concepts or the scientist revising the philosopher’s accounts of empirical research. We crafted this book together so as to respect the intellect of the student and recognize the unfamiliar practice of thinking about the nature of knowledge and reality.
Third, this book is a kind of chimera structured around two of philosophy’s core disciplines – epistemology and metaphysics (an unconventional framework) – with lots of historical and contemporary examples from the sciences, including the physical (from cosmology to geology), biological (from ecology to medicine), and social (from anthropology to economics). We recognize that the science–philosophy interface requires intriguing case studies (e.g., time travel) to illustrate abstract concepts because if a student is not engaged, then the book is just filling space.
We should also note what is missing from this text. Apart from the need to forgo covering every important view on the topics we chose to treat (such as the kairetic account of explanation), there is also no systematic treatment of ethical, social, religious, and political questions. This absence is not intended to suggest that the cultural context of science is unimportant, but that an exploration of the values–science interface warrants an entire text.
We agree with Carlo Rovelli, theoretical physicist writing for Scientific American, who argued that:
Philosophy provides guidance how research must be done. Not because philosophy can offer a final word about the right methodology of science [but] because the scientists who deny the role of philosophy in the advancement of science … are the ones trapped in the ideology of their time.
But not only science should take account of philosophy. As Rovelli continues: “Just as the best science listens keenly to philosophy, so the best philosophy listens keenly to science.” We hope that this text fosters such mutual respect among students majoring in philosophy and STEM fields.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank our department head, colleagues, and families for their encouragement and support in the writing of this book. We especially want to thank the students in FPG’s philosophy of science courses at the University of Wyoming, who provided valuable feedback on earlier versions of the manuscript that eventually morphed into this book. Marissa Koors from Wiley suggested the inclusion of our manuscript in their series This is Philosophy, and the series editor, Steven Hales, got the project going. Our thanks to both of them, as well as to Charlie Hamlyn, who saw the book through to completion. Five anonymous reviewers helped us improve the manuscript by alerting us to several errors and by suggesting discussions of additional topics to enlarge the scope of the text, for which we are grateful. A number of former students and colleagues contributed directly to the content, either by critically evaluating some parts of the manuscript, or by helping us see some of the issues in a different light during fruitful discussions. In particular, our thanks go to Elizabeth Cantalamessa, Conor O’Malley, Bradley Rettler, and Lindsay Rettler. Thanks also to Elizabeth Bell, whose delightful illustrations will help the reader get a better grasp of some of the more abstract topics, and to John Poland for compiling the index.
ABOUT THE COMPANION WEBSITE
A website for This is Philosophy of Science can be accessed at https://thisisphilosoph.wordpress.com. But why would you want to go to a website when you already have a textbook and you have more than enough reading and studying to fill your days? Well, we suggest that the website is a valuable resource when:
You’ve been given an assignment–perhaps a paper to write or presentation to give–and you sure don’t want to mess up technical terms. The website Glossary is an ideal resource to assure that when you write “emergent properties” or say “empiricism” you don’t rely on a philosophically flawed use of the words.
The exam is just days away. How can you best prepare? First, go to the website Glossary and make sure you’ve fully mastered the basic concepts that appear in the chapters covered by the test. And second, test yourself using the multiple-choice questions that appear on the website (these represent many of the important topics covered in each chapter).
As the instructor of the course, tapping into the chapter quizzes on the website might provide an ideal basis for organizing a study session for your students–and perhaps even telling them that your exam will include questions drawn directly from the website!
1 PILLARS OF SCIENCE: REASONS, KNOWLEDGE, AND TRUTH
The empirical sciences are dedicated to describing, explaining, and predicting natural phenomena, such as ionic bonding, predation rates, formation of galaxies, bird migrations, gravitational waves, protein metabolism, or the probability of an earthquake in northern California. The ultimate goal is to gain genuine knowledge about such phenomena – what exactly they are, what regularities govern their occurrence, why and how they occur, when they might happen in the future, and with what probability.
In subsequent chapters, we will investigate many of the difficult and fascinating issues involved in a successful exploration of the natural world. Some of those issues arise with equal force in different sciences, while others may arise in only one discipline, but not in any of the others, at least not in the same form. For now, however, we are going to discuss some of the concepts and procedures that arguably can be found in all empirical sciences. These include (i) the fundamental nature of reasons we give for accepting or rejecting a scientific hypothesis, or any ordinary claim about the world for that matter; (ii) the general structure of the different kinds of inferences we can make on the basis of observations; (iii) the nature of truth and the specter of relativism; and (iv) the relation between facts, hypotheses, laws, and theories. Having a good grasp of these concepts will prove invaluable for understanding the intricacies of empirical science and the philosophical problems that arise in the course of scientific investigations.
The initial discussion will be a bit on the abstract side, and you might at first find it puzzling how questions such as the ones we are going to raise in this chapter are of any relevance to the practice of science. The situation is perhaps similar to learning the rules of baseball before swinging a bat. Sure, you might hit the ball if you don’t know the how the game is played, but you might well run in the wrong direction afterward! And so, as our discussion proceeds in the later chapters, you will find that having gained mastery of some fundamental concepts in epistemology (the study of knowledge) is of great value. So let’s get going.
1.1 Epistemic Reasons
Typically, when we wonder whether we should accept some claim, such as a scientific hypothesis, or not, we look for reasons for doing so. Another way of putting this is that we don’t believe something without having reasons. For example, if someone asks you to accept that there are intelligent, extraterrestrial life forms, you’re likely to ask for reasons before you adopt this belief. And if the other person just hems and haws, you’re not going to believe in extraterrestrials. On the other hand, if you are presented with the cosmic background radiation as evidence for the occurrence of the so-called Big Bang, you have some reason for believing that the universe emerged through this sort of process. (Notice that when we use the term “belief,” we do not mean to talk about religious faith.)
Of course, not any old reason is a good reason. If I believe something because I would like it if it were true, or because I am better off believing it, the belief might well turn out to be false – and in the overwhelming number of cases, it will be. Wishful thinking rarely leads to true beliefs. Thus, we need another kind of reason for believing something if we want to find out the truth about the world.
Reasons of the desired kind are called epistemic reasons. They are the sort of reasons that allow us to accept a belief only if there is good evidence for its truth, or only if the belief doesn’t contradict other, already well-established beliefs derived from good evidence. Of course, it is very contentious what makes for a good epistemic reason. The debate