Animal Welfare. John Webster

‘A Cool Eye towards Eden’ I illustrated this theme with a picture of a brown rat in a larder. (Figure 1.1). I wrote at the time: ‘A normal reaction to the brief glimpse of a rat in one’s larder would be horror or, at least, a cold resolve to destroy the rat as quickly as possible, together with any others who happen to be around. Now study the picture more carefully. The rat is not only sleek to the point of being chubby but completely unalarmed by the flash photography, totally at ease in human company and altogether charming. Her name is Cordelia’. Once we give the rat a name we provoke a shift in attitude. Nevertheless, Cordelia was a rat, and a rat is a rat, whether we classify it as laboratory animal, vermin or pet. She adapted wonderfully well to an enriched environment with loving human contact (my adult daughter, also an academic). If she had grown up in the company of other rats in the wild, she would have adapted equally well to that and, in the interests of her own survival, become fearful and dangerous in the presence of humans. If she had spent most of her life isolated in a barren laboratory cage, she would have had limited opportunity to develop her mind through lack of experience and thus be unable to handle complex decisions such as how to reconcile fear and curiosity in the presence of a novel stimulus. However, the essence of the rat mind is the same, whatever its circumstances. We have no right to assume that some rats are more equal than others. The behavioural and emotional needs of any sentient animal are determined by its own sentience, and these are entirely independent of our perception of its lovability, palatability, utility or nuisance value. In the case of wild animals, be they rats, badgers or, indeed, elephants, there are valid reasons ranging from human health to sustainable management of habitat to operate a form of population control. However, the principle of respect for all life directs that this should be as humane as possible. Where there is no clear need for population control, the policy for wild animals should be to leave them well and leave them alone. The most humane approach to the sensitive and sustainable management of wild animals is to preserve their natural habitat and stay out of their way.

      Theme 2: It is an anthropocentric fallacy to assume that the greater the similarity of an animal species to the human species, the more intelligent they are and the more worthy they are of our concern and respect.

It is in our human nature to express most concern for the animals that look and appear to behave most like us. We are conditioned to believe that humans are the most intelligent of the animal species, so assume that animals that evolved in ways most similar to us must rank second. Thus, not only in popular opinion but also in legislation we give more rights to primates than to pigs. The anthropocentric fallacy was well recognised by Darwin and is implicit in the title of his seminal work ‘The Descent (not the Ascent) of Man’. To give just one illustration of the flaw in this argument, corvid birds (e.g. crows) are better at problem solving than chimpanzees. Much more of this anon. However, this argument based simply on the basis of problem‐solving skills is, like all arguments based on selected evidence, far too simplistic. I shall seek to persuade you that it is pointless to claim that one animal species is more intelligent than another. Each sentient animal is born with, and further develops the mindset and skills most appropriate to its needs and these needs are defined by the environment to which it must adapt. When we seek to measure the intelligence of animals according to criteria that we humans would define as measures of intelligence, such as the ability to associate symbols with boxes that contain food rewards, we may conclude that the most advanced of non‐human animals can just about match the intelligence of a three‐year‐old child. When we start to wonder about the skills that animals display in relation to things that matter to them, but which we cannot measure in the laboratory, like navigating the world, we can only conclude that, in some respects, their skills may be superhuman. These two themes crystallise into one single, central message. Our respect for, and actions towards, all species of sentient animals should be based on our best possible understanding of their life as they see it, not as we see it. In matters of human respect for animals, the question ‘What is this animal for?’ has no meaning.

      The essence of this book is an exploration of animal sentience: how it is determined by, and how it adapts to the physical and mental challenges of the specific environments to which they are exposed. Part 1, The Sentient Mind, skills and strategies, first explores the nature of sentience itself, how animals are motivated primarily by their feelings and the implications this has for their survival, success and wellbeing. It then examines the special senses, vision, hearing and olfaction, and the capacity of the mind to construct mental formulations based on information provided by the special senses and, from this, acquire knowledge and understanding.

Part 2: Shaping sentient minds: adaptation to the environment, examines the minds and skills of animals in groups defined not by their taxonomy, or their ‘utility’ (e.g. pet, farm, game, vermin) but by their habitats and the special challenges they present. I first examine animals in the natural environments of the waters and the air; least subject to interference from that most invasive of terrestrial species, mankind and therefore with most freedom to look after themselves. Terrestrial mammals are grouped according to their habitat. Animals of the savannah and open plains include the large number of herbivores (both wild and domesticated) and the smaller number of carnivores who prey on them. The chapter on animals of the forest gives special attention to the physical and social skills needed for life in the three dimensions of the tree canopy (Chapter 9). The last of the ‘environmental’ chapters (Chapter 10) considers our close neighbours, animals whose natural lives have been most affected by human interference, especially dogs, horses and animals confined to the farmyard or animal factory. In this section, I explore ways in which sentient animals build on the physical and mental tools acquired by way of their birthright in order to meet the special circumstances of their environment. These range from skills needed to manage primitive emotions like hunger, pain and fear to high‐level cognitive formulations such as education and navigation, high‐level emotional formulations like pleasure and grief, and the social graces of cooperation and compassion. Throughout this ‘environmental’ section, human attitudes are kept, wherever possible, off the page. The final section, ‘Nature’s Social Union’, addresses the critical second clause in my title ‘Why it matters’ on the sound basis that sentient animals have feelings that matter to them, so they should also matter to us. This section examines human attitudes and actions to animals so far as possible through their eyes, not ours and reviews how we can apply our understanding of the sentient mind to meet our duty of care. I pose and seek to address questions such as: ‘What can we learn from the animals that will help us to improve their lives and ours? How should we use this knowledge and understanding in the context of our responsibilities to our fellow mortals in the home, on farms, in zoos, laboratories and in the wild? Humans are burdened with the responsibility of care for the living world, based on the principle of respect for all life. This applies not only to animals in our direct care but to those whose lives we affect indirectly through our choice of diet or our competition for habitat (which means, just about all of them and all of us). Our aim must be to seek an honourable social union that achieves justice through proper respect to the things that matter to us and those that matter to them.

      Wherever possible, my conclusions and assertions have been drawn from the evidence of science and the careful observations of those with sound practical experience of animal life. However, this can never be enough. I am just as concerned about what we don’t know about animal minds as what we do. I shall often enter the realms of pure, although rational, speculation and I shall leave a lot of questions unanswered. This a brief exploratory voyage into largely unknown waters and makes no claim to be definitive. The subject is wide open. My observations, thoughts and ideas are offered as substance for reflection, discussion and an outline chart for future explorers.