cannot be defended, William Lyndwood speculates,233 because while they still retain the guilt (culpa) it is impossible to remit the punishment. The power of binding and freeing was handed down to ministers for edification and not for destruction. But an indulgence, which is a gratuitous remission of sin, tends to destruction, because by this process sin remains unpunished. Indeed, the facility of pardon encourages men to sin. In response to these arguments Lyndwood stresses the importance of contrition on the part of the penitent, which relates to justice, and the satisfaction which is rendered through the Church’s communication of the merits of the saints, which relates to mercy. Therefore both justice and mercy are given their due. More elaborate treatments were on offer. Bonaventure and the Alexandri summa make a crucial distinction between the punitive and medicinal aspects of penance.234 Indulgences relate only to the former. If, however, we talk in terms of medicinal healing of the soul, the penitent must personally shoulder his or her own burden. The punishment of damnation or spiritual death is not sustained on another’s behalf. Those who are irrecoverable beyond charity cannot derive any benefit from souls existing in charity and within the united Church. Thomas Aquinas also believed that an indulgence “does not take the place of satisfaction as medicinal,”235 but struggled to address one of the difficulties which seemed to follow. While feeling the force of the argument that indulgences do not avail those who are in mortal sin, he was obliged to admit that in certain forms of indulgence-grant the saints’ merits were applied in a way which might well allow such a sinner to gain some benefit.236
Thus Aquinas cum suis sought to reconcile the two rival economies, secular and sacred; to bridge the gap between human giving and divine grace, bringing together deficient sinners and superendowed saints in a business transaction which was to the spiritual advantage of the former and the material advantage of those who presumed to manage the immaterial resources of the latter.
Authority and Jurisdiction in the Dispensing of Pardon
But who exactly possessed the awesome power of dispensing such a vast treasury and relieving so much retributive suffering? Where did the requisite authority lie? Did it extend to the ordinary parish priest? The Alexandri summa starts its consideration of these issues with a statement of the utterly uncontentious point that every priest possesses the power of the keys.237 But, can every priest draw on the treasury of the Church? It may be said that every priest has access to the spiritual treasury of his own parish, just as the bishop has of his diocese. Thus it would seem that both priest and bishop can make relaxationes from their respective treasuries. But the Summa proceeds to refute this hypothesis. Indulgences come from the supererogations of the members of Christ’s body and mainly from the supererogatory merits of Christ himself, which constitute the spiritual treasury of the Church. And this treasury is not for all to dispense, but is the prerogative of those who chiefly bear the office of Christ (i.e., the bishops). All bishops can make indulgences and relaxations, and chiefly the summus pontifex, the pope. So, concludes the Summa, making indulgences is denied not only to layfolk but also to priests and inferior prelates such as abbots and priors. The importance of hierarchy is affirmed—the church hierarchy is disposed in a way which follows the angelic hierarchy, wherein the superiors can do more than the inferiors.
For his part, Albert the Great emphasizes the fact that, while a simple priest has at his disposal the spiritual treasury that comprises the merits of his own parishioners, these are unsufficient—a very substantial treasury is needed for the granting of indulgences.238 Furthermore, while a simple priest possesses the power of the keys, he does not have the necessary power of jurisdiction. Hence the plebani or “lower orders” cannot give indulgences. But what if someone were to say, I myself have seen simple priests giving indulgences without episcopal permission—therefore, why can’t a lay person? Albert thinks that this reasoning is flawed. In the first instance, we are dealing with the pronuntiator of the indulgences, the mere “announcer” who recommends them in his preaching, rather than the authoritative person who actually makes them. Furthermore, giving indulgences requires jurisdiction in giving, the right to give. A lay person does not have the requisite jurisdiction and therefore he cannot give them.
Aquinas also was concerned to affirm the principle of jurisdiction, but for him it means locating the authority firmly at the top of the hierarchy: “he alone who is at the head of the Church can grant indulgences.”239 Thus, “parish priests or abbots or other like prelates” cannot do so, inasmuch as their status and orders neither confer the relevant authority nor bring with them a sufficient treasury of merit. However, Aquinas goes on to affirm the principle of delegation. Subject to the pope’s authority, and not by any authority of their own, bishops can indeed issue indulgences: “they can grant them within fixed limits and not beyond.”240 Furthermore, deacons and others who are not priests can enjoy delegated jurisdiction and thus grant indulgences, even though they lack the power of the keys (which priests do have) and hence lack the power of absolution in the tribunal of penance. More precisely, as Aquinas explains elsewhere, they lack the key of ordo, which brings with it sacramental agency.241 A priest forgives a fault (culpa) through the authority of his ministry “insofar as he confers a sacrament of the forgiveness of sins.” But the making of pardons works on a different principle. An indulgence “is not extended for forgiveness of a fault because it is not something sacramental—it results not from orders but from jurisdiction. For a nonpriest can also grant an indulgence if it is committed to him to do so.”
But does the person who grants an indulgence have to be of good moral standing? What of the “character issue,” which (as has been illustrated above) loomed so large in scholastic discussion of the requisite worthiness of the preacher and of the minister of the sacraments? Albert the Great presents the matter in a quite sensational form by asking if a pope living in mortal sin can give indulgences to those who are living in mortal sin.242 It would seem not, the argument goes, because works performed in mortal sin are dead, and dead works do not vivify. Since indulgences are ordained to vivi-fication and spiritual life, it would appear that such a sinner’s indulgence would not be valid. Furthermore, a river which has no source to feed it cannot flow. But a pope in mortal sin is a river whose source, the Holy Spirit, does not flow, because “a holy and disciplined spirit will flee from deceit” (Wisdom 1:5) and “wisdom will not enter a deceitful soul, or dwell in a body enslaved to sin” (Wisdom 1:4). Therefore it cannot flow to others. Finally, a ray of sun blocked by a cloud does not reach us. St. Dionysius calls the grace of the Holy Spirit a ray, and sin is called a cloud in Isaiah. Thus it may be said that the grace which is hindered by sin is effectively blocked. The indulgence issuing, or which should issue, from a sinful pope is grace intercepted by sin, and so is not valid.
Against these arguments, however, may be posited the idea that prophecy, which may be identified as a divine ray, comes from grace, which is, so to speak, no respector of persons. It flowed through Caiaphas, who was “high priest that year,” as says the Evangelist John (11:51): the point being that, by dint of office, a priest has certain powers conferred from above, despite any personal iniquities he may have. Aquinas makes the same point by saying that indulgences are granted by virtue of conferred power, and since mortal sin takes away not power but goodness it does not interfere with their operation.243 Albert cites Numbers 22, 23, and 24 to the same end: there we read of how a most iniquitous man, Balaam, received a most clear prophecy, which flowed through him to the whole Synagogue and Church. Albert’s conclusion is that indulgences, whether they are given by an evil man or by a good man, are equally valid. They function through grace freely given (gratia gratis data), which is a matter of (divine) power, not of goodness of life, and all such gifts flow equally well through good and bad men. Despite his mortal sin, this (hypothetically immoral) pope is sourced by the power of the Holy Spirit. Aquinas sharpens up this argument considerably, by saying that the prelate who, while in a state of mortal sin, grants an indulgence, is not actually pouring forth anything of his own. A man does not lose jurisdiction through sin. “Consequently, indulgences are equally valid, whether they are granted by one who is in mortal sin, or by a most holy person; since he remits punishment, not by virtue of his own merits, but by virtue of the merits laid up in the Church’s treasury.”244
Is an evil bishop able to grant indulgences? That