Bob Plamondon

Full Circle: Death and Resurrection In Canadian Conservative Politics


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as would many other long- time Tories.

      Despite these formidable challenges, however, MacKay and Harper launched a process in the summer of 2003 aimed at exploring methods of co-operation between the parties. Stunningly, what began with modest goals of co-operation and, optimistically, an agreement to find a formula to end vote splitting then eclipsed even the wildest expectation. A full-scale merger was on the table. Most surprising to

      MacKay, the proposed agreement included virtually every element that was central to the beliefs and values of a Progressive Conservative. In fact, the aims and principles proposed for the new party were lifted word for word from the PC party constitution. The legacies from the Reform party and Alliance constitutions were virtually unrecognizable in the proposed agreement.

      By Thanksgiving weekend, there was only one main area where agreement could not be reached: how to select the party leader. Stephen Harper wanted a simple and democratic one-member one- vote system. MacKay wanted every member to have a vote; but he also wanted each riding to be given the same weight when the votes were tallied. The one-member one-vote system would naturally encourage candidates to spend their time and energy where the party was strong. MacKay feared that very small riding associations, located in regions where it was difficult to sign up party members, would be ignored, thereby hampering the party’s ability to build a truly national base of support. However, this was not a purely academic question related to governance. The political imperative was that one method favoured Harper’s chances of winning the leader- ship of the new party, and the other favoured MacKay’s.

      Harper and MacKay had drawn their lines in the sand on the leadership selection issue. Despite a successful negotiation on every other front, MacKay was not prepared to compromise on this final issue. Walking away from the negotiations on this point of principle would have been easy, if not a relief, for MacKay. But Harper was convinced a merger was the only way the Conservatives could defeat the Liberals. He came to this conclusion in the spring of 2003 when, despite his best efforts, the Tories won a key by-election in a rural Ontario riding. The Alliance came in a very distant and disappointing third. After the by-election defeat, Harper was inclined to agree to almost every condition MacKay imposed, so long as the country ended up with one conservative party and there would be a leader- ship contest.

      Over the Thanksgiving weekend, Harper assessed the risks and then agreed to the equality of riding condition. It was not an easy decision. He was risking his position as leader, and there was also a legacy of democratic populism in the Reform and Alliance parties that was not evident, at least on paper, in the new party. By merging under MacKay’s conditions, Harper was also equating his 66 MPs with the twelve-member PC caucus.

      MacKay had a far tougher decision to make. His was the party with the legacy from Confederation. His was the party that had roots and appeal in all parts of Canada. His was the party with the deep emotional scars, and for which ratification of a deal was anything but certain. His was the party with momentum, with polls showing 17 per cent for PCs and only 11 per cent for the Alliance. Even though Harper had given in to every one of MacKay’s demands, and there was nothing left that MacKay could ask for, it was still a gut- wrenching decision.

      During his six years as a federal politician, life and events had seemed to come at MacKay at full speed. There were few moments when the world slowed down long enough to allow focus on a solitary issue. But this quiet October morning in his constituency office was one of those moments.

      MacKay felt burdened by the history of his party. Tory contributions had been woven into the fabric of the nation, and MacKay could not be certain that a new conservative party would connect to the legacy with which he had been entrusted. MacKay was worried about whether this new entity would even be called the “Tory” party. Would it be the party of Sir John A. Macdonald, Sir Robert Borden, R.B. Bennett, John Diefenbaker, and Brian Mulroney? Or would it become the party of Preston Manning? Every time MacKay walked past the busts of former PC prime ministers at PC party headquarters he could sense accusatory eyes watching him. MacKay wondered if these men would applaud his moves, or would they be spinning in their graves?

      MacKay took comfort in the counsel that was available to him from former prime minister Brian Mulroney. MacKay understood that, as well as advice, Mulroney had enough sway in the party to defeat a proposed merger if such was his will. But Mulroney was supportive of the merger. And then there was MacKay’s father. Elmer MacKay was an elder statesman of the party, elected to the House of Commons on seven occasions and serving in the cabinets of two prime ministers. It was Elmer MacKay who resigned his seat in 1983 so that Mulroney could enter the House of Commons through a by-election as the member for Central Nova in Nova Scotia. In retirement, however, Elmer MacKay still felt the scars from the battles with the Reform party in 1993. The elder MacKay initially opposed the merger.

      MacKay knew that among the senior people in the party, some would support the merger and some would oppose it. Some of his twelve-member caucus had already spoken out against a merger after news of the negotiations had been leaked to the press. MacKay realized he would never get unanimity on the issue. He was going to be criticized no matter what he decided. This was not a time for consultation and persuasion; this was a time for leadership. But if he signed the agreement, MacKay’s leadership would be finished. If party members voted yes, the merger would proceed and he would no longer be leader. If they voted no, his leadership would be in ruins and he would have to resign.

      MacKay removed short-term political consequences from his decision criteria. Party financing, the recent polls, and the dynamic of Paul Martin’s likely advent as leader of the Liberal party were not on his mind. Even his own leadership and agreement with David Orchard were not factors in this decision. This decision was more important than the career of Peter MacKay.

      His mind was drawn to both the history and the future of Canada. What was right for his party? What would Sir John A. Macdonald want him to do? Most important, what was right for Canada?

      CHAPTER 2

      CONSERVATIVE COALITIONS

      A political party that does not understand the reality of competition and strategy in a parliamentary democracy is doomed to failure.

      An election is like a hockey game. It’s not about who has the fastest skaters, the hardest shot, or even the toughest players. What matters most is which team puts the most pucks in the net. Similarly, it’s not the smartest leader, best ideas, or most energetic team of candidates that matters. It’s who gets the most votes. Politics is about beating your competition. Politics is about winning.

      And here’s the score: Liberal party eighty-four, Conservative party fifty-five—that’s the number of years since Confederation that each of the parties has held government. Since 1900, the score firms up seventy-five to thirty-one in favour of the Liberals. No wonder the team in the red sweaters is known as Canada’s “natural governing party,” and arguably the western world’s most successful political franchise.

      Under Canada’s parliamentary system, one rule of the game is that the party with the confidence of the House of Commons is asked to govern. This is a rule that Liberals understand very well, certainly far better than do their Conservative competitors. In a country as geographically, linguistically, culturally, ethnically, philosophically, and economically diverse as Canada, Liberals have figured out that they could never win the number of seats required to gain this confidence by speaking to a narrow range of interests, grievances, or communities. To win, a party needs to build a coalition of interests. Some call it a “big tent”: a place that comfortably and peacefully accommodates a large number of voters. This might seem onerous; however, it is anything but a negative. Coalition building helps keep the country united. A system built on the foundations of confidence and consensus also helps isolate extreme positions, making it very difficult for extreme views to find a voice in decision-making. At its core, a system that requires consensus for success helps promote harmony, understanding, and tolerance.

      The Canadian parliamentary system also places a premium on getting the right number of votes in the right places. For example, in the 1979 election Progressive Conservatives under Joe Clark received 35.9 per cent of the popular vote, while Pierre Trudeau’s Liberals earned 40.1 per cent