Johannes Siemes

Hermann Roesler and the Making of the Meiji State


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drafts of the government's opposition, too, contain the first article of the constitution. The kokutai ideology was the common article of faith of all the leaders of the new epoch. The only one who was against the mystical first article was the foreigner H. Roesler. For him it was a contradiction to build a modern constitutional state on a mystic foundation. The constitutional thought was to him an expression of the modern 'spirit of social freedom,' and that seemed to him a more reliable foundation for a modern political order than an irrational myth.

      Soon after the promulgation of the constitution, the Imperial Rescript on Education, drafted mainly by Inoue Kowashi, was issued. It makes the kokutai ideology the norm of education. In this edict, the traditional Confucian family ethics is put wholly into the service of the state and the Emperor. The imperial throne appears as the ground and center of all social relations. From this time, the kokutai ideology was, with an ever-increasing power that reached its peak in the years before the war, indoctrinated into the people and made, in the form of State Shinto, into a universally binding state religion.

      There cannot be any doubt: in the kokutai ideology the individual is totally subordinated to the state and its mission. The myth of the eternal Japan was the typical myth of the totalitarian state: the single person has no value in itself, only the greatness of the people has ultimate meaning.

      In the atmosphere of this totalitarian ideology respect for the dignity of the person and the ethos of personal freedom, decision and responsibility could not develop. What the constitution in this respect demanded for its fruitful implementation, was not understood. The myth of the divinely founded and ruled family state substituted a false image for the existing social reality. Japan was not any longer an archaic patriarchical society, but a modern industrial society, burdened by all the tensions and needs of such a society. The social problems of this society demanded a new social spirit, a new social ethic: to feel oneself, out of respect for the dignity of every man, responsible for shaping the public life in such a way that everybody in today's mass society may keep intact his humanity. For these social tasks the official state myth could not generate any moral energy. The official ethic was centered on devotion to the family and to the imperial house. Social responsibility remained limited to one's own family and the Emperor and his Empire. The sphere of social life which is neither the family nor the state, that sphere where the economic and cultural life of modern society moves, where, beyond family and state, by free cooperation the free cultural life of a free society has to be built, remained void of moral impulses.

      Corresponding to the idea of the family state, there prevailed a governmental patriarchalism in which the 'initiative from below', the participation of the people in politics, was not desired, and the concern for the common good was the domain of the bureaucracy. Furthermore, at the apex of this family state there was no responsible head. The myth which made the Emperor a quasi-divine being prevented his carrying out the supreme political decision-making which the constitution clearly assigned to him. If the Emperor was to retain the halo of superhuman wisdom and sanctity, he could not be allowed to be dragged down into politics, into the arena of party strife and fallible decision. Therefore, the Japanese avoided asking political decisions from him and kept him away from governmental affairs. In this vacuum of decision-making in the constitutional system stepped anonymous rulers, those who in reality dominated the throne and made the will of the Emperor by deciding for him the selection of ministers and the policy of the Cabinet. Under Emperor Meiji it was the Genrō of the Restoration, in the final phase it was the military clique. Those real decision-makers behind the throne were men and power groups which stood outside the constitution and were, in the last resort, responsible to nobody. So the way was open to an abuse of the imperial power, and this abuse of the imperial power by uncontrolled power cliques perverted the whole structure of the Meiji Constitution.

      The worst effect of the kokutai ideology was the extreme nationalism of the whole people. This ideology swelled the national self-conscience into belief in the divine mission of the Emperor and his people to govern the world. This religious nationalism became the life impulse of the new Japan and made the growth of a Christian humanistic idea of the state and of personal freedom impossible. A people indoctrinated in this ideology was bound to adhere with blind enthusiasm to whatever policy it seemed would enhance the national honour and greatness and could not bring forth any internal resistance against an even inhuman dictatorship which claimed to execute the national mission. This supernationalism of the kokutai ideology has been the ultimate and decisive cause preventing the actuation of the Meiji Constitution in the direction of the ever greater social freedom which Roesler had envisaged as the goal of the constitution. It finally rendered the constitution entirely meaningless and brought about the collapse of the state of the Meiji Constitution.

      PART TWO

      THE TEXT

      OF THE

      MEIJI CONSTITUTION

      ACCOMPANIED

      BY HERMANN ROESLER'S

      COMMENTARIES

      Roesler's Introductory Remarks*

      In commenting on the draft of the Constitution of the Empire of Japan it may first be convenient to briefly inquire into the nature and object of a constitution. In a more general sense a constitution is a fundamental law by which a certain system of government is established. In that sense every people formed into a state must have a constitution, written or not written, because there can be no state without a chief who exercises, or commands to be exercised, the governmental powers according to certain principles of law, without a certain formation of public authorities, and without a certain legal condition of the people and certain legal relations between the chief of the state and his subjects. In that sense Japan was from immemorial times possessed of a constitution because it was governed by a hereditary Imperial dynasty; a jurisdictional and administrative system was organized throughout the country and the people were formed into a system of feudal orders which has lately been transformed into a system of social classes.

      But in a more special and modern sense, a constitution is a fundamental law by which the subjects are admitted to the enjoyment of certain rights in respect of the government. A constitutional government is formed when the exercise of the governmental powers is to a certain extent controlled by, or brought under the influence of the people. It is opposed to an absolute government in which the people have no political rights, that is to say, no legal powers of controlling and influencing the acts of the government. As regularly the people at large cannot well be admitted to an interference into the exercise of governmental powers, a national representation is to be formed which is entrusted with the exercise of the political rights of the people inasmuch as an immediate concurrence with the government is concerned. Consequently the formation of a national representation for controlling and examining the acts of government is essential to a constitutional government, and in order to secure a lawful and beneficial concurrence of the sovereign power and of the national representation, a careful and exact determination of the rights and duties of both of them is required. Thus, in a constitutional government the working conditions and objects of the exercise of sovereign rights is in a certain degree not left to the free judgment of the chief of state but determined by law, and insofar the sovereign power is limited. A constitutional government may be, what is commonly, and especially in Germany, called either simply representative or parliamentary. A parliamentary government is that in which the balance of political power rests with the national representation, while in a representative government that balance rests with the chief of state, and consequently in a monarchy with the monarch. For Japan, by the present constitution, a representative, not parliamentary, system of government has been established; consequently the sovereign decision will, where no express provision is made to the contrary, be reserved to the Emperor. Thus the time-honored elements of the original Japanese constitution have been maintained, and the sacred Imperial Power, as it has been transmitted from ages immemorial by the glorious Imperial ancestors, has not radically been changed but only developed into a more convenient condition according to the requirements of the time. Also it appears wiser to let the constitutional system gradually develop, and not to overstep hastily, in pursuance of lofty theories, the necessary stages of progress; the much more so, as the parliamentary system, even