which is that of the Prime, or Chief Heads, more then that men differ so among themselves, that the same things seeme not good to all men? Whence it happens, that those persons, who by some are look'd on as the best, are by others esteem'd to be the worst of all men.
III. But men, by reason of their passions, will very hardly be perswaded that a Kingdome, and Tyranny, are not diverse kindes of Cities, who though they would rather have the City subject to one, then many, yet doe they not beleeve it to be well govern'd unlesse it accord with their judgements: But we must discover by Reason, and not by Passion, what the difference is between a King, and a Tyrant: but first, they differ not in this, That a Tyrant hath the greater Power, for greater then the Supreme cannot be granted; nor in this, That one hath a limited power, the other not; for he, whose authority is limited, is no King, but his Subject that limits him. Lastly, neither differ they in their manner of acquisition; for if in a Democraticall, or Aristocraticall Government some one Citizen should, by force, possesse himself of the Supreme Power, if he gain the consent of all the Citizens, he becomes a legitimate Monarch; if not, he is an Enemy, not a Tyrant. They differ therefore in the sole exercise of their command, insomuch as he is said to be a King, who governs wel, and he a Tyrant that doth otherwise. The case therefore is brought to this passe, That a King legitimately constituted in his Government, if he seeme to his Subjects to Rule well, and to their liking, they afford him the appellation of a King, if not, they count him a Tyrant. Wherefore we see a Kingdome, and Tyranny, are not diverse Formes of Government, but one and the self-same Monarch hath the name of a King given him in point of Honour, and Reverence to him, and of a Tyrant in way of contumely, and reproach. But what we frequently finde in bookes said against Tyrants, took its originall from Greek, and Roman Writers, whose Government was partly Democraticall, and partly Aristocraticall, and therefore not Tyrants onely, but even Kings were odious to them.
IV. There are, who indeed doe think it necessary, That a Supreme Command should be somewhere extant in a, City. but if it should be in any one, either Man, or Councell, it would follow (they say) that all the Citizens must be slaves. Avoiding this condition, they imagine that there may be a certaine Form of Government compounded of those three kinds we have spoken of, yet different from each particular, which they call a mixt Monarchie, or mixt Aristocraty, or mixt Democraty, according as any one of these three sorts shall be more eminent then the rest: For example, if the naming of Magistrates, and the arbitration of War, and Peace, should belong to the King, Judicature to the Lords, and contribution of Monies to the People, and the power of making Lawes too altogether, this kind of State would they call a mixt Monarchie forsooth. But if it were possible that there could be such a State, it would no whit advantage the liberty of the subject; for as long as they all agree, each single Citizen is as much subject as possibly he can be; but if they disagree, the State returns to a Civill War, and the Right of the private Sword, which certainly is much worse then any subjection whatsoever: But that there can be no such kind of Government hath been sufficiently demonstrated in the foregoing Chapter, Artic: 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12.
But that there can be no such kinde of Government] Most men grant, That a Government ought not to be divided, but they would have it moderated, and bounded by some limits. Truly it is very reasonable it should be so; but if these men, when they speak of moderating, and limiting, do understand dividing it, they make a very fond distinction. Truly, for my part, I wish that not onely Kings, but all other Persons endued with Supreme Authority would so temper themselves as to commit no wrong, and onely minding their charges contain themselves within the limits of the naturall, and divine Lawes: But they who distinguish thus, they would have the chief Power bounded, and restrain'd by others; which, because it cannot be done, but that they who doe set the limits, must needs have some part of the Power, whereby they may be enabled to doe it, the Government is properly divided, not moderated.
V. Let us see a little now in the constituting of each Form of Government, what the constitutours doe. Those who met together with intention to erect a City, were almost in the very act of meeting a Democraty; for in that they willingly met, they are suppos'd oblig'd to the observation of what shall be determin'd by the major part: which, while that convent lasts, or is adjourn'd to some certain dayes, and places, is a clear Democraty; for that convent, whose will is the will of all the Citizens, hath the Supreme Authority; and because in this Convent every man is suppos'd to have a Right to give his voice, it followes, that it is a Democraty by the definition given in the first Article of this Chap. But if they depart, and break up the Convent, and appoint no time, or place, where, and when they shall meet again, the publick weal returns to Anarchy, and the same state it stood in before their meeting, that is, to the state of all men warring against all. The People therefore retains the supreme power no longer then there is a certain day and place publiquely appointed, and known, to which whosoever will, may resort. For except that be known and determined, they may either meet at divers times, and places, that is in factions, or not at all; and then it is no longer demos, the People, but a dissolute multitude, to whom we can neither attributes any Action, or Right: Two things therefore frame a Democratie, whereof one (to wit the perpetuall prescription of Convents) makes demos, the People, the other (which is a plurality of voyces) to kratos or the power.
VI. Furthermore, it will not be sufficient for the People, so as to maintain its supremacy, to have some certain known times, and places of meeting, unlesse that either the intervals of the times be of lesse distance, then that any thing may in the mean time happen whereby (by reason of the defect of power) the City may be brought into some danger, or at least that the exercise of the supreme authority be, during the intervall, granted to some one man, or Councell. For unlesse this be done, there is not that wary care, and heed taken for the defence and Peace of single men which ought to be, and therefore will not deserve the name of a City, because that in it for want of security, every mans Right of defending himselfe at his own pleasure, returns to him again.
VII. Democraty is not framed by contract of particular persons with the People, but by mutuall compacts of single men each with other. But hence it appears in the first place, that the Persons contracting, must be in being before the contract it selfe. But the People is not in being before the constitution of government, as not being any Person, but a multitude of single Persons; wherefore there could then no contract passe between the People and the Subject. Now, if after that government is framed, the subject make any contract with the People, it is in vain, because the People contains within its will, the will of that subject to whom it is supposed to be obliged; and therefore may at its own will and pleasure disengage it selfe, and by consequence is now actually free. But in the second place, that single Persons doe contract each with other may be inferred from hence, that in vain sure would the City have been constituted, if the Citizens had been engaged by no contracts to doe, or omit what the City should command to be done or omitted. Because therefore such kind of compacts must be understood to passe as necessary to the making up of a City, but none can be made (as is already shewed) between the Subject and the People; it followes, that they must be made between single Citizens, namely that each man contract to submit his will to the will of the major part, on condition that the rest also doe the like, as if every one should say thus, I give up my Right unto the People for your sake, on condition, that you also deliver up yours, for mine.
VIII. An Aristocraty, or Councell of Nobles endued with supreme authoritie, receives its originall from a Democraty, which gives up its Right unto it; where we must understand that certain men distinguisht from others, either by eminence of title, blood, or some other Character, are propounded to the People, and by plurality of voyces are elected; and being elected, the whole Right of the People, or City, is conveighed on them, insomuch as whatsoever the People might doe before, the same by Right may this Court of elected Nobles now doe. Which being done, it is clear that the People, considered as one Person, (its supreme authority being already transferred on these) is no longer now in being.
IX. As in Democraty the People, so in an Aristocraty the Court of Nobles is free from all manner of obligation; for seeing subjects not contracting with the People, but by mutuall compacts among themselves, were tyed to all that the People did, hence also they were tyed to that act of the People in resigning up its Right of government into the hands of Nobles. Neither could this Court, although elected by the People, be by it obliged to any thing; for being erected, the People is at once dissolved, as was declared above, and the authority it had as being a Person utterly vanisheth. Wherefore the obligation which was due