The state is a “spiritual unity” whose fundamental idea “permeates every individual, so that he feels in himself some of its spiritual force, that he considers himself a member of the whole with love for it, and that the feeling of belonging to the community is stronger than the feeling of provincial, local, or individual isolation.”79 In this sense, the state resembles a family, and “what belongs together by nature does not need a social contract. Among parents and children, among brothers and members of the same family, no compact is needed.”80 Hence there is also no need for written guarantees of individual rights. In every healthy state liberty is identical with obedience. “Compulsion will be transformed on a higher level into voluntary individual initiative. Duty will become liberty.” Once this is attained, the state can achieve what must always be the supreme aim of its domestic policy: social cohesion on the basis of the voluntary cooperation of its citizens.81
In its organization the good state was understood by Ranke as a monarchy in which “the right man is placed in the right place.”82 To demand participation of the governed in the affairs of government, or to consider the governing class as a group alien to those they rule, is to misunderstand the role of the division of labor in a society. The rulers represent a “selection of the most skillful in the whole nation, who have cultivated their ability for this task.”83
Underlying Ranke’s monarchical conviction is the optimistic idea that, left to herself, “nature, which is always complete, guarantees that these (capable men) are always there. All that matters is to find them.”84 Considering “the human inclination to abuse power,” Karl asks whether the power of the government should not be limited. To Friedrich, who admits that this form of government can degenerate in a thousand ways, this seems unnecessary. The state will not only abstain from regulating those spheres of life in which “nothing is more desired than spontaneity of expression,” but it seems obvious to Friedrich that this type of government is “founded in the nature of things, required by the idea of our monarchies.”85
One cannot help sensing a very deep contradiction in Ranke’s argumentation in the Political Dialogue. On the one hand, Ranke’s purpose is to describe not the “best state,” but “merely to understand the one before our eyes.”86 On the other hand, he is constantly seeking the good state, the natural state. If all the existing states are of divine origin, should not, as Carl asks, “all states be equally perfect?” In other words, should not the North American Republic, the French July Monarchy, as the product of historical forces, be of equal value with the Prussian Monarchy. If Ranke were consistent in his demand that the historian or political thinker should find the state in history rather than apply abstract criteria to it, he should have had Friedrich reply to Carl in the affirmative. Instead, he now distinguishes between the “idea” of the state “to which we ascribe divine origin” and “its realization, its concrete form in the world.”87 Thus there are healthy and sick states. By the former type, which he compares to a body “in possession of all its powers and all its limbs,” he obviously does not mean the libertarian state that limits the sphere of political power.
Indeed, Ranke’s study of the state seems to have little to do with the concretely existing historical states. He tends not to study states in terms of their functions, the operation of power within them, or the conflict of interests. As Professor Theodore H. Von Laue observes, for Ranke practical politics involves the training of civil servants and the experts of government.88 Political theory deals with “the state,” but the state is an abstract, standing separate and above the actual activities of real governments. Conceived as a metaphysical reality, it could be used to demand the supremacy of the monarchy over the individual. Narrowly conceived in political and military terms, divorced from the total pattern of social, economic, and intellectual forces, Ranke’s concept of the state seems to apply to the absolute’ monarchies of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries much more closely than to states in general.
Certainly, Ranke is justified in rejecting the metaphysics of individual rights. But in its place, he substitutes a metaphysics of state rights. Despite his emphasis upon the individual character of states as the products of history, in practice all of his states are surprisingly alike. As Ernst Schulin points out, in a recent study on the place of the Orient in Hegel’s and Ranke’s concept of world history, Ranke seems far less capable of describing the individual characteristics of a people than Hegel.89 In practice, all Ranke’s states are guided by the abstract demands of a raison d’etat relatively uneffected by internal developments. In this close identification of the state with foreign policy, Ranke’s concept of the state appears more abstract and rigid than those of Savigny or Wilhelm von Humboldt. Viewing political power in this manner, Ranke also has little understanding for the new forces that operated in European society since the French Revolution.
After 1836, Ranke wrote little relating to historical or political theory, except for random remarks scattered throughout his writings. Two notable exceptions remain: the lecture to King Maximilian in 1854 wherein he rejected the existence of linear, moral progress and spoke of the immediacy of all epochs before God, and the “Political Memoranda”90 in which he counseled King Friedrich Wilhelm IV of Prussia on revolutionary events’ between 1848 and 1851. These memorandums show little change in Ranke’s political views,91 although he now considered a constitution to be inevitable. Afraid of the danger of social upheaval, which he saw hidden behind universal suffrage that had been granted in 1848, he urged the introduction of a limited suffrage and the maintenance of ultimate political control in royal hands. The Prussian Army alone had prevented the revolution from succeeding. King and Army for him were the only stable forces in Germany. “Only when destructive parliamentary majorities will have won control of the army will the revolution have finally triumphed in Germany. Only then will a constituent assembly exercise the same rights as the French Assembly did it in 1789.”92 Behind ministerial responsibility, there lurked the threat of rule by “artisans and day laborers.”93 Afraid of the spread of French ideas, he still saw the need for a common German press law.94 He was unwilling to support the extension of political rights; nevertheless, he recognized the social obligations of the state. Not from humanitarian or moral considerations, but from the standpoint of the military needs of the Prussian state that needed workers to serve in its army, Ranke advocated the right to work.
It is conceivable that the state might employ in peace time under military discipline at least those workers fit for military service. Just as once the military was transformed from an inchoate mass of volunteers into a disciplined army, the activities of unskilled laborers now need to be organized. One can form labor brigades for those public works that still need to be undertaken, such as building projects, flood control, soil reclamation, etc. On the other hand, only limited political rights can be granted to the non-political classes.95
Ranke followed Bismarck’s policies with little enthusiasm. Even after 1849, he still hoped for a strengthened Bund under joint Prussian and Austrian leadership which would permit political diversity, and not threaten the traditional pluralism that he considered so important to the cultural development of German nationality. Bismarck’s concession to the liberals disturbed him even more deeply, although he never opposed it openly. When he hailed Bismarck after his break with the National Liberals in 1879, it was not because he saw in him the founder of the German Empire, but rather the man who defended Europe from social revolution.96
Despite the lack of theoretical formulations after 1836, Ranke’s prolific historical writings nevertheless reflect the ideas presented in the essays of the period from 1831 to 1836. Although he closely relied upon the documents, his histories are not highly specialized monographs. He seeks to trace dominant trends that he, however, generally defines in narrowly political terms. Using official sources, Ranke tends to judge events from the standpoint of governments. Thus, as Eduard Fueter has pointed out, in the discussion of the English Revolutions in the seventeenth century, he appears to ignore the great economic transformations without which the events of the time cannot be understood, because these changes were not recorded in diplomatic papers.97
Rudolf Vierhaus has disputed this view. In a recent study, Vierhaus has sought to defend Ranke against the frequent