will be between monarchy and aristocracy; and to omit that the world, as it was created, so also it is governed by one God Almighty; and that all the ancients have preferred monarchy before other governments, both in opinion, because they feigned a monarchical government amongst their gods; and also by their custom, for that in the most ancient times all people were so governed; and that paternal government, which is monarchy, was instituted in the beginning from the creation; and that other governments have proceeded from the dissolution thereof, caused by the rebellious nature of mankind, and be but pieces of broken monarchies cemented by human wit; I will insist only in this comparison upon the inconveniences that may happen to the subjects, in consequence to each of these governments.
4. And first it seemeth inconvenient, there should be committed so great a power to one man, as that it might be lawful to no other man or men to resist the same; and some think it inconvenient eo nomine, because he hath the power. But this reason we may not by any means admit, for it maketh it inconvenient to be ruled by Almighty God, who without question hath more power over every man, than can be conferred upon any monarch. This inconvenience therefore must be derived, not from the power, but from the affections and passions which reign in every one, as well monarch as subject; by which the monarch may be swayed to use that power amiss. And because an aristocracy consisteth of men, if the passions of many men be more violent when they are assembled together, than the passions of one man alone, it will follow, that the inconvenience arising from passion will be greater in an aristocracy, than a monarchy. But there is no doubt, when things are debated in great assemblies, but every man delivering his opinion at large, without interruption, endeavoureth to make whatsoever he is to set forth for good, better; and what he would have apprehended as evil, worse, as much as is possible; to the end his counsel may take place; which counsel also is never without aim at his own benefit, or honour: every man's end being some good to himself. Now this cannot be done without working upon the passions of the rest. And thus the passions of those that are singly moderate, are altogether vehement; even as a great many coals, though but warm asunder, being put together inflame one another.
5. Another inconvenience of monarchy is this: that the monarch, besides the riches necessary for the defence of the commonwealth, may take so much more from the subjects, as may enrich his children, kindred and favourites, to what degree he pleaseth; which though it be indeed an inconvenience, if he should so do; yet is the same both greater in an aristocracy, and also more likely to come to pass; for there not one only, but many have children, kindred, and friends to raise; and in that point they are as twenty monarchs for one, and likely to set forward one another's designs mutually, to the oppression of all the rest. The same also happeneth in a democracy, if they all do agree; otherwise they bring in a worse inconvenience, (viz.) sedition.
6. Another inconvenience of monarchy, is the power of dispensing with the execution of justice; whereby the family and friends of the monarch, may with impunity, commit outrages upon the people, or oppress them with extortion. But in aristocracies, not only one, but many have power of taking men out of the hands of justice; and no man is willing his kindred or friends should be punished according to their demerits. And therefore they understand amongst themselves without farther speaking, as a tacit covenant: Hodie mihi, cras tibi.
7. Another inconvenience of monarchy, is the power of altering laws; concerning which, it is necessary that such a power be, that the laws may be altered, according as men's manners change, or as the conjuncture of all circumstances within and without the commonwealth shall require; the change of law being then inconvenient, when it proceedeth from the change, not of the occasion, but of the minds of him or them, by whose authority the laws are made. Now it is manifest enough of itself, that the mind of one man is not so variable in that point, as are the decrees of an assembly. For not only they have all their natural changes, but the change of any one man be enough, with eloquence and reputation, or by solicitation and faction, to make that law to-day, which another by the very same means, shall abrogate to-morrow.
8. Lastly, the greatest inconvenience that can happen to a commonwealth, is the aptitude to dissolve into civil war. and to this are monarchies much less subject, than any other governments. For where the union, or band of a commonwealth, is one man, there is no distraction; whereas in assemblies, those that are of different opinions, and give different counsel, are apt to fall out amongst themselves, and to cross the designs of commonwealth for one another's sake: and when they cannot have the honour of making good their own devices, they yet seek the honour to make the counsels of their adversaries to prove vain. And in this contention, when the opposite factions happen to be anything equal in strength, they presently fall to war. Wherein necessity teacheth both sides, that an absolute monarch, (viz.) a general, is necessary both for their defence against one another, and also for the peace of each faction within itself. But this aptitude to dissolution, is to be understood for an inconvenience in such aristocracies only where the affairs of state are debated in great and numerous assemblies, as they were anciently in Athens, and in Rome; and not in such as do nothing else in great assemblies, but choose magistrates and counsellors, and commit the handling of state affairs to a few; such as is the aristocracy of Venice at this day. For these are no more apt to dissolve from this occasion, than monarchies, the counsel of state being both in the one and the other alike.
Chapter 25: That Subjects are not Bound to Follow Their Private Judgments in Controversies of Religion
1. Having showed that in all commonwealths whatsoever, the necessity of peace and government requireth, that there be existent some power, either in one man, or in one assembly of men, by the name of the power sovereign, to which it is not lawful for any member of the same commonwealth to disobey; there occurreth now a difficulty, which, if it be not removed, maketh it unlawful for any man. to procure his own peace and preservation, because it maketh it unlawful for a man to put himself under the command of such absolute sovereignty as is required thereto. And the difficulty is this: we have amongst us the Word of God for the rule of our actions; now if we shall subject ourselves to men also, obliging ourselves to do such actions as shall be by them commanded; when the commands of God and man shall differ, we are to obey God, rather than man: and consequently the covenant of general obedience to man is unlawful.
2. This difficulty hath not been of very great. antiquity in the world. There was no such dilemma amongst the Jews; for their civil law, and divine law, was one and the same law of Moses: the interpreters whereof were the priests, whose power was subordinate to the power of the king; as was the power-of Aaron to the power of Moses. Nor is it a controversy that was ever taken notice of amongst the Grecians, Romans, or other Gentiles; for amongst these their severAl civil laws were the rules whereby not only righteousness and virtue, but also religion and the external worship of God, was ordered and approved; that being esteemed the true worship of God, which was kata ta nomima, (i.e.) according to the laws civil. Also those Christians that dwell under the temporal dominion of the bishop of Rome, are free from this question; for that they allow unto him (their sovereign) to interpret the Scriptures, which are the law of God, as he in his own judgment shall think right. This difficulty therefore remaineth amongst, and troubleth those Christians only, to whom it is allowed to take for the sense of the Scripture that which they make thereof, either by their own private interpretation, or by the interpretation of such as are not called thereunto by public authority: they that follow their own interpretation, continually demanding liberty of conscience; and those that follow the interpretation of others not ordained thereunto by the sovereign of the commonwealth, requiring a power in matters of religion either above the power civil, or at least not depending on it.
3. To take away this scruple of conscience concerning obedience to human laws, amongst those that interpret to themselves the word of God in the Holy Scriptures; I propound to their consideration, first: that no human law is intended to oblige the. conscience of a man, but the actions only. For seeing no man (but God alone) knoweth the heart or conscience of a man, unless it break out into action, either of the tongue, or other part of the body; the law made thereupon would be of none effect, because no man is able to discern, but by word or Other action whether such law be kept or broken. Nor did the apostles themselves pretend dominion over men's consciences concerning the faith they preached,