instituted a one-thousand-member General Peoples Congress (GPC) in 1982, with himself as the Secretary-General.67 With the return of opposition leaders from exile and national stability established, Salih’s political credibility was strengthened. Fortuitously, the North Yemen discovery of large oil reserves in 1984 had an almost immediate impact on the economy, further bolstering Salih’s position to something equalling that of the former Imām Yahya.68 Salih used his political muscle effectively to obstruct South Yemen from joining the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC), arguing that the PDRY’s economic policies and Marxist philosophy were incompatible with the other member states.69 Whilst Salih continued to exert his influence in order to exclude the PDRY from formal associations with the rest of the Arab world, boycotting its applications to all major inter-Arab political forums, economic development in the North was not as expedient as was politically required. With the discovery of the large untapped Shabwah oil fields in South Yemen, reunification once again became an enticing proposition.70 However, hopes of massive oil reserves within the southern desert were also somewhat over-optimistic and whilst oil revenue today constitutes 60% of the state budget, 400,000 barrels per day spreads out thinly amongst a population of 18 million.71
1.3 – A postcard of the British-built water tanks at al-Tawāhī, Aden, which were built on the site of an extinct volcano crater, circa 1960.
In November 1992, a real breakthrough was reached in the drawn-out reunification process when both sides agreed to adhere to the Aden Agreement that was originally initiated in 1982. Basically, reunification had been achieved after agreements on the establishment of a new transitional government for a new Republic of Yemen within a 12-month period had been reached. The first six months saw a concerted effort by both leaders to win over the sceptics but, as developments ‘snowballed’ and increased fears of tribal factionalism loomed, both presidents hurriedly brought forward the reunification date to 22 May 1990.72 The former president of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, was also instrumental in accelerating reunification and he was anxious for it to be concluded before the Arab League meeting scheduled later that year in Baghdad. Although it was widely known that Saddam wanted to upset the Saudis by facilitating a unified Yemen, his wider motives became apparent very soon afterwards when he invaded Kuwait in 1990.73 On 1 May 1990, despite PDRY objections,74 voting for the union was unanimous and the next day a triumphant Salih announced from Aden the birth of the Republic of Yemen.75 Sana’a was to become the political capital and Aden was named as the economic capital of the new reunified state. Ali Abdullah Salih was to head the new Republic and Ali Salem al-Bidh was to be Vice-President. Haidar Abu al-Attas, an influential Ḥaḍramī and former President of the PDRY was to head the transitional government and his former Southern state faired well in political representations despite its small population.76 However, in rushing through the reunification process a number of important issues including the role of religion, education policy, women’s rights and the details of post-unity relations were not adequately addressed. And, whilst it may be true that to try to resolve these issues before reunification would have further delayed the process, resolving these central policy matters placed tremendous pressure on the interim government and even impeded economic prosperity and political harmony because of pervasive pre-unity political and ideological differences.77
The Gulf crisis of the early 1990s, precipitated by the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in August 1990, became a turning point in the history of modern Arabia. For just as the Suez War of 1956 stimulated the rise of Arab nationalism and solidarity, the Gulf War had direct reverse military and economic consequences on the relative unity of the Arab world.78 In particular, the impact of the war on the political ideology and realpolitik of the Arab states resulted in a complete discrediting of Arab nationalism. The deep divisions created by the breaking of perceived Arab solidarity in favour of a Western-dominated alliance and security brought into question the validity of any inter-Arab solidarity based on forms of joint Arab security.79 The retrogressive development of religious extremism propagated through Islamic fundamentalism, which had ironically originated from the austere scriptural literalism of Saudi-backed Salafiyyah and Wahhābiyyah movements, was becoming a threatening force to pro-Western Arab leaders. When the new Yemeni Republic refused to support the US-led coalition against Saddam Hussein, its oil-rich Gulf Arab sponsors and neighbours were angered by the Yemeni position, which they interpreted as ingratitude. The Yemen was precariously placed as the only Arab state among the 15 members of the UN Security Council at the outbreak of the Iraqi invasion and, whilst there was a unified condemnation from the other Council members, the Yemeni position was one of abstention.80 As a result of its perceived pro-Iraqi stance, which in reality had been one of neutrality, virtually all aid to the Yemen by foreign donors was either suspended or drastically cut.81 For example, US aid was cut from $23 million to three million and in addition to punitive measures by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, who curbed billions of dollars of aid to the Yemen, the Saudi government revoked all the special privileges of Yemeni workers in the Kingdom in October 1990. The Saudis also began making arbitrary arrests, detentions, torture and general harassment of Yemenis living and working in the Kingdom.82 The resultant mass exodus of some 800,000 enforced returnees to the Yemen was something the new government could ill afford.83 Reliance on the remittances of migrant workers was a significant economic factor and its sudden curtailment would have further serious repercussions on the domestic economy. Furthermore, returnees from both Saudi and Kuwait brought back with them only what they could carry or salvage from the sale of their belongings, properties and businesses, rendering many of them virtually bankrupt. One deportee, Gadri Salih, described to me in some detail, briefly outlined in the Prologue, the trauma of leaving Riyadh during the first Gulf War, where he had lived as a boy after his original migration from the Yemeni community in Eccles, Greater Manchester, where he was born. After spending more than 10 years in Saudi Arabia, the contrast between his life there and the relative poverty of his father’s native village forced yet another migration just two years after his return to the Yemen when his father had died. Using both his, and his mother’s British nationality, he was forced to migrate back to Britain.84 The Yemeni government lost further export revenues to Kuwait and Iraq estimated to be worth around $100,000 million.85 The first Gulf War had a crippling effect on both the economy and international relations of the new Republic of Yemen, and reconciling itself with the major Gulf donors and the US became a political imperative for Salih. Paradoxically, the Yemeni display of Arab solidarity during the Gulf War would have probably manifested itself differently if it were not for the reunification. The PDRY had not traditionally warmed to Saddam’s regime and it had remained consistently neutral during the Iran–Iraq War (1980–88). However, under Ali Abdullah Salih’s leadership, the YAR had idealized Saddam’s dictatorship. Salih was personally impressed by Saddam’s Baathist rule in Iraq and he emulated a ‘Republican Guard’ and a nepotistic bureaucracy monopolized by kinship and tribal influence.86
After much protest and dissent from amongst certain sectors of the Northern shaykhdoms and questions concerning how the oil revenues were directed or, rather, misdirected, matters eventually came to a head and resulted in armed conflict. By March 1992, pro-GPC government troops and anti-government Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) forces began to occupy strategic positions throughout the Yemen.87 For some time, there was a stand-off as the ruling elite promised political concessions and economic reforms. However, for many these promises were simply political rhetoric and delaying tactics. In April 1994, fighting flared up again and the President’s forces moved swiftly to crush the YSP militias.88 Most of the conflict occurred in the north and the Islamists were also active in the fighting, justifying their involvement as a jihād against the YSP kuffār (lit., ‘unbelievers’) ideologies and forces. As the joint government and Islamic forces took control, local power amongst tribal shaykhs and political parties shifted. Aden was sacked and looted and although the war was not between the North and the South, but between political parties, Dresch notes that ‘the effect was felt by Southerners to be a Northern invasion’.89 As influential