et al. (2005)), adult version, can be used to assess all executive functions, including flexibility. This questionnaire can be used in self or hetero-assessment.
It is composed of 75 questions grouped into nine scales: inhibition, flexibility, emotional control, self-control, initiation, working memory, planning/organization, task control and material organization. This tool was designed from an ecological perspective and allows the identification of executive deficits in adults (aged 18–93 years old) through their consequences in daily life.
Two other versions have been proposed, one for children and another for adolescents: the BRIEF (Behavioral Assessment of Executive Functions Inventory), child and adolescent version calibrated from 5 to 18 years of age (Gioia et al. 2000); the other for preschoolers: the BRIEF-P (Gioia et al. 2003). These two versions are proposed in hetero-assessment.
The BRIEF consists of 86 questions that can be grouped into eight scales: inhibition, flexibility, emotional control, initiation, material organization, working memory, planning/organization and control.
For each of the first two versions (BRIEF and BRIEF-A), two indices – a behavioral regulation index (BRI) and a metacognition index (MCI) – can be calculated, as well as a global executive composite score (ECS).
The BRIEF-P assesses behaviors in the school and/or family context of young preschoolers (aged 2–5 years and 11 months). It is composed of 63 questions (grouped into five scales: inhibition, flexibility, emotional control, working memory, planning/organization). In particular, three indices can be calculated:
1) the inhibitory control index (ICI), which combines inhibition and emotional control;
2) the flexibility index (FI), which combines flexibility and emotional control;
3) the emerging metacognition index (EMI), which combines working memory and planning/organization.
The Cognitive Flexibility Inventory (CFI) (Dennis and Vander Wal 2010) provides a quick measure of cognitive flexibility. It is composed of 20 items in all. It is offered in a self-report format. Three aspects of cognitive flexibility can be measured through the following three subscales:
1) the tendency to perceive difficult situations as controllable;
2) the ability to perceive multiple alternative explanations for life events and human behavior;
3) the ability to generate multiple alternative solutions to difficult situations.
On the basis of observation that cognitive flexibility may be particularly involved in emotion regulation, as a deficit in cognitive flexibility may be observed in mood and anxiety disorders; Gabrys et al. (2018) proposed the Cognitive Control and Flexibility Questionnaire (CCFQ).
This questionnaire was constructed to assess cognitive flexibility in the specific context of stressful situations. The CCFQ is a quick, self-report measure of cognitive flexibility with 18 items, all of which focus on stress management.
Table 1.2 summarizes the examples of indirect measures of flexibility presented in this chapter.
Table 1.2. Examples of indirect measures of flexibility
| Authors | Population | Number of items | |
| Cognitive Flexibility Scale | Martin and Rubin (1995) | Adults | 12 |
| BRIEF-A: Behavioral Assessment of Executive Function Inventory | Roth et al. (2005) | Adults | 75 |
| BRIEF | Gioia et al. (2000) | Children and teenagers (aged 5 to 18 years old) | 86 |
| BRIEF-P | Gioia et al. (2003) | Preschoolers (aged 2–5 years old) | 63 |
| Cognitive Flexibility Inventory | Dennis and Vander Wal (2010) | Adults | 20 |
| Cognitive Control and Flexibility Questionnaire (CCFQ) | Gabrys et al. (2018) | Adults | 18 |
1.3.2. Which measure for which flexibility?
Beyond the fact that no measure can be considered to uniquely and purely assess cognitive flexibility, each chosen measure influences the type of flexibility that is assessed. Researchers and practitioners wishing to use a measure of flexibility should therefore first establish precisely what flexibility they wish to measure, in order to choose their tool accordingly.
In the field of categorization development, for example, as Blaye and Bonthoux (2001) proposed, we consider that two levels of flexibility must be distinguished.
The first, long considered as evidence of flexibility in the use of several categorization modes, rather corresponds to the possibility of multiple pairings for the same object. In a situation of choice of association with a target image (e.g. a dog), children aged 2–3 are able to choose, in turn, a thematic associate (a doghouse) and a taxonomic associate (a frog).
But this first level does not imply a real controlled switch between two modes of categorization, used in a conscious and controlled way by the child. It implies, certainly, a possibility of pluri-representations for the same object, but a weak representation of the categorical relations in play.
In this case, choices could be guided on a case-by-case basis by the stimuli. A more controlled flexible use of categorical relations would correspond to what we call categorical flexibility and could be assessed by a task, as we have proposed (Maintenant and Blaye 2008; Maintenant et al. 2011), involving maintaining the use of one categorization mode over several trials, concerning several different targets, and then switching to the use of another categorization mode over several trials again.
This second level of flexibility would require top-down control and thus more precise representations of categorical relations. This second level would be accessible later. We have been able to show that, when it comes to switching in a controlled way from one mode of categorization to another, it is necessary to wait until 8–9 years of age (Maintenant and Blaye 2008). Moreover, this categorical flexibility would imply sufficient conceptualization of the categorical relations to be used (Maintenant and Pennequin 2016).
Indeed, whether in children or adults, whether the switch is requested on instruction (deductive categorial flexibility) or induced by feedback (inductive categorial flexibility), we have been able to demonstrate that this categorial flexibility requires a sufficient level of representation of the categorization modes and a better conceptualization than during multi-pairing (Maintenant et al. 2013; Maintenant and Pennequin 2016).
Moreover, with Blaye et al. (2007), Maintenant and Blaye (2008), Maintenant et al. (2011), we consider that categorial