that of the Emmets and the Tones… But let us be practical men, and take and hold every inch that we advance toward the citadel. My policy is: take what you can get, and then we will use it to get more….70
He had gone to America reluctantly, partly because of the arduous work involved and partly because he felt that ‘Irish politics for the moment have got into a position of delicacy and some danger’.71 The revival of O’Brien’s campaign was no doubt in his mind, but further delicacy was added when, on 31 August, a manifesto was published by the group of progressive landlords who had been active in the Land Conference. Led by Lord Dunraven, and with Col. Hutcheson-Poë as its secretary, the group styled itself the Irish Reform Association. Its manifesto declared that:
… while firmly maintaining that the parliamentary union between Great Britain and Ireland is essential to the political stability of the Empire and to the prosperity of the two islands, we believe that such union is compatible with the devolution to Ireland of a larger measure of local government than she now possesses.72
In New York, Redmond had had harsh words for his old colleague on the Recess Committee, Sir Horace Plunkett, whose views were close to the devolutionist unionism of the Dunraven group. Plunkett’s book, Ireland in the New Century, published in March, had been the target of fierce criticism in the nationalist press for its assertion that ‘defects of character’ and excessive deference to the Catholic clergy were underlying causes of Irish backwardness in agriculture and industry. Until Home Rule existed, said Redmond, Plunkett’s proposals for industrial revival were ‘simply quackery’ and were, in fact, ‘being worked against us very cleverly… This is nothing more or less than an insidious effort to undermine the Home Rule movement….’ When asked in the US for his views of the Reform Association manifesto, however, his reflex conciliationism was instantly in play:
The announcement is of the utmost importance. It is simply a declaration for Home Rule and is quite a wonderful thing. With these men with us, Home Rule may come at any moment.73
By the time he spoke in Montreal a month later, the Reform Association had produced a detailed statement of their devolution scheme, and his response was more measured:
And the first plank in the platform of this association is the concession of a large measure of self-government for Ireland. I am free to confess that their ideas of a large measure of self-government are very meagre and unsatisfactory. But… that marks an enormous advance for our cause.
The devolution plan embraced four main proposals. A financial council would be established to take over control of purely Irish expenditure, though not of revenue-raising. The council would consist of twelve elected and twelve nominated members, presided over by the Lord Lieutenant; its function would be to submit the annual Irish estimates to Parliament, and its decisions would be reversible by the House of Commons by a three-quarters majority. Various ways to give the council the necessary revenue were proposed. Lastly, a second council comprising all Irish MPs, representative peers and members of the financial council was to be set up with the power to promote bills for purely Irish purposes.74 The Freeman responded sceptically, claiming that the prices asked by the Reform Association leaders for their lands threw doubt on the genuineness of their professions. Davitt called the plan a ‘wooden-horse stratagem’ to divide Nationalist ranks, and declared that ‘no party or leader can consent to accept the Dunraven substitute without betraying a national trust’. Dillon similarly dismissed it at Sligo on 2 October.75
IV
The Reform Association suggestions were the outcome of discussions between Lord Dunraven and Under-Secretary Sir Antony MacDonnell, in which Wyndham had also at times been involved, on ways to improve the management of Irish affairs and relieve the logjam in parliamentary business. On 10 September, Sir Antony had written to Wyndham, who was on holiday recovering from exhaustion, informing him of this co-operation. Receiving no reply, he assumed Wyndham’s approval. Two weeks later, he helped Dunraven to draft the detailed second statement, issued on 26 September. It emerged afterwards, however, that although Wyndham had received the first letter, he had failed to grasp its significance, and had not only mislaid it but had forgotten ever having received it. Immediately on publication of the second statement, Wyndham, just returned from holiday, wrote to the London Times unreservedly repudiating the scheme as contrary to Unionist principles. The paper published this letter with an editorial denouncing the scheme as the outcome of machinations of ‘an influential clique in Dublin Castle of which Sir Antony MacDonnell is regarded by numbers of Irish Unionists as the head’. Aware for the first time of his superior’s disapproval, MacDonnell wrote to Dunraven telling him that he could no longer work with the Reform Association. Simultaneously, a storm of protest erupted from the Irish Unionists, all too ready to detect a plot to introduce Home Rule by stealth.76
Wyndham declared at Dover in November, in reference to the Dunraven plan, ‘I have blown out that candle, so that no encouraging ray from it would ever be shed upon the prospects of Home Rule.’ The facts of MacDonnell’s involvement in the scheme did not become publicly known until the following February, but unionists, especially the Ulster members, were already suspicious, and began in October to demand his removal from office. Two Ulster MPs, William Moore and Charles Craig, set about galvanizing opinion in the province for political action. For the first time, a separate Ulster strand was seeking representation within the broader Unionist coalition, a process that would result in the formation of the Ulster Unionist Council in March 1905. The first item on the agenda of the new movement was to get to the root of the suspected links between the devolution plan and the Irish administration.77
In December 1904, the Cabinet passed a ‘measured censure’ on Sir Antony MacDonnell, expressing disapproval of his involvement in the devolution scheme while stopping short of accusing him of disloyalty. In February, MacDonnell and Wyndham privately discussed how the episode should be defended in Parliament. MacDonnell insisted that he should not have to resign, saying that he had concealed nothing and, under the terms of his appointment, had felt justified in helping Lord Dunraven. Wyndham conceded these points.78 At the debate on the Address at the opening of the 1905 session in February, Charles Craig put a list of searching questions to the Chief Secretary covering all aspects of his and MacDonnell’s involvement in the devolution plan. Wyndham replied that MacDonnell had acted erroneously but honestly, that he himself had first learned of the proposals in The Times on 26 September and, knowing nothing of MacDonnell’s involvement, had written immediately to condemn them. In the House of Lords on 17 February, Lord Dunraven gave an account of his role in the affair, stressing that the ideas had been long in gestation and that MacDonnell’s aid had come only in September, after the first manifesto. However, Lord Lansdowne disclosed that the terms of MacDonnell’s appointment in October 1902 were understood to mean that he would have ‘greater opportunities for initiative than he would have expected had he been a candidate in the ordinary course’. This revelation increased Ulster Unionist anger, seeming to them to widen the scope of the plot and to cast suspicion on Wyndham.79
Redmond moved his amendment to the Address on 20 February stating, as in the previous year, that ‘the present system of government in Ireland is in opposition to the will of the Irish people’.80 The Ulster Unionist members, from their opposite standpoint, spoke in support of the amendment. Wyndham repeated his defence of his actions, but could only account for the clash between his own and MacDonnell’s versions of events by explaining