it became an exclusively anarcho-syndicalist movement. It mushroomed from its initial 15,000 members to over 700,000 by 1919, a reflection of the country’s burgeoning industrial base. The number of workers engaged in non-agricultural activities had quadrupled from 244,000 in 1887 to 995,000 in 1900.15 The leaders of the new organization rejected both individual violence and parliamentary politics, opting instead for what was called revolutionary syndicalism. This involved a central contradiction which would bedevil the organization until the Spanish Civil War. As recruits flooded in, the CNT had to act as a conventional trade union defending the interests of its members within the existing order while at the same time advocating direct action to overthrow that order. The involvement of its members in violent acts of industrial sabotage and revolutionary strikes meant the new organization would frequently be declared illegal.
Surprisingly, however, when the next challenge to the Restoration system came, it was not mounted by the rural anarchists or the urban working class but by the industrial bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, once the crisis started, proletarian ambitions came into play in such a way as to ensure that the basic hostilities within Spanish politics became more acute than ever. The social problems faced by the Restoration system, with political power concentrated in the hands of those who also enjoyed the monopoly of economic power, had been intensifying for decades. They were pushed to breaking point by the coming of the First World War. Given Spain’s near bankruptcy and the parlous state of its armed forces, the Conservative government led by the wealthy lawyer Eduardo Dato had little choice but immediately to declare strict neutrality. Nevertheless, in a letter to Maura explaining his decision, Dato revealed his sympathies for the Austro-German Central Powers.16 Political passions were aroused by an ongoing acrimonious debate about whether Spain should intervene and, if so, on which side. The army, most Conservatives, the Mauristas and the Carlists admired what they saw as Prussian discipline and efficiency and so supported the Central Powers. The Liberals, Lerroux’s Radicals, the left and most intellectuals equated Germany with barbarism and so supported the Western Allies, whose cause they associated with civilization. The fiercely pro-Allied Romanones inspired a controversial article entitled ‘Fatal Neutralities’, although he quickly accepted that there was no alternative to neutrality. Heated polemics in the press (much of it owned or lavishly subsidized by Germans) and in mass meetings intensified the ever growing divisions within the Liberal and Conservative parties. Despite the lack of options, the political system would be torn apart by the economic consequences of the war, by the massive social upheaval that came in its wake and by the reverberations of the Russian revolution.17 Within the polemics about Spain’s possible participation in the conflict could be discerned the personal interests of some politicians. Needless to say, where there was corruption, Alejandro Lerroux could usually be found. His enthusiastic espousal of Spanish military intervention on the Allied side saw him attacked by pro-German gangs. While probably sincere, his stance was not unconnected with the exports by his companies, particularly of meat, to the French Republic.18
As a non-belligerent, Spain was in the economically privileged position of being able to supply both the Anglo-French Entente and the Central Powers with agricultural and industrial products. Manufacturers benefited from import substitution in the domestic market and from the possibility of filling the gaps left in their own export markets by the belligerent powers. Coalmines in Asturias, iron-ore mines and the shipping industry in the Basque Country, the Catalan textile and chemical industries, the Valencian and Mallorcan leather industries all experienced a frenetic boom which stimulated a dramatic take-off for the Spanish economy. The profits of Basque shipping lines increased from 4.43 million pesetas in 1913 to 52.69 million in 1915. In Bilbao, investment in new companies went up from 14.5 million pesetas in 1913 to 427.5 million by the end of the war.19
The boom had attracted rural labour to mines and factories in towns where the worst conditions of early capitalism prevailed, especially in Asturias and the Basque Country. The increase in the numbers of industrial workers would soon constitute a daunting challenge to the Restoration system. Between 1910 and 1918, the numbers of miners would rise from 90,000 to 133,000, of metallurgical workers from 61,000 to 200,000 and of textile workers from 125,000 to 213,000. At the same time, massive exports created domestic shortages, galloping inflation and plummeting living standards. Per capita consumption of basic foodstuffs, such as wheat, rice, chickpeas and potatoes, fell dramatically as prices rocketed during the war years. The Catalan bourgeoisie did not plough back profits into modernizing their factories. Rather, they frittered them away on building spectacular residences, buying luxury cars and frequenting the casinos, cabarets and brothels that sprang up. Working-class militancy was provoked by popular resentment of such conspicuous consumption together with the reluctance of the newly enriched bourgeoisie to concede wage increases.20 As a result, in December 1915, the Dato government collapsed and the King called upon Romanones to replace him. Despite promises of clean elections, the contest of 9 April 1916 was rigged and saw Romanones gain a substantial majority. The new parliament was known as ‘the Cortes of the relatives’ since all the principal Conservative and Liberal leaders had managed to secure the election of family members. In fact, it was well known that party leaders maintained their position by nepotism, patronage and turning a blind eye to the plundering of state resources. The Socialist press revealed that the same political grandees sat on the boards of the country’s most prosperous companies, citing this as proof that Spain was controlled by a small privileged elite.
Government ministers were actively involved in corruption. During the war, the Minister of Finance, Santiago Alba, made substantial sums of money from his alliance with the Mallorcan robber baron Juan March, who was making colossal profits from exporting food to both belligerents, as well as from his key business, tobacco smuggling. In this, March exploited the widespread nicotine addiction of Spaniards. Nearly three-quarters of a century earlier, Richard Ford had noted that ‘a cigar is a sine qua non in every Spaniard’s mouth, for otherwise he would resemble a house without a chimney, a steamer without a funnel’.21 So successful was March’s smuggling operation that government revenue from tobacco duty was plummeting to such an extent that it was decided to grant him the official monopoly for a fee.22 Alba’s reputation for venality was such that when he was appointed minister, some journalists said to March, ‘Now you will have the doors of the Ministry wide open.’ He smiled and replied smugly, ‘I won’t be the one visiting him. He will come to see me when I decide that the time is ripe.’23
The ‘extreme friendship’ that March demonstrated towards the young Liberal politician was expressed in many ways. On one occasion, March organized a banquet in Palma de Mallorca for him and presented Alba’s wife with a bouquet of flowers in which were concealed ten 1,000-peseta notes. A striking example of how Alba expressed his gratitude for the friendship arose out of the introduction in 1915 of the Subsistence Law, the purpose of which was to bring under control the massive and highly profitable export of necessary foodstuffs to belligerent powers. Alba secured for March several exceptional export licences which allowed the Mallorcan plutocrat legally to bypass the restrictions imposed by the law. In 1916, the government prohibited the export of rice from Valencia. March’s agents in the Valencian region began to stockpile huge quantities of rice and applied for an extraordinary licence on the grounds there was a surplus beyond the market’s capacity to absorb. Without requiring any proof or instituting any inspection, Alba secured for March the necessary licence to allow him to sell the rice in Europe at inflated prices, having previously bought it at extremely low prices. Alba and the Conde de Romanones endeared themselves further to March by failing to make any serious effort to challenge his massive tobacco-smuggling activities. Alba’s political ambitions received substantial financial support from March, especially in Mallorca. In return, Alba arranged for March to have a parliamentary seat in 1923. A number of extremely senior and influential government officials were alleged to be in March’s pocket. It is hardly surprising that Alejandro Lerroux was also on the payroll of March, who contributed substantially to his electoral expenses as well.24
Romanones was no more successful than Dato in dealing with the social problems provoked by the world war. In 1916, a total of 2,415,304 working days were lost in strikes, more than six times as many as in the previous years, and there were also a number of dramatic bread riots.25 Strikes secured some wage rises but these were not sufficient to keep up with the inflation of food prices. From 1913 to 1917, prices increased by 50 per cent, profits