part of the education of the budding preacher:
Whether or not it is sinful to preach with temporal reward as a secondary consideration.
Whether or not it is sinful to preach in a state of mortal sin, having full awareness of that fact.
Whether or not it is sinful to fail to practise what one preaches.17
Whether or not a fat man (pinguis) sins by preaching about hunger.
Whether or not the mercenary man sins by preaching, and if he is to be valued and tolerated.
Whether or not the preacher who knows that he will scandalize everyone by his preaching, acts badly by preaching to them.
Whether or not vainglory, which is a venial sin, deforms preaching, and makes it a venial sin.
The Pardoner’s implicit quaestio, whether or not a sinful preacher can perform a proper act of preaching, is very much at home in this company of quodlibets, its terms of reference being similar or even identical. It is this intellectual context of scholastic debate, as instigated by the Paris schools, reflected in preacher’s aids and manuals, and exacerbated by the Lollard controversies, in which many of the problems raised by the Pardoner originated and essentially belong. In order to define the common parameters more exactly we may briefly examine three discussions which have been preserved in fuller form than those recorded fragmentarily in the student’s notebook.
The Sinful Preacher: Secrecy, Scandal, and Skill
The first is by the Carmelite theologian Gerard of Bologna, who in 1295 considered the question, is it better to preach and do the opposite of what you preach, than to be silent?18 After all, man learns better by example than by word. Gerard is adamant that, in absolute terms and with regard to the lesser evil, it is better that an evil preacher should be silent. The act of preaching is indecent in one who acts in a manner contrary to his teaching, and to preach in this way is presumptuous. But what of the person, such as a bishop or curate, who ex officio has the duty of preaching? This is a very difficult matter, Gerard declares, because such people are expected to preach and yet, if they live wicked lives, they preach indecently and unlawfully. In the Cura pastoralis we read that any man who keeps divine doctrine to himself is accursed, yet elsewhere in the same work St. Gregory attacks those who “investigate spiritual precepts with shrewd diligence, but in the life they live trample on what they have penetrated by their understanding,” thereby polluting the clear water of truth for their flocks.19 It appears from this, says Gerard, obviously relishing the puzzle, that in such a case it is bad to preach and it is also bad to be silent.
Gerard attempts to find a way out of the difficulty by making a distinction according to whether the preacher’s sin is notorious or secret. If the sin is unknown to the listeners, and they actually want preaching and are willing to listen, then it is better, or at least less evil, to preach than to be silent, since the audience is not scandalized or provoked to sin, being ignorant of the preacher’s sin. On the other hand, this action seems definitely bad in as much as the preacher is not rightly and reverently teaching the word of God, such teaching requiring a good life and good works of the preacher. If, the preacher’s sin being concealed, the people do not greatly require preaching, it is better, or less evil, to be silent because in this way no offense is given. Similarly, if the preacher’s sin is public knowledge, and the people do not want his preaching or are unwilling to hear it, then silence is the best policy. But if the sin is public knowledge and the people want preaching and are willing to listen, then it is difficult to see which is the best course of action and which is the worse. That such a person should preach is a source of scandal, scandal being defined in terms of a statement or action which provides the occasion for the ruin of others. Because the audience condemns a preacher of this kind his preaching does not profit them.20 According to St. Gregory, “No one does more harm in the Church than he who, having taken the title or rank of holiness, acts evilly.”21 Jerome’s attack on those who fail to practice what they preach is then cited. It is clear, therefore, that if someone’s life is despised his preaching will consequently be condemned, as Gregory says. Yet, continues Gerard, hammering home the point once more, it is also evil that such a preacher should be silent because he has the pastoral care of the people and is supposed to teach them, especially since they want preaching and are willing to listen. The obvious solution, of course, is that the sinner in question should renounce his evil life and thus preach in the appropriate manner. If this is not done, there is no obvious solution. This matter is difficult to determine in disputation, Gerard admits; the particular circumstances of place and time must be considered, and each case should be judged on its merits. But, in conclusion, he offers one general recommendation. If, all circumstances having been considered, it seems that the flock would come to greater peril through their preacher’s silence than through his preaching, then it would appear to be less evil for him to preach. If, however, the people would not suffer much from his silence, then perhaps it would be less evil to be silent and worse to preach.
Our second discussion, part of a quaestio included in Thomas of Chobham’s Summa de arte praedicandi, is of special interest because of its clear definition of the problem rather than for any solution it offers.22 The topic is, whether to preach in a state of mortal sin is itself a mortal sin or not. Three arguments are marshaled in favor of the proposition. It would seem that by no means should such a person preach, since scriptural authority condemns that kind of behavior. For example, in Psalm 49:16–17 God says to the wicked, “What right have you to recite my statutes, or take my covenant on your lips? For you hate discipline, and you cast my words behind you.” Second, since only the person who is without sin can cast the stone (as John 8:7 teaches), only the good man can cast the stone of preaching. Third, David, after his sin with Bathsheba, did not judge or teach until the prophet Nathan assured him that his sin had been forgiven (II Kings 12:13); hence no-one should preach until he knows that his sins have been forgiven by God. The first argument against the proposition is of particular interest to readers of the Pardoner’s Tale. Just as a man who is in a state of mortal sin may give alms and pray and do other good works, by the same token he can preach and direct the people to good works. Unfortunately, Thomas of Chobham fails to pursue the full implications of this startling yet apparently reasonable idea, being content to offer a version of an argument which we have seen Gerard of Bologna handle with far greater penetration. Distinctions are drawn between preaching ex officio and preaching in special circumstances, and between sins which are public knowledge and those which are secret. The sinner who, not required to preach by virtue of office, actually does so out of devotion or owing to the wish of another, does not sin by preaching, providing that his sinful state is concealed. If, however, his sin is manifest, then, irrespective of whether he is preaching ex officio or not, he sins mortally on account of the scandal he creates.
The implications of the above-mentioned disturbing idea that the sinful preacher is to be valued are, however, fully explored in our third and last major excursus, this being (in my view) the most substantial and challenging of all the thirteenth-century discussions relating to the officium praedicatoris. It forms part of the prologue to Henry of Ghent’s Summa quaestionum ordinariarum, first written circa 1275–76 and edited toward the end of his career, in 1289. Henry’s quaestio on whether or not a sinner can be a teacher (doctor) of theology23 displays an acute awareness of the relative demands of technical proficiency and skill in preaching on the one hand, and the purity of the preacher’s life on the other. Here Henry brings to bear the apparatus of Aristotelian causality (particularly the theory of instrumental causality) and Aristotelian psychology (particularly the theory of habitus or stable mental condition). He begins by marshaling two arguments in favor of the proposition that the doctor of theology need not be a just man. First is the story of the man who did not walk with Christ. The apostles wished to prohibit him from teaching, but Christ said, “Forbid him not,” on the grounds that “he that is not against you is for you” (Luke 9:50). Insofar as he did not remain with Christ he was evil, but if it was not permissible for him to teach theology he should have been prohibited. The second argument in favor is found in Philippians 1:15–19, where Paul says that some of his brothers who are announcing the message are doing it just out of rivalry and competitiveness