Beresford had ordered Silveira with a body of troops to Montalegre to try to deny Soult’s force that road into Spain, but Silveira had reached the town only as the French departed. Ironically it was Silveira, who was jealous of Beresford’s command, that later sought to blame Beresford for the escape of part of the French army.140 Wellesley was not critical of Beresford, indeed he had had to stop to rest his own troops and obtain supplies after the capture of Porto, but Beresford seems to have been sensitive to the criticism, for writing to his half-sister Anne on 26 May he referred to the escape of some of the French ‘for which I need not be much criticised, as it is really wonderful how they escaped, tho in so miserable a condition having abandoned everything and trusting simply to their getting off by their lightness’.141 If anything, Beresford perhaps drove his men too hard, as is witnessed by the large number of losses suffered through exhaustion on the march from Amarante to Chaves adverted by then Major (later Field Marshal) Hugh Gough.142 Wellesley realised the reality of the situation echoing Beresford’s remarks to Anne, when he wrote to Castlereagh:
It is obvious, however, that if an army throws away all its cannon, equipments and baggage, and everything which can strengthen it, and can enable it to act together as a body; and abandons all those who are entitled to its protection, but add to its weight and impede its progress; it must be able to march by roads through which it cannot be followed, with any prospect of being overtaken, by an army which has not made the same sacrifices.143
The campaign had been a huge success. Wellesley had achieved his objective, even if the elusive Soult had escaped with part of his corps. Within two weeks of leaving Coimbra the Anglo-Portuguese army had driven a French army out of Portugal in a precipitous flight causing it to abandon artillery, carriages, horses and large numbers of men, not to mention seized property. A number of regiments of the Portuguese army had performed well in the first campaign of 1809. Further, while Wellesley and Beresford had been chasing Soult out of northern Portugal, the Loyal Lusitanian Legion and the militia of Idanha-a-Nova had proved brave and tenacious when holding off Marshal Victor’s much larger French corps at Alcantara for nine hours, before retiring in good order on 14 May. Beresford, in his order of the day, praised the conduct of Colonel Mayne and the Legion observing that: ‘The army will see, that although troops are sometimes obliged to retreat, at the same time they may cover themselves with glory, and merit the greatest praise.’144
Soult’s force was degraded and no longer an immediate threat. Wellesley and Beresford were now able to turn their attentions elsewhere. Wellesley needed to meet the threat posed by Victor and King Joseph, whereas Beresford badly needed time to train an army that had begun to show its metal, so much so that when Mackenzie had expressed the view the Portuguese would not fight Wellesley retorted: ‘You are in error in supposing the Portuguese troops will not fight. One battalion has behaved remarkably well with me, and I know of no troops that could behave better than the Lusitanian legion.’145
7 CONTINUING REFORM OF THE PORTUGUESE ARMY: THE SUMMER CAMPAIGN OF 1809 AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE DEFENCE OF PORTUGAL
When I arrived here the army was in a terrible state…One found it without discipline and without subordination. The soldiers were lacking in confidence in their officers who were negligent in their duties and had an attitude and behaviour which encouraged insubordination among the soldiers. There was completely lacking in the officers any strength or application of military laws, and the army I saw was an ungovernable machine.1
Following the successful campaign on the Douro, Beresford continued the serious business of reforming and rebuilding the Portuguese army. In this he was helped by both Forjaz and Wellesley in enforcing structural and command change; and over the years by several hundred British officers in drilling and training the infantry, cavalry and artillery. Portuguese officers, trained in accordance with the British regulations, increasingly played a part in training their own men.
Castlereagh’s letter to Beresford of 15 February confirming his appointment to command and organise the Portuguese army had merely specified ‘a due proportion of British Officers will be appointed to assist you, and a supply of arms to the extent of 10,000 stand has been for some time embarked …’2 The number of officers allocated at the outset was twenty-four, but Beresford soon realised this number would not be nearly enough. The original twenty-four officers came both from Britain and from the British army in Portugal.3 Those already with the British army in Portugal who chose to join Beresford included Lieutenant Colonels Blunt and Campbell.4 Many of those who applied from the British army in Portugal were relatively junior and Beresford needed more senior officers, not just for training and disciplinary purposes but to lead the regiments and brigades in battle.5 The strongest attraction for those in the British army to join the Portuguese army may well have been double or later single step promotion, but an additional incentive was that serving officers in the British army also received pay both for their rank at home and in respect of their Portuguese appointment. Many of them elected to have their British salary paid at home while living in Portugal on their Portuguese salary.6
By early April 1809, if not earlier, Beresford had realised he would need many more than twenty-four British officers if he was to train the Portuguese army to a sufficient level of competence. His request for a total of 150 such officers caused some concern at government level, even though it had been suggested originally by Castlereagh.7 On Wellesley’s advice, Beresford was offered a further twelve to fourteen officers, though Wellesley was quick to realise once he arrived in Portugal that this number would be insufficient.8 Furthermore, those now accepted to join the Portuguese army were only given a step up in rank in that army, a far less attractive proposition than hitherto. As late as 23 April Beresford was telling his sister, Lady Anne Beresford, that ‘officers in abundance are volunteering to serve under me in the Portuguese service, nay even from the Guards, two colonels of which have offered their services’.9 However, he realised that notwithstanding the British commitment to Portugal and to rebuilding the Portuguese army, it was not going to be easy to obtain a sufficient number of officers with the requisite experience to train the Portuguese army, irrespective of whether they were to come from the British Isles or from the British forces in Portugal, for he went on:
As usual however at home after agreeing to everything before I left them, and directing Cradock to give me in officers every assistance he could, they now throw some doubt on the propriety of my having officers from regiments on service, and propose to send them to me from England, alas they propose making it a business of patronage and they have thereby put a very great delay in my advancing the discipline of the Portuguese troops.
He had received notice of this objection from Brigadier General Stewart some days previously and had immediately remonstrated to Castlereagh.10 Apart from the question of delay, it is clear from his letter to his sister that Beresford was concerned that appointments would not be made on merit, a principle of which he was a steady advocate.
Towards the end of 1809, Beresford was to revise the figure of British officers he required slightly, seeking a total of 179 officers, being five for each infantry regiment, three for each regiment of caçadores and three for each of the twelve regiments of cavalry.11 Now, however, he had a far more pressing problem, for although the government had approved the appointment of thirty more British officers to the Portuguese army in May, it was on the basis of only one step up in the Portuguese service, but even that move was threatened by a suggestion by Wellesley that all promotion should be done away with as it was liable to cause command difficulties when the armies were operating together.12 Beresford was seriously concerned that this suggestion would mean that not only would he not be able to persuade a sufficient number of British army officers to join the Portuguese service but that those, other than the original twenty-four appointees who had joined in expectation of promotion in the British army, would now resign.
Beresford raised this concern with Wellesley in mid May and his apprehension was soon proved to have a valid foundation. While the British government refused to modify its new stance on the matter, a compromise of sorts was eventually achieved, though not before the number of resignations had threatened to destroy the work Beresford and his fellow officers were seeking to undertake. The compromise involved an assurance that the quality of service in the Portuguese army would