In Leave organizations, such people come in the form of the church member with heretical beliefs, the accidental Democrat, or the Communist Party member who proves to be secretly reactionary. In the case of states, the potential expellee is typically the illegal immigrant or, in some states, the resident alien who breaks the law.
Acquisitions of Membership
The verbs we ordinarily use for acquisitions of memberships are somewhat less rich and varied than those English provides for voluntary terminations of membership. If we look at which verbs sound right for acquisition of membership in different kinds of groups, however, the underlying pattern maps surprisingly neatly onto the fivefold schema revealed by our examination of how we talk about ending memberships. The most general and common verb for acquiring memberships is, simply, “to join.” It can normally be used without any apparent awkwardness for voluntary acquisitions of membership in the first three types of membership groups we have identified: Cancel, Quit, and Leave groups. One thus joins Cancel groups like the AAA or the racquetball club just as one joins Quit groups like the softball team or Leave groups like the Communist Party or the clergy.
The next most common verbs for acquiring memberships—“to sign up” or “to enroll”—are almost as general. The two verbs are close synonyms, and they apply to memberships in both Cancel and Quit groups. One can sign up for an amateur soccer team or the outdoor club just as one can sign up or enroll in the AAA. Interestingly, however, in contrast to the verb “to join,” these verbs are not at home when it comes to referring to memberships in Leave groups. One does normally “join” but does not normally simply “sign up for” the clergy or the Communist Party. The difference in application of these verbs thus marks the same distinction between these kinds of memberships as do the ways we ordinarily refer to voluntary terminations of memberships.
The pattern then also extends to Change and No Exit memberships. For Change groups, the way one enters the group is to “become” something. Interestingly, here the verb refers to a change in quality of the member, not merely acquisition of the membership as something external to the person. In the case of No Exit memberships, since the membership is fixed, one never really enters it by “becoming” something; one simply “is.”
Table 2.2 summarizes these patterns of verb usage for acquisitions and involuntary terminations of memberships and shows how they map onto ordinary patterns of usage for verbs referring to voluntary terminations. In the end, we have a whole pattern of regularities in ordinary English, all informed by the same implicit, underlying typology.
Ordering the Typology: Memberships’ Varying Distance from the Subject
As the arrangement of Table 2.2 implicitly suggests, the five understandings of membership can be ordered in the following sequence: No Exit, Change, Leave, Quit, and Cancel. There is an underlying logic to this order. As one moves from right to left, memberships become more and more distant from the subject. At one extreme, No Exit memberships, not only is the person a member of the group or category, but the category-defining feature is part of the person. In fact, it is normally understood as an “identity.” With memberships of this type, one would normally say simply: “I am an x.” At the other extreme, with Cancel-type memberships, there is only an arms-length and typically instrumental relationship between the person and the group of which he or she is a member. The membership may even be referred to as something the member “has” rather than “is.” For instance, one might say, “I am a member of AAA,” but it would be equally natural to say, “I have an AAA membership.” The same does not go for other sorts of memberships; compare “I am a member of the clergy” and “I have a clergy membership.”
Table 2.2. Correspondence Between Principal Exit Verbs, Other Exit Verbs (Voluntary and Involuntary), and Entrance Verbs
Moving from the opposite poles of our continuum toward the center, a Change membership is still apt to be understood as an “identity.” However, as it can be changed, it is also understood as less tightly bound to the subject. The subject could cease to be a member of the group, much as some might counsel against it.
Quit memberships are more distant from the subject. A membership of this type is thus not an “identity.” However, it does directly involve the person—usually the body—of the member, not merely his or her money. Some people, certainly, may come to define their identities around their activities, as in the case of the athlete who boasts, “I am a member of the football team,” or the professional who says, “I am a member of the faculty.” Even here, though, it is interesting that the phrase “a member of” is ordinarily apt to be used, whereas it is clearly awkward and misplaced in the case of No Exit memberships. Other aspects of ordinary language also suggest that such memberships are less generally understood as “identities” than are memberships in Change or No Exit groups. Political mobilizations of professors or football players are not called “identity politics,” for example. And the question, “What are you?” is, at least in large portions of the United States, customarily answered with information concerning one’s ancestry. Someone wishing to learn another’s occupation there would instead normally ask, “What do you do?” Finally, in contrast to other forms of memberships, Leave memberships reach beyond both the wallet and the body, to the “heart,” mind, or spirit of the member.
Five Models of Political Membership
Descent: Belonging by Virtue of “Blood” or Ancestry
Using the typology of forms of membership that ordinary language analysis uncovers, we can clearly discern five distinct ways of thinking about the nature of belonging in political communities as well. A first model of political membership may be called the “Descent” view. As seen in this model, political membership appears as an instance of No Exit membership. From this perspective, “citizenship” is usually equated with “nationality,”3 and both appear as innate characteristics that cannot be acquired other than by birth. It is seen as a common genetic or biological inheritance rather than a properly “ethnic” one with a significant cultural component.
This model figures in discussions of citizenship in two ways. First, it underlies representations of the nation as an extended family and members of a given political group as descendants of common (biological) ancestors. Second, such perspectives are commonly invoked in contemporary political debates, though usually attributed to others.
Actual European social and political organization has only rarely corresponded to the Descent model. While there are examples of societies organized on the basis of such an idea, they may more readily be found in ancient Rome and Greece than in modern or even medieval Europe. In classical Athens, citizenship was restricted to those both of whose parents were citizens (Walzer 1983: 53–55). The Roman gens, vast clans supposedly united by common ancestry, also corresponded to the Descent vision (Bloch 1961: 137–40).
Today, German immigration and citizenship policy might most clearly appear to reflect a Descent perspective on political membership, especially in the unusual ease of entry accorded to foreigners of German ancestry and the difficulty of acquiring German nationality for those who are not. Even in the case of policy regulating acquisition of German nationality, however, recent reforms suggest that the importance attributed to ancestry is declining relative to birthplace and long-term residency, and presumably thus socialization, in Germany (Götz 1995; Murray 1994). Nonetheless, the Descent idea does figure significantly in current political discussion of citizenship and immigration issues, often as a view that parties to contemporary debates accuse others of holding and are at pains to avoid being perceived as endorsing.
Because it attributes membership to a biological foundation, the Descent model might appear to be inherently “racial.” However, whether such a conception is racial in character actually depends on whether the fact of kinship or phenotype is stressed (Nieguth 1999: 164–66). The Descent category may therefore be disaggregated into two subtypes usefully distinguished by Nieguth: