that is characterized simultaneously by social growth and decline, by cultural valuation and devaluation, and ultimately by processes of polarization. This, in essence, is what makes it explosive. In large part, these asymmetries and structural disparities have been neither planned nor consciously brought about; rather, they are what sociologists refer to as unintended consequences. For this very reason, they are irritating. Unlike industrial modernity’s society of equals, late modernity has increasingly been taking on the form of a society of singularities.9 In short, this means: whereas industrial modernity was based, in so many facets of life, on the reproduction of standards, normality, and uniformity – and one could say that “generality” reigned supreme – late-modern society is oriented toward the production of unique and singular entities and experiences and it values qualitative differences, individuality, particularity, and the unusual. If one would prefer to use more familiar terms from sociological and political debates, one could loosely describe late modernity as a society of radicalized individualism. In a sense, it takes this individualism, which has been a part of modernity from the beginning, to an extreme level. To me, however, the traditional concept of “individualism” – as well as that of “individualization” – seems both too broad and too narrow to describe the social and political processes that characterize late modernity.10
I therefore prefer the term “singularization.” It more accurately denotes the social processes in which particularity and uniqueness, non-exchangeability, incomparability, and superlatives are expected, fabricated, positively evaluated, and experienced.11 In late modernity, a social logic of singularization has been established on a large scale, whereas during earlier phases of modernity such logic was only able to exist in small segments of society. It has an inevitably paradoxical structure: core areas of society have now developed general structures and practices whose interest is systematically oriented toward the particular. Thus, singularities neither exist outside of the social world nor are they directed against it – rather, they are at its center. They are not “released into the wild.” On the contrary, they are produced by and are part of the everyday praxis of society.
Unlike the processes of individualization, those of singularization are not restricted to human individuals. Of course, late-modern society admires the particularity of individual people – an excellent performance at work, a top athlete, a prominent environmental activist, or an extraordinary blogger, for instance – but it also admires the singularity of things and objects, such as the authenticity and non-exchangeability of sought-after goods and brands, which are now in part esteemed like works of art. These processes also subject spatial entities to singularization – such as cities or landscapes as recognizably “valuable” places – and they do the same to temporal entities, which can interest us as singular events or memorable moments. Finally, late-modern society even singularizes its collectives: from projects and networks to voluntarily chosen “neo-communities” (of a religious or regional sort, for instance), each of which promises to be incomparable. Late modernity’s systems of evaluation typically frown upon that which is merely standardized and functional – “average” individuals who are mere role players, things that are industrial goods bought “off the rack,” spaces that are “faceless,” and temporal routines that are dull and forgettable – and instead direct society’s interest toward that which is felt to be singular and is valorized as such. Only the latter is attributed value in the true sense.
Broadly speaking, late modernity has thus turned out to be an extremely ambitious form of society in which it is no longer sufficient for anything to be average. Instead, it is expected of individuals, things, events, places, and collectives that they leave the average in the dust. It is only the singularization of the social that promises contentment, prestige, and the power of identification; it alone, from the perspective of late-modern culture, makes people and the world valuable. The transformation from the society of equals to the society of singularities has several causes: the most important among them are the structural shift of the economy from industrial to cognitive-cultural capitalism, the technological revolution of digitalization, and finally the socio-cultural process in which a new urban middle class of highly qualified and educated people, who are oriented toward self-development and individual prestige, has advanced to become society’s new leading milieu.
The “singularistic” structure of late-modern society, however, necessarily comes with its reverse side: that which is unable or unwilling to be singular (or forbidden from being so). Such entities are disdained; they remain invisible in the background, and they receive only minimal – if any – recognition. Inevitably, there are thus winners and losers; there is appreciation and devaluation. This insight is central: the singularization of the social is not a linear process in which everyone and everything receives recognition for his, her, or its uniqueness. Processes of singularization have not caused us to enter a postmodern “realm of freedom” on the heels of industrial modernity’s “realm of necessity.” Rather, society’s valorization of the singular entails the devaluation of that which is standardized and common (and therefore disappears into the background). Under today’s conditions, the ubiquitous singularization of the social inexorably and systematically generates structural asymmetries and disparities.
This dual structure of singularization and polarization applies to every dimension of the tectonic shift that late modern societies have been experiencing. Some of these dimensions will be discussed in the chapters of this book.
Regarding the economy, today’s ambitious and globally networked cognitive-cultural capitalism, which is oriented toward developing complex goods – things, services, events, media formats – that are highly innovative, creative, and appealing, has the reverse side that so-called simple services (routine and repetitive jobs held by low-qualified individuals, whose prestige and social security are minimal) have become more widespread. Conversely, cognitive-cultural capitalism is governed by market structures that follow a winner-take-all logic, so that extremely lucrative goods – from high-tech pharmaceuticals and top football players to globally renowned artwork and desirable real estate – lead to an excessive production of wealth.
In the late-modern educational system, the rapidly growing number of university graduates and the heated profile competition between schools, between universities, and between graduates for excellence and unique selling points is only one side of things. The reverse side of this is the indirect devaluation of lower or mid-rank educational degrees. Today, what was once a normal level of achievement is regarded as no more than average.
High ambition and devaluation also go hand in hand in the area of lifestyles. The lifestyle model of “successful self-actualization,” which strives for uniqueness and the accumulation of singularity capital, turns daily life, work, leisure, and family life into an ambitious challenge. The new middle class rises to this challenge. The reverse side of this process is the subtle cultural devaluation or massive social downgrading that the traditional middle class and the precarious class have been experiencing. In addition, however, there is also a great deal of frustration among members of the new middle class who have failed to live up to their own ambitious standards: the singularistic lifestyle is systematically prone to cause disappointment.
The digital world, too, is based on a fundamental asymmetry: between those individuals (and also goods, places, institutions) that attract attention and appreciation (occasionally in excess), and those that largely remain invisible, are poorly networked and isolated, and either lack recognition or become the focus of negative attention (they are hated or disdained, for instance).
On the level of spatial structures, the current popularity of metropolitan areas is characteristic of late modernity. Appealing cities attract new businesses, workers, and visitors, and a trans-regional competition is now taking place between cities vying to offer the best quality of life. The reverse side is that this has given rise to “left-behind” areas, which are now in a downward spiral of depopulation and waning attractiveness.
In the end, it is only logical that the singularism of late-modern society has also led to polarization in the sphere of politics. Since the 1980s, the dominant form of politics has been a new type of liberalism that is radically based on competition and difference, dynamism, and the removal of