of the rise of right- wing populism and the Reform Party of Canada coinciding with the election of a Conservative government: “Within a short time, the Tories dismantled state-nationalist economic policies, decentralized political authority and control, and generally followed a pro-business agenda. What was the effect of this political change upon the western region... ironically right-wing populism gained in momentum!”
Manning believes that Liberals have generally been better than Conservatives at responding to western grievances. “Whether Mulroney had behaved differently, or if Trudeau had behaved differently, maybe Reform wouldn’t have happened, or more likely it would have happened fifteen years later. The traditional parties are just slow-moving anyway. The success of the traditional parties, to a large degree, depends on their ability to recognize these movements and accommodate them—or fails to recognize them and accommodate them. In the twentieth century, the Liberals have been more the ones who have picked up these movements and tried to accommodate them. The Conservatives have been slower at it.” Nowhere in this statement does Manning talk about governing. Shaking things up seems to be his goal.
Manning knew that the CF-18 decision engendered mistrust and disappointment that cut a wide swath across the western electorate. Resentment of the Progressive Conservative government in western Canada was at an apex. Mainstream westerners could no longer simply blame the Liberals. Manning knew that westerners were hungry for a legitimate and credible voice that could articulate western resentment. He remarked, “The hotheads talked about separation; cooler heads sought better alternatives, but the conditions for a full- blown prairie fire were present. The time for ‘waiting for something to happen’ was over. Something was happening. It was time to act.” The Reform party was not the brainchild of disgruntled Progressive Conservatives. The origins of Reform can clearly be traced to the latent forces of the Social Credit movement. Like Reform, the Social Credit party had clear western roots. It was formed in the early part of the twentieth century in western Canada to combat the more powerful industrial class of the East. In Alberta, Social Credit governed from 1935 to 1971, principally under the leadership of premiers William Aberhart and Ernest Manning. Beginning in 1952, Socreds governed British Columbia for thirty-six of thirty-nine years.
Federally, the Social Credit party has existed since 1935. In the early 1960s it held as many as 30 seats in the federal Parliament, consistently ranking ahead of the New Democrats. The last time Social Credit or Créditistes had members in the House of Commons was during the short-lived thirty-first Parliament led by Joe Clark.
The 1979 election left Clark only 6 seats short of a majority government, precisely the number of seats held by Social Credit under the leadership of Fabien Roy. On the fateful night of December 13, 1979,a vote of confidence was held on the Clark government, and Social Credit members either abstained or failed to show up for the vote. It would have taken very little effort on Clark’s part to gain the sup- port of the small Social Credit caucus, but he had decided to run his government as if he had a majority, and he ignored the otherwise “conservative” Social Credit MPs. In effect, Social Credit defeated the government. As Elmer MacKay recalls, Clark was not concerned about bringing the Socreds on side. “We could have won them over by giving them a few perks in office and by increasing their profile. And as a guy who likes to win, I told Clark we should make common cause with Socreds. They were not difficult people to deal with. But Clark thought it would be like Diefenbaker in 1958; going from a minority to a huge majority.” History shows that Socred members would regret their decision to defeat the Clark government, as they have not held a seat in Parliament since. Many people remember the legacy and the glory days of Social Credit; no one more so than Preston Manning.
Manning and many of his followers were influenced by the writings of Peter Brimelow, especially his 1986 book The Patriot Game. The essence of the “patriot game” is to use the fear of Quebec’s separation as an excuse to control the national political agenda, largely to the benefit of a class of mostly Liberal political elites. Brimelow predicted in the book that new splinter parties would emerge, that the fate of Confederation was anything but certain, and that elections would take the form of Russian roulette.
It was somewhat unexpected for a populist free-enterprise prairie politician to lead on issues related to Quebec. But Manning was a dedicated historian with a passion for the country’s constitution and the rule of law. He was also brave and not worried that he might be criticized for speaking out. While most observers would say that Reform was able to flourish because of Mulroney’s perceived inadequacies, Manning gives the initial credit for the Reform revolution to another Quebec politician. “Trudeau laid the seeds for separatism... by insisting that the federal government, and not the Quebec government, be the guardian of the French language and culture. He was on a collision course with Quebec nationalists [for that], plus from the way he repatriated the constitution.”
Manning signalled that the day of the realignment of the conservative political movement was pending. In the book he and his father researched and wrote, ominous counsel was offered to conservatives under the heading “Consideration of One Remaining Alternative”:
Anyone who speaks or writes about the subject of political realignment is open to the common misinterpretation that he is advocating the formation of another political party altogether apart from those presently in existence. I wish to make it very clear that this is not what I am advocating in this thesis. I do not believe that the formation of an entirely new political party is the best way to meet the serious national political needs of the present hour. Nevertheless, having regard to the prevailing political mood of the Canadian people, present national party leaders and federal politicians, especially those affiliated with the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada, should take cognizance of the following fact: if the Canadian political situation continues to degenerate, and if the cause of conservatism continues to suffer and decline, not for lack of merit or a willingness on the part of the Canadian people to support modern conservative principles or policies, but rather because of unnecessary dissention among politicians and par- ties, the idea of establishing a wholly new political party committed to the social conservative positions will find an ever increasing number of advocates and supporters among a concerned and aroused Canadian public.
The establishment of Reform was the fulfillment of that prognostication. The brand of conservatism Mulroney offered failed to meet Manning’s conditions for not organizing a new political party. To Preston Manning, the Mulroney government had fallen into Brimelow’s Patriot Game and was ignoring western concerns: “The Mulroney Conservatives tried to accommodate the Quebec bloc by making his [Mulroney’s] own deal with the nationalists. He hoped that things like Meech Lake would accommodate them. But I don’t think Mulroney ever understood the western movement. There wasn’t much of an attempt to accommodate it.”
Preston Manning and Stephen Harper shared a distrust of and disappointment in the Mulroney administration, but they came to this common conclusion from different perspectives. Manning expected Mulroney to fail, perhaps even hoped he would fail, while Harper was filled with enthusiasm after helping Tory MP Jim Hawkes get elected in 1984. Manning scrutinized Mulroney’s actions, looking for a political opening for himself and a western-based populist movement; Harper travelled to Ottawa to work as Hawkes’s legislative assistant. Then Manning’s and Harper’s views began to converge.
Ottawa did not impress the young Stephen Harper. It was relatively early days in the Mulroney administration, and Harper began his year-long sojourn with high hopes for a fundamental conservative transformation of the workings of government. He hoped to find Parliament a place of ideas, debate, intellectual stimulation, integrity, and respect for the taxpayer. Instead he discovered a phony environment filled with trivial and meaningless chatter and policies designed not to offend the masses. Harper had no interest in playing the Ottawa game of glad-handing and networking. While others went to restaurants and bars, he went to the parliamentary library. The keen young conservative had set his sights on reforms to the unemployment insurance program.
Like almost every intern who works as a parliamentary assistant, Harper told his boss that he had no interest whatsoever in seeking elected office. But many interns who make such a statement are hiding personal ambition, and if they get the chance to seek elected office they will take it. Harper is a case in point.
Harper