commentary added to the communication of the note was listened to by the minister with fair composure; at the passage that our feelings were shared by those of all civilized nations, he observed that this was a mistake. With all the emphasis I could command, I pointed out how regrettable it would be if we could not come to an understanding with Russia on this question, in which everything which is most sacred to us was at stake, and, whatever the minister might say, everything which is sacred in Russia. The minister attempted to minimize the monarchical side of the question.
"With regard to the dossier which was put at the disposal of the Governments, M. Sazonof wanted to know why we had given ourselves this trouble, as we had already delivered the ultimatum. This was the best proof that we did not really desire an impartial examination of the matter. I said to him that the results which had been attained by our own investigations were quite sufficient for our procedure in this matter, which had to do with Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and that we were only ready to give the powers further information if it interested them, as we had nothing to keep secret.
"M. Sazonof said that now that the ultimatum had been issued he was not in the least curious. He represented the matter as if we only wanted to make war with Serbia whatever happened. I answered that we were the most peace-loving power in the world, but what we wanted was security for our territory from foreign revolutionary intrigues, and the protection of our dynasty from bombs. …
"In spite of his relative calm, the attitude of the minister was throughout unaccommodating and hostile."
The Russian "Official Gazette" announced that the Government were closely and anxiously following the Serbian controversy, to which Russia could not remain indifferent.
Count Szápáry telegraphed to Count Berchtold that, after a council of ministers which had lasted five hours, M. Sazonof had received the German Ambassador, Count Pourtalés.
M. Sazonof took the position that the Serbian question was a European affair, the settlement of 1909 having been made under the auspices of all the powers. He pointed out
"that Austria-Hungary had offered a dossier for investigation when an ultimatum had already been presented. Russia would require an international investigation of the dossier, which had been put at her disposal. My German colleague at once brought to M. Sazonof's notice that Austria-Hungary would not accept interference in her difference with Serbia, and that Germany also on her side could not accept a suggestion which would be contrary to the dignity of her ally as a great power.
"In the further course of the conversation the minister explained that that which Russia could not accept with indifference was the eventual intention of Austria-Hungary 'to devour Serbia.' Count Pourtalès answered that he did not accept any such intention on the part of Austria-Hungary, as this would be contrary to the most special interest of the monarchy. The only object of Austria-Hungary was 'to inflict on Serbia justly deserved chastisement.' M. Sazonof on this expressed his doubts whether Austria-Hungary would allow herself to be contented with this even if explanations on this point had been made.
"The interview concluded with an appeal by M. Sazonof that Germany should work with Russia for the maintenance of peace. The German Ambassador assured the Russian Minister that Germany certainly had no wish to bring about a war, but that she naturally fully represented the interests of her ally."
Count Pourtalès telegraphed his Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg that M. Sazonof was very much agitated.
Count Berchtold telegraphed to Count Mensdorff, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at London, to explain to Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, that the action taken toward Serbia was not a formal ultimatum but "merely a démarche with a time limit," which, if not acceded to, would be followed only by Austria's breaking off diplomatic relations and beginning military preparations.
"If Serbia were to give way only under the pressure of our military preparations, we should indeed have to demand that she should make good the expenses which we had incurred; as is well known, we have already had twice (1908 and 1912) to mobilize because of Serbia."
Count Berchtold telegraphed to Count Szápáry, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, a report of his interview with Prince Koudacheff, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna. The prince had stated that St. Petersburg was apprehensive that the démarche might take the form of humiliating Serbia, and this would have an echo in Russia.
"I explained … the danger, not only to the integrity of the [Dual] Monarchy, but also to the balance of power and the peace of Europe, which would be involved in giving further scope to the great Serbian propaganda, and how all the dynasties, and not least the Russian, would apparently be threatened if the idea took root that a movement which made use of murder as a national weapon could be continued with impunity.
"I pointed out that we did not aim at any increase of territory, but only at the maintenance of what we possess, a point of view which could not fail to be understood by the Russian Government."
Russia. M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, telegraphed to Prince Koudacheff, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna, to ask Count Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, that the time limit in the note to Serbia be extended, as it left to the powers insufficient time for conciliation.
"Austria-Hungary, having declared her readiness to inform the powers of the results of the inquiry upon which the Imperial and Royal Government base their accusations, should equally allow them sufficient time to study them.
"In this case, if the powers were convinced that certain of the Austrian demands were well founded, they would be in a position to offer advice to the Serbian Government.
"A refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render nugatory the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the powers, and would be in contradiction to the very bases of international relations."
M. Sazonof communicated this message to London, Rome, Paris, and Belgrade, with the request that in the three former cases similar instructions be given to their Ambassadors at Vienna.
Great Britain. Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, telegraphed to Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, that he had said to Count Mensdorff, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at London, that it was a matter for great regret that a time limit, and such a short one at that, had been insisted upon at this stage of the proceedings.
"The murder of the archduke and some of the circumstances respecting Serbia quoted in the note aroused sympathy with Austria, as was but natural, but at the same time I had never before seen one state address to another independent state a document of so formidable a character. Demand No. 5 would be hardly consistent with the maintenance of Serbia's independent sovereignty if it were to mean, as it seemed that it might, that Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right to appoint officials who would have authority within the frontiers of Serbia.
"I added that I felt great apprehension, and that I should concern myself with the matter simply and solely from the point of view of the peace of Europe. The merits of the dispute between Austria and Serbia were not the concern of his majesty's Government, and such comments as I had made above were not made in order to discuss those merits.
"I ended by saying that doubtless we should enter into an exchange of views with other powers, and that I must await their views as to what could be done to mitigate the difficulties of the situation."
Sir George Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey that M. Sazonof, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, had sought an interview with him, as the Austrian step clearly meant war. At the interview M. Sazonof had said Austria's demands were provocative and immoral, some being impossible of acceptance. She would never have taken such action unless Germany had first been consulted. He hoped Great Britain would proclaim her solidarity with Russia and France. France would fulfill the treaty obligations with Russia, besides supporting Russia in diplomatic negotiations. Sir George said, that personally he did not expect any declaration of this kind from Great Britain. Direct British interests were nil in Serbia, British public opinion would not permit Great Britain to enter war on her