to trickle out.
The operation was eventually slated for the morning of 16 April. Loden had 150 men in his group. As well as his own company platoons he could call on the heavy machine guns of the Fire Support Group (FSG) and a mortar team carrying three barrels. They were supported by explosives experts from the Royal Engineers, a Royal Military Police team, and an Afghan anti-drugs team. The force also included Corporal Sainaina Wailutu, a twenty-nine-year-old Fijian company clerk who had joined the British Army seven years before, to search any women they detained. Loden planned to fly one of his