commitment by the State and the success or otherwise of which would only be determined many years in the future. detailed provisions of the Bill which were to be subject to further.
NAMA was, of course, only one of the many challenges Brian faced in 2009. In legislative terms, Brian also introduced legislation to provide for a substantial reduction in the remuneration of public servants. This meant that all persons employed or holding office in public service bodies, which embraced in effect the wider public service and, therefore, a very significant part of the electorate, were to be subjected for the first time to reduction9 in remuneration from 3 per cent to 10 per cent, depending on their salary. Ensuring the passage of such a measure through the Houses of the Oireachtas was a major achievement. In 2009, Brian was also responsible for the introduction and passage of a number of other very important legislative measures affecting financial matters, including the Finance Act, the Financial Services (Deposit Guarantee Scheme) Act, and the Financial Emergency Measures in the Public Interest Act, (No. 2) Act, 2009.
Brian’s work rate in 2009 was astonishing. He was indefatigable and continued to engage fully in all aspects of political life. He was always optimistic that the measures taken would improve Ireland’s financial situation. Nothing could have prepared him, or the rest of us, for the tragic news that Brian was to receive a few days before Christmas 2009 and nothing could have prepared him for what was to be the greatest challenge of his life. Brian had no inkling in December 2009 that he had any serious illness. The diagnosis of his illness came as a complete shock. Brian’s reaction to his illness was as awesome as it was inspiring. I remember talking to Brian about his diagnosis shortly after it was made. He was his usual courteous self and appreciative of the inquiry and concern. He was able to talk about his illness and what it meant in a detached but very focused and realistic way. He made no complaint about his diagnosis. Above all, there was no element of self-pity.
The diagnosis was very serious and the prognosis for recovery was very poor, as he well knew. His decision to continue in office and to carry out his public duties was a reflection of his sense of public duty and of his great personal courage. He spoke of his decision as if it were the only obvious decision to make and certainly expected no thanks or commendation for it. It was, in fact, a momentous and courageous decision. He could so easily have given up the struggle against the unremitting tide of financial and economic problems battering the State and nobody would have blamed him for doing so. To gain any appreciation of the courage involved in the decision, one has to understand the scale of the challenges he continued to face and the enormity of the burden, which he continued to carry and that he knew was unlikely to diminish.
Throughout 2010 I would have seen Brian at cabinet and would have met him or spoken to him every few days. His performance levels were remarkable. He had no difficulty meeting the tremendously tight timelines in which decisions had to be made and issues confronted and had no difficulty in confronting the issues. He did not waste time lamenting his condition nor did he seek sympathy. I remember mentally remarking on many occasions that, if I did not know he was ill, I would not have even suspected it. He behaved precisely as he did before and even when he appeared at cabinet after treatment he conducted his usual workload. I did not notice any diminution in his capacity or determination. His only apparent concession to his illness was to bring a couch into his office to enable him to take a rest during the course of the day, when he needed to do so, and to develop a passion for green tea, but apart from these nods to his illness and a reduction in the large number of public and political commitments which he undertook, he continued to perform at a level which made it very difficult to believe that there was anything really wrong with him. Every now and again there would, however, be some little reminder of what he was confronting. I remember one day sympathising with him over some problem he had to deal with. He looked at me, smiled and shrugged and said that every day you are alive is a great day. I will never forget the remark. It was, as usual, made without self-pity or sorrow. It was a remark as simple as it was inspiring.
Many remember the dispiriting days of November 2010, but few remember the important external events which transformed the cautious optimism of early 2010 into the deep pessimism of November. As Donovan and Murphy point out,10 in a narrow and financial sense 2010 began relatively well for Ireland. Although the economy was still in deep recession, the NTMA continued to borrow at rates which, although slightly higher than normal, were well within an acceptable range. In the spring of 2010, it became clear that Greece was in real trouble and it applied, in April 2010, for a bailout. The emergency support for Greece did not calm the markets. In May 2010, shortly after the launch of the Greek Programme, EU member states decided on the creation of a €750 billion support fund for states cut off from market funding.11
As the true scale of the Greek problem became apparent and as it emerged that Greece had entered the EMU on the basis of fraudulent government statistics and had continued to report false numbers, the markets reacted angrily and Irish Government bond yields rose steadily from May 2010. In August 2010, Standard & Poors issued a very unfavourable rating assessment of Ireland. Market sentiment was worsened by the Deauville Declaration which followed a bilateral summit between Chancellor Merkel and President Sarkozy. The Declaration issued on 18 October 2010 suggesting that lenders in the sovereign debt market might face losses in future bailouts, had the effect of causing immense increases in Irish bond yields. These external developments created enormous problems for Ireland. In addition, the ECB was greatly concerned with its financial exposure to Ireland and the statement by ECB President Trichet in September 2010 expressed concern about the amount of Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) outstanding to Anglo Irish Bank.
The Cabinet decided on Sunday 21 November 2010 to apply for financial assistance from the EU. Brian had to fly out to Brussels that Sunday morning to finalise the agreement and the bailout terms. He rang me from Baldonnell airport. Weather conditions were appalling. He had been up late the night before and had attended the Cabinet meeting at which the decision to apply for a bailout was made. As always, he was very focused. He was aware of the immensity of what he was doing and its consequences for Ireland. He gave no consideration to himself or what it might mean for him. His only concern was to achieve the best possible outcome for his country. Again, there was no sense of self-pity or regret that he had to discharge this unenviable task. It was an extremely poignant and historical moment. He was doing something which no other Finance Minister ever had to do. He knew too that he would forever be associated with this event and that all of his decisions since becoming Minister for Finance would be closely questioned and evaluated. He realised this evaluation would be conducted, in many cases, by those who were only too willing to criticise with the benefit of hindsight and with the luxury of never having had to make such difficult decisions and, particularly, decisions in such extraordinary and unforgiving circumstances. He also knew, only too well, that the bailout would have huge political consequences for him and his party. Again, however, there was no trace of self-pity or despondency and, above all, no regret that he had continued to fight the battle after the diagnosis of his illness.
Following the bailout, there was still much for Brian and the Government to do. A budget had to be introduced based on the economic programme prepared by the Government prior to the bailout and which was, in substance, adopted by the Troika, as the basis for the financial conditionality reflected in the Memorandum of Understanding to which Ireland was obliged to subscribe in order to obtain the benefit of the bailout. This budget inevitably carried very serious political consequences, as he and the Government acknowledged publicly at the time.
In December, Brian also introduced the Credit Institutions Stabilisation Bill, an extremely important and complex piece of legislation designed to provide a resolution framework for failing banks, while avoiding the ever-present risk of triggering a bond default consequent on such resolution, which would have had disastrous consequences for the banks and the economy generally. This was in large part unchartered territory. Brian steered this Bill through the Dáil and Seanad under an immensely tight time schedule. Its passage was essential to facilitate urgent State investment in the banks, including a vitally important investment in Allied Irish Banks the following day, and its passage was a condition of Troika support. The legislation was extremely controversial, but it provided a resolution framework for dealing with the troubled banks and for reducing the entitlements of subordinate bondholders.
The events of November