Richard Mulcahy. Pádraig Ó Caoimh

and in terms of disempowering the army-based IRB. Consider the following civil–military decisions:‘(b) The supreme body directing the Army is the Cabinet; (c) The immediate executive representative of the Govt. is the Min. for Def. who is therefore Administrative Head of the Army. The MD is [should be?] a civilian; (d) The Administrative Head of the Army is responsible to the Govt. for the well-being & efficiency of the Army.’47 And also consider the following army organisational decisions: ‘(f) All appointments in the Army must be sanctioned by the Min. for Defence; (g) The Min. for Defence has the right to nominate, or veto the nomination of any member of the Army, but he must produce a working Army.’48 Moreover, on the same subject, the minutes record that every member of GHQ accepted their commissions, Mulcahy even taking an oath of acceptance of his duties under the terms of the new dispensation.

      Nonetheless, there are clues in the minutes which indicate that all was not well. In the first instance, de Valera knew that he had to sweeten the pill of change if he was to succeed: ‘The Army to be referred as the ‘‘Recommissioned Army’’ instead of the ‘‘New Army’’ henceforth.’49 Also, the act of defining the duties of the CS position was not an open-and-shut case: ‘The President to draw up a memo defining the executive powers of the Chief of Staff.’50 Then there was the difficulty that, even though Mulcahy would have three adjutants, namely O’Connell, as ACS; Stack, as DCS; and O’Duffy, as DCS, O’Duffy was in the most powerful position because: ‘Comt. E. O’Duffy to act as full representative of the Chief of Staff during the latter’s absence.’51 But the real clue that de Valera was not in a strong position is the existence of a Cabinet minute which said that everyone in GHQ had agreed to accept their commissions. The reality, of course, was that GHQ, as immediate events were to show, most certainly did not agree to accept.