A Failed Political Entity'. Stephen Kelly

Ireland. A British declaration, he had subtly suggested, could come thereafter. Addressing a heated meeting of the Fianna Fáil parliamentary party on 28 September, at which several ministers, TDs and senators spoke, but not Haughey, Lynch once again ‘reiterated party policy on Northern Ireland emphasising the consistency of Fianna Fáil policy both at present and during the time of his two predecessors in office’. ‘At all times,’ a clearly irritated Lynch pointed out, ‘this policy had been endorsed by successive parliamentary party meetings and Ard Fheiseanna.’23

      Speaking in the Dáil on 17 October, Lynch reiterated his belief that ‘The immediate priority is … to establish in Northern Ireland a system of devolved administration which the majority of people in both sections of the community can support and sustain …’.24 Pressed by Opposition deputies whether his calls for the establishment of a power-sharing administration in Northern Ireland ‘without any insistence on an all-Ireland dimension’ were at odds with the 1975 Fianna Fáil policy paper on Northern Ireland, Lynch was resolute. ‘I reject entirely that suggestion,’ he said.25

      Despite what he might say in public, Lynch’s comments were an attempt to distance Fianna Fáil from its 1975 proposal for a British ‘withdrawal’ from Northern Ireland. The crucial difference between the traditional Fianna Fáil call for a declaration of intent to withdraw and that of Lynch’s policy of calling for a declaration of interest in Irish unity was not widely picked up on by Fianna Fáil backbenchers and many within the media. However, what was apparent was that Lynch was losing touch with grass-roots supporters in relation to Northern Ireland. British ambassador to Ireland, Robin Haydon, privately referred to as ‘Sir Spy’ by Pádraig Ó hAnnracháin,26 accurately assessed the mood, reporting back to London that grumblings within Fianna Fáil over Lynch’s stance on Northern Ireland were widely growing. According to Haydon, Lynch’s approach to Northern Ireland ‘no longer reflected the grass-roots, republican, nationalist feelings of his party and laid insufficient stress on the aim of “reunification”’.27