represent important aspects of different religions, but this could increase them unnecessarily. The other option would be to encompass the more general notions that have to do with this form of perennial philosophy of all religions and reflect them in the framework of astrobiological discoveries.
One issue that is extremely important is that the astrotheological discussion should come from religious representatives who have adequate knowledge of the working form of science and astrobiology. Point 3 is essential in order to not fall into absolute biases that blind the assimilation of new results that arise, which will ultimately influence point 4.
The most fundamental aspect we could infer from these four axes is that of our place in the universe from a religious perspective. What is our place in the universe considering the presence of life outside the Earth within the framework of religion? are we moving towards new religious forms that contemplate “other creations” as well as a second astrobiological Genesis? This will push us to rethink several of the religious concepts we currently handle [1.2].
However, when discussing axis 4 we would have to take into account the following:
“Astrotheology should take seriously that most astrobiologists are searching for life that is far from an ETI with which we might have conversations over metaphysics. It is microbial life that is being imagined and that seems like it potentially could be found [1.26].”
There are important issues worth discussing about astrotheology and the discovery of life outside the Earth. To what extent is it relevant for religious studies to find microbial life compared to extraterrestrial intelligence (ETI)? Would discovering non-intelligent and microbial life forms imply a sort of preference for “intelligent creation” on Earth over other planets from a biogeocentric point of view? These and other issues deserve proper discussion to reach a consensus.
1.4 Interplanetary Issue
What if a fact-finding mission involves extraterrestrial life? What would happen if we accidentally caused damage to these life forms? Of course, I mean non-intelligent life, which presents us with a situation where we must decide for ourselves what is the right way to proceed.
These kinds of questions differ from those that might be asked in astroethics. In the latter, there would be more of a focus on issues regarding territorial conflicts, such as: What would happen if a nation under the pretext of staying in an area, the moon, for example, for the purpose of research, intends for second intentions to “appropriate” that land? What would prevent a country from indefinitely occupying a place on Mars under the pretext of continuing its research, considering that no celestial object can be the object of militarization?
We cannot deny that eventually any issues involving the presence of life and the militarization of space or space mining will have to intersect. In the future it is most likely that they will, and to date there is no normative document that addresses all the implications and responsibilities involving all the variables to consider, especially since it is one thing to discuss it around a table, and another to have the problem directly in front of us.
But coming back to the issue of Interplanetary, in astrobioethics it will have to be limited to our role in relation to these other forms of life. This puts us in the position of thinking about defining the axiological dimension that extraterrestrial life will have for us. Should we consider that these forms of life have value in themselves or just an instrumental value? Therefore, we could look at extraterrestrial life from two perspectives, which, since it is always changing, could be more or even interconnect. The perspective of value in itself—taking Kant as a reference—and that of instrumental value—considering the utilitarian perspective.
It should be emphasized that the idea that the human being has value in himself, according to Kant’s argument, comes mainly from the fact of his being a rational being. We do not expect in the short term to meet beings from other planets with intelligence and use of reason, so we will subtract from this thought only the notion of value in itself, since an authentic use of Kantian morality has no place here. Taking into consideration that we think that non-intelligent extraterrestrial life forms cannot defend themselves or have a way of communicating with us in any way, to what extent can we give them some value? The value we could give a non-intelligent extraterrestrial life forms is perhaps as the only galactic companions we know, and that neglecting them or not treating them properly, would then make us alone in the known universe. Here you can enter the word coined by Charles Cockell, which is that of “teloempathy.” What does it mean? Basically, to have empathy for other terrestrial and non-terrestrial life forms because they have interests. What is that interest? That of not being destroyed [1.12] [1.13] [1.15].
However, when we start talking about interests, we are moving away from Kantian morality, so it is more convenient to talk about an astrobioethics with utilitarian rather than Kantian tendencies,
“…if we really want to consider a ‘universal’ ethic in the most real sense possible, it should be based on the experience and the cases studied, so that we avoid a metaphysical attempt that can bring us difficulties rather than solutions [1.7].”
Considering a form of universal ethics would be inconvenient if we put it in front of the transdisciplinary nature of astrobioethics discussed ages ago. The a posteriori form of work that involves the process of astrobiological discovery does not have a universal common theoretical framework to establish a univocal criterion, so our moral reflection is more about the interest that an object may have for us, or, to the contrary, the value that the object of study may have in itself; in this case, an extraterrestrial life form.
If the extraterrestrial life we find has extrinsic or instrumental value, is it really a moral act? If we think of it in terms of the value to humanity that results from research, perhaps yes, but the status of extraterrestrial life places it on an axiological plane different from that of experimenting with other forms of terrestrial life. While teloempathy is an extension of the ecological morality existing on Earth, dealing with the intrinsic value of an extraterrestrial life form can place it in a different position. What happens if in space mining we also find extraterrestrial life forms and that, in addition, the removal of the minerals present in them is of great importance for the Earth? Perhaps it would be more appropriate if this thought was taken to the extreme: What would happen if, after having studied it enough, this way of life does not represent greater scientific value for humanity and there is pressure to use its environment for space mining?
If we only entertain the idea that protecting an extraterrestrial microbial life form has value because it is important for research, then when that value no longer exists, we will have no fear of intervening. Perhaps we could think of places of planetary protection as large reserves, special places where it is forbidden to intervene [1.14]. We should not repeat the ecological damage we have caused on planet Earth in other planetary environments where life may exist. May this new small step for mankind not be the start of trampling life in the universe, as we did with nature on Earth. To avoid this, our value system must be rethought not only on a theoretical but also practical level.
For this reason, an instrumental ethic that only values extraterrestrial microbial life for its usefulness to science is a pseudomorph since in turn it will only be a matter of time for that value to cease to exist. Then, we will have no other reason not to intervene and give it up to be used for the interests that some company or state might have for that place. It is an issue that sooner or later will occur, if not in this generation, the next or subsequent generations. Therefore, it must be considered with the seriousness necessary to achieve a consensus.
However, we could press the question of what to do in a crucial situation where it is imperative to intervene in an environment which has the potential for life or where life has already been confirmed. If it is a potential environment, the pressure might be less than if it is a place with the confirmed presence of life. Let us not forget that we are thinking of an extreme situation, where all other options to avoid landing there have been exhausted and we cannot prolong the decision any longer. In this case we could evoke the third principle of deep ecology, as presented in the book The Basic Principles of Deep Ecology written by Naess and Sessions