Marco Santoro

Mafia Politics


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(see also Hobsbawm 1973; Shanin 1971). The social bandit is their archetypical outlaw form:

      Social banditry, a universal and virtually unchanging phenomenon, is little more than endemic peasant protest against oppression and poverty: a cry for vengeance on the rich and oppressors, a vague dream of some curb upon them, a righting of individual wrongs. Its ambitions are modest … Social banditry has next to no organization or ideology, and is totally inadaptable to modern social movements. (1959, 5)

      Mafia (in all three senses of the word) provided a parallel machine of law and organized power; indeed, so far as the citizen in the areas under its influence was concerned, the only effective law and power … The apparatus of coercion of the ‘parallel system’ was as shapeless and decentralized as its political and legal structure, but it fulfilled its purpose of securing internal quiet and external power. (1959, 35, 38)

      Hobsbawm’s understanding of the mafia has not been very influential in mafia studies – at least not compared to the influence his thesis on social banditry has had on sociohistorical research. This is a pity, as there was much to recommend in his first book, including the suggestions of reading mafia as a (pre-)political phenomenon and pursuing its study in a comparative perspective. In this early book, and even more explicitly in a later one (1969), Hobsbawm makes passing references to other countries, including China, Colombia and Japan. Indeed, even though it is not evoked directly, this was an expansion of the comparative framework for reading mafia (in addition to social banditry) that would only be furthered in later years with the explicit comparison of Italian mafias to other similar social formations such as triads, yakuza and, since the 1970s, Colombian cartels.

      The publication since the 1930s of the fifteen-volume Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences was a major achievement in the history of these sciences, including sociology. For mafia studies, it was the occasion to see its object recognized as a social phenomenon worthy of attention on its own and therefore of an autonomous entry, authored by the same Mosca whose name and ideas, in the meantime, had been travelling beyond Italy and Europe (in 1939, the English translation of his Elementi di scienza politica would be issued in the US as The Ruling Class). The only novelty with respect to his previous writings on the subject was a political acknowledgment of the fascist regime – presented as able, like no previous one, to defeat the mafia (Mosca 1933). Unfortunately, this was simply not true. Fascism fought the mafia, it is true, but the lower branches of it rather than its highest ranks, so that the mafia persisted behind the scenes, sometimes well camouflaged within the same fascist ruling class (on mafia during fascism, see Duggan 1989).

      After Cressey’s influential 1969 study, many other social scientists entered the fray. Some challenged Cressey directly, arguing anew that the mafia did not exist (Hawkins 1969; Smith 1990 [1975]), that it was not nearly as organized and sinister as he had implied (Albini 1971; Chambliss 1978; Reuter 1983), or that organized crime was more ethnically than organizationally based (Ianni 1972, 1975). Others used Cressey’s framework to study a specific example of organized crime (Anderson 1979). All these studies recognized the centrality of Cressey’s study and took it as their point of departure (cf. Colomy 1988; Akers and Matsueda 1989), but they also revealed that, rather than using rituals and being bureaucratic in structure, their group structure was based upon network models otherwise known as forms of patron–client relationships. Among these revisionist scholars were Joseph Albini and Dwight Smith (sociologists), Francis Ianni and Elizabeth Reuss-Ianni (anthropologists), Peter Reuter (economist) and Mark Haller and Alan Block (historians). These revisionist authors helped lead the way in challenging the governmental (or bureaucratic) model of organized crime that viewed the mafia as the top criminal organization that had a monopoly on rackets in the US and around the globe (see Albini and McIllwain 2012, 4–5).