to be co-signed by the Minister for Finance and the Governor of the Central Bank, and a Memorandum of Understanding with all three institutions (IMF, EU and ECB), detailing the conditions for the loan finance being provided. The latter would indicate how much the State could spend on different programmes, what savings had to be made, what new taxes were to be raised, and what structural reforms were to be implemented. The programme would be supervised by Troika officials in Dublin, and the senior executives would visit every quarter for a review. Meanwhile, there would be a requirement for Ireland to report (sometimes weekly) on the measures being taken.
There, in the Labour parliamentary meeting room, between a mural based on the French Revolution and the 1916 Rising on one wall, and portraits of Labour Leaders back to James Connolly and Jim Larkin on the other wall, we were being shown how Ireland was in the process of losing its economic sovereignty. Being told so by the representatives of the economic institutions who were, in effect, taking charge of our affairs. As Ruairí Quinn put it, ‘the country is now in receivership’.
The documents now being agreed by the Fianna Fáil/Green Government would constrain the State, and of course the next Government, until the end of 2013. With Ireland no longer able to pay its way, and turning to the ‘lenders of last resort’, the conditions were bound to be onerous. To my mind, the worst was the interest rate. The institutions would borrow on the open markets for 22 per cent less than the rate at which they were lending it to us. I felt strongly that this mark-up or profit amounted to exploitation, and even a humiliation. I was determined to play my part in having these terms re-negotiated.
We used the two meetings to sound out where there might be flexibility, and we detected marginal differences in the attitudes between the Troika representatives. The IMF seemed the most reasonable. The European Commission, representing the Union, seemed to view us as errants in need of correcting. (Over time, the relationship with the Commission did improve.) The ECB was a bank, and behaved like a bank: Ireland was in debt; they were giving us credit based on terms; and we would have to stick to those terms.
One issue on which the Troika was insistent at these meetings (presumably because they were talking to the Labour Party) was privatisation. ‘We are keen to move on this,’ they told us. And when we pushed back, they countered by stating that Europe was putting up the money to keep us going. ‘Ireland is one of the richest countries in the EU. How much are you putting up yourselves?’ Such thinking was unacceptable to us. It was clear that our priority in government would be to re-negotiate the deal and to maximise flexibility.
As Christmas 2010 approached, there was a sombre and worried mood throughout the country. Uncertainty prevailed. What would the future hold? For jobs? For businesses? For families?
In the run up to Christmas every year, the Labour Party Leader hosts a drinks reception for staff, press and active members of the Party. It is normally held in the members’ restaurant in Leinster House a couple of days before the Christmas recess. This year there was no mood for celebration, and the public would hardly tolerate the idea of politicians celebrating while the people were suffering and the country was losing its economic freedom. We cancelled the Christmas party.
CHAPTER 3
ELECTION CAMPAIGN
On Monday mornings, I held my constituency clinic at Park House, a small community centre on Library Road in the centre of Dun Laoghaire. Since becoming Party Leader, my conversations there with constituents about their housing, social welfare or other concerns were sometimes interrupted by phone calls from our press office or head office. On Monday 22 November, 2010 one such call came in from Tony Heffernan to tell me that the Leader of the Green Party, John Gormley, had just said that a general election should be held early in the New Year. Apparently, the Green Party intended to stay in government until then to see through the December budget and the Finance and Social Welfare Bills that would follow, but after that, they were out.
In effect, this was the start of the general election campaign. Gormley’s declaration, coinciding with the arrival of the Troika, meant that the countdown to political change had started. There was no date set, but there was now no doubt there would be a general election sometime early in 2011. This was the moment I had been preparing for since I had become Leader of the Labour Party a little more than three years previously. Back then, my ambition to take Labour up to near thirty seats at the next election was considered to be overly ambitious, but not anymore. Opinion polls were now predicting that Labour would get twice, maybe even three times the level of support we got in the previous three general elections.
For most of its 100 year history, Labour had been a 10 per cent party. It got 10 per cent of the vote in the 1997 General Election under Dick Spring, the same in 2002 under Ruairí Quinn, and again in 2007 under Pat Rabbitte. Slightly better results were achieved in the Local and European Elections in 2004 (14.2 per cent) and 2009 (14.2 per cent). It was no wonder Ireland was often described as having a two-and-a-half party system, with the Fianna Fáil-Fine Gael civil war divide being defining. Since the 1920s, Labour was considered to be the ‘half party’ As Leader I was determined to lift Labour’s sights and to make Irish politics a three way contest. As Dick Spring had shown in 1992, when he spoke about the idea of a ‘rotating Taoiseach’, many people wanted a credible government alternative to Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael. And it wasn’t going to be easy, however, or happen overnight. Politics is a sluggish beast; it can take many laps before any significant change in positioning is noticed.
During my first two years as Leader, there was little sign of a lift. The Red C series of opinion polls had us consistently around 10 per cent. In fact, their poll in September 2008, just a year after I became Leader, put us on just 9 per cent. IPSOS/MRBI had us on 11-13 per cent until February 2009, when we shot up to 22 per cent and Fianna Fáil fell back to 26 per cent. In June 2010 it jumped again to 29 per cent, and to 33 per cent in their September 2010 poll.
I was canvassing in the Markets area of Belfast with my good friend Alasdair McDonnell of the SDLP in the Westminster Election in April 2010, when news came through that Labour had reached 24 per cent in the Red C poll. The news cheered everybody, including Alasdair, who was fighting a difficult battle for re-election in Belfast South. A Millward/Brown poll for TV3 News on 23 September 2010 put Labour on 35 per cent, Fine Gael on 30 per cent and Fianna Fail on 22 per cent. It concluded:
A Labour Taoiseach is now a possibility. Our national poll reveals an electorate looking to break the two and a half party system. Who leads the next government looks to be the biggest question now facing the Irish people. With 35 per cent of first preference votes, the Labour Party have emerged as the strongest party in what is an extremely competitive scenario. It can now credibly assert its potential to lead the next government. Eamon Gilmore is also the most popular party leader for Taoiseach, underlining Labour’s surge. 35 per cent opt for him, compared to 19 per cent for Enda Kenny and just 11 per cent for Brian Cowen.
Other polls were confirming this pattern. On June 27 2010, the Red C poll gave the choices for Taoiseach as Gilmore (40%); Kenny (28%) and Cowen (18%). In their poll on September 29 2010, IPSOS/MRBI asked the question: ‘If the next General Election were to result in a Fine Gael and Labour coalition, who would you prefer to see as Taoiseach?’ 48% replied Gilmore and 26% said Kenny. The lead was consistent over all regional, age, gender and social categories, including among farmers where the result was Gilmore 42% and Kenny 33%. The only exception was Connaught/Ulster where it broke even at 37% each.
‘Gilmore for Taoiseach’ was no longer an aspirational slogan on a Labour Youth poster. The idea was now being taken seriously right across the country.
For a political leader, opinion polls are a form of political continuous assessment. There is a poll almost every week. Whether you are up or down in them, for at least two days afterwards you are answering media questions about your performance. And then things move on. They can be misleading, though. Labour’s local and European Election results in 2009, although they were our best ever, still fell short of the poll ratings both before and after the election. Short of my ambitions, as well. I wasn’t about to get complacent over the general election because of surveys.
To convert opinion poll ratings into election results, a party needs good electable candidates; good organisation in the constituency; money