Austrian-Bavarian border along the right shore of the Danube as far as the confluence of the Enns and further along the aforementioned river in a southerly direction as far as the city of Eisenerz and from there to the south-east along the stipulated line to the city of Leoben, will be occupied by troops from the United Kingdom;
c) the entire remaining territory of western Austria will be occupied by troops from the USA;
d) the city of Vienna will be occupied by troops from the USSR, the United Kingdom and the USA with the following allocation of zones: troops from the USSR occupy the eastern part of the city located between Danube and Danube Canal; troops from the United Kingdom and troops from the USA the remaining territory of the city, whereby the demarcation line between the troops from the United Kingdom and the troops from the USA will be established by an agreement between the command of the United Kingdom and that of the USA.12
During the course of the session of the “Voroshilov Commission” on the issue of occupation zones in Austria, held the following day, April 18, 1944, Admiral Ivan Isakov and Maiskii spoke their mind. Isakov referred to the borders of the Soviet zone having to allow for a direct rail and shipping connection on the Danube, and Maiskii stressed “that the Soviet zone should if at all possible border both Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.” Furthermore, Maiskii noted that “the location of the industrial plants in this country and the population figures for the individual federal regions of Austria must be taken into account. All three zones must possess approximately the same population.”
In another of his remarks, Maiskii underlined his vision, according to which “the borders between the zones must be drawn by and large in accordance with the administrative borders between the federal regions or between individual districts (municipalities).”
On this, the Commission’s minutes of the session note that “Comrade Bazarov was given the task of obtaining a map of Austria with the borders of federal regions marked on it, in order to be able to discuss at the next session of the Commission the issue of the allocation of occupation zones among the three Allied powers on the basis of the administrative structure of Austria.”13
In its session on April 30, the Commission again returned to the question of the drawing of borders between the occupation zones. The suggestions submitted for review were found “by and large” to be good. As noted in the minutes, the “Soviet occupation zone was allocated the following federal regions: Burgenland, half of Lower Austria and of Styria; the zone of the United Kingdom—half of Lower Austria and of Styria as well as half of Carinthia; the zone of the USA—Upper Austria, Salzburg, Tyrol and half of Carinthia. The population in each of the zones amounts to around 1.5 millions.” With regard to Vienna, the decision reached earlier regarding the zones was confirmed.14
The final results of the preparatory work of the “Voroshilov Commission” on Austria were summarized in a résumé by its chairman to Stalin, Molotov, Vyshinskii, and Dekanozov, dated June 12. It read:
In Austria, the Soviet occupation zone has an area of 21,066 square kilometres with a total population of 1,407,000 people. The remaining part covers an area of 62,587 square kilometres with 2,738,000 inhabitants. The city of Vienna, with its population of 1,929,000 people is to be treated separately as an independent unit with a joint occupation by troops of the three powers.
The Commission is of the opinion that the demarcation line between the British and the American zone in Austria and in the city of Vienna must be fixed by the English and the Americans themselves.
The territorial components do not underlie the allocation of zones in Austria, but rather the population figures and the distribution of industry.
A large proportion of the industrial plants are located in the Soviet zone (whose population makes up a third of the population of Austria), and the Soviet zone is furthermore connected directly with Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Hungary via railway routes.15
The history of the debate on the Austrian question within the EAC constitutes one of the hitherto least handled topics in the literature. This can already be seen in the differing reading of dates: thus, for example, according to one author, the Soviet proposal regarding the zones was put forward on June 29, 1944;16 according to another, this happened only on July 1.17 Considerably more important, however, is the question as to how the delegates of the Western powers in the EAC responded to this proposal and how and when an agreement was reached that was acceptable to all parties.
If one is to believe the brief comments in Aleksei Roshchin’s book (himself a member of the European Advisory Commission and author of the only work on this institution in the Soviet and Russian historiography), the proposal for the Soviet zone made by the British side on August 22, 1944, actually foresaw a larger territory than the Soviet side had envisaged. This was connected with the circumstance that the American side had initially not wanted to participate in the occupation of Austria and only declared itself willing to send merely “symbolic contingents” (France’s position was similar). For this reason, the British plan was based on merely on a Soviet-British occupation of Austria. The territory of Upper and Lower Austria (excluding Vienna) was intended for the Soviet side—the remaining part of the country was to be occupied by British troops. Vienna was elected as a zone of common occupation in which the aforementioned “symbolic” contingent of the United States would have been stationed.
The stance of the United States and France later underwent a change, upon which the British side submitted a new proposal in the EAC on January 30, 1945, according to which the USSR would only receive the territory of Lower Austria (without Vienna) for its occupation zone. Styria and Carinthia were foreseen for Great Britain; Salzburg and Upper Austria would be allocated to the United States, and Tyrol along with Vorarlberg to France. The Soviet side responded to this by proposing an enlarged Soviet zone: the territory of Upper Austria situated on the left (northern) bank of the Danube and Burgenland should belong to this. Ultimately, this proposal met with approval and constituted the basis for the Allied agreement regarding the occupation zones for Austria, signed on July 9, 1945 (five days earlier, on July 4, 1945, the agreement on the control machinery had been signed).18
It should be noted that there existed with regard to the zone boundaries a considerable difference between the situation in Austria and that in Germany. Whereas the zone agreement for Germany had already been signed on September 12, 1944, at that point in time—as demonstrated by the correspondence of Churchill and Stalin from May 17 and 18, 1945—there had been no contracted decision for Austria regarding the establishment of zones in that country.19 Against this backdrop, it makes sense to correct a portrayal of the diplomatic history of the final phase of the war in Europe by Valentin Falin:
In April 1945, Soviet troops in Austria pressed forward westwards in pursuit of the enemy across the demarcation line agreed by the three powers. In the framework of a consultation with Stalin, the head of the 3rd European (German) Section of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, Andrei Smirnov, expressed the opinion that the Soviet Union cling to the line reached and, if need be, bring about a fresh examination of the Allied agreement. Stalin’s reaction to this was as follows: “Wrong and harmful.” On his order, a telegram had already been prepared for Eisenhower with the following substance: “The military situation has made it necessary for the troops of the Red Army to cross the line agreed on by the Allies. It goes without saying that these troops will be pulled back into the territory foreseen for the USSR upon the cessation of hostilities (communication to the author by Vladimir Semenov, who was present at the aforementioned consultation).”20
It is evident that Semenov’s memory had let him down and that Falin borrowed from the memories of his oral history source too uncritically. Just to repeat: until July 9, 1945, there were no “agreed demarcation lines.” Nevertheless, there is no reason to assume that the quoted passage entirely lacks a certain authenticity. It is most probable that certain Soviet circles contemplated for a period of time the option of using the most advanced Soviet formations on Austrian territory in order to force through the Soviet proposal for the zone boundaries, which the Western powers were initially not prepared to accept. It is most probable that numbering among the advocates