440c1–d3, which illustrates via an example that the spirited part of the soul is an ally of the rational part of the soul. The Platonic example consists of the opposing reactions of two men to harsh treatment: one of them believes that he is in the wrong, while the other believes that he is being wronged.
Literature: Schlange-Schöningen 2003: 255–90, 2006.
The man who thinks that he is suffering justly, because he himself committed some wrong first, endures his punishment all the more nobly the nobler he is by nature. The other man, who thinks that he is being wronged, gets angry, rages and fights on the side of what seems to him to be just. We can observe these things happening every day among our slaves, too. Those who are caught thieving or doing things of that sort do not get angry when they are being whipped or starved or dishonored by their masters. But those who think that they suffer, or have suffered, such punishments wrongly, their spirit always turns savage inside them and craves vengeance on the one who is wronging them.
Which forms of punishment for slaves are presented in the passage?
What criterion determines whether slaves accept punishment or not, according to Galen? Do you believe Galen?
How might the principle of just punishment have affected the unilateral right of masters to punish their slaves?
1.22 Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights, 1.26.3–9: Latin Miscellany of Learned Material (Second Century CE)
Aulus Gellius here reports part of the answer given to him by Lucius Calvinus Taurus, a contemporary Platonist philosopher, when he asked him whether wise men ever got angry. Plutarch, another Platonist, was an influential philosopher and biographer.
Literature: Harris 2001: 317–36; Klees 2005; Hunt 2016; Lenski 2016.
“This is what I think,” Taurus said, “about getting angry. But it would do no harm to hear, also, what our Plutarch, an extremely learned and wise man, thought. Plutarch,” he said, “once gave orders that a slave of his, a worthless and insolent fellow but with ears filled with philosophical works and arguments, be stripped of his tunic for I don’t know what offence, and whipped. The beating had started, and he kept protesting that he had not done anything deserving flogging – he had not been guilty of anything wrong or criminal. In the end, amid the flogging, he began to shout – no longer making complaints, groans, and laments but serious and reproachful arguments: that Plutarch’s behavior was improper for a philosopher; that it was shameful to get angry; that Plutarch had often lectured on the evil of anger and had even written a very fine book On Lack of Anger, and that it was not compatible with anything of what was written in the book that he, submitting and yielding to anger, punished him with many blows.
“Then Plutarch spoke, calmly and mildly. ‘Oh you who deserve to be under the whip, do I now seem angry to you? Is it from my face, or from my voice, or my complexion or, even, from my words that you perceive I’ve been seized by anger? I think that neither my eyes are fierce, nor is my face wild, nor am I shouting uncontrollably, nor am I raging to the point of foaming around the mouth or turning red, nor am I saying words to be ashamed of or regret, nor am I trembling or gesticulating because of anger. For, in case you don’t know it, all these things are the typical signs of anger.’ And, turning at the same time toward the one who was whipping the slave, he said: ‘Meanwhile, while this fellow and I are arguing, you continue your task.’”
How does the slave initially attempt to avoid punishment? How does this relate to 1.21?
What is the second argument that he uses? Does it work?
How is Plutarch’s emotional state portrayed in this passage? Can we learn something about masters’ mentality from Plutarch’s response?
How does this master–slave negotiation relate to that described in 1.19?
What conclusions should we draw from the fact that the slave has learned some of his master’s philosophy?
What conclusions can we draw about slave agency from this passage?
How does this passage illustrate both the asymmetry and the negotiation that slavery involves?
1.23 Digest, 1.6.1–2: Collection of Latin Juristic Texts (Sixth Century CE)
On the Digest, see 1.2.
Literature: Härtel 1977; Knoch 2017: 111–18.
Gaius, Institutes, Book 1:
Slaves are under the power (potestas) of their masters. This power is derived from the law of nations, for we can observe that equally among all nations masters have had power of life and death over their slaves. Whatever acquisition is made via the slave is made by the master. In our times, however, no man who is a subject of the Roman Empire is permitted to act against his slaves with excessive brutality and without a cause acknowledged by the laws. For, through an enactment of the divine (emperor) Antoninus, one who kills his own slave without cause is to be punished in the same way as one who has killed the slave of another. But even excessive harshness of masters is also curbed via an enactment of the same emperor.
Ulpian, On the Duties of the Provincial Governor, Book 8:
If a master acts brutally against his slaves or forces them to indecency and disgraceful violation, the tasks of the governor are stated in the rescript addressed by the divine Antoninus Pius to Aelius Marcianus, the governor of the province of Baetica. The terms of this rescript are the following: “It is certainly proper that the power (potestas) of the masters over their slaves be unimpaired and that no man’s rights be taken from him. However, it is in the interest of the masters not to deny relief to those who justly implore for help against brutality or starvation or intolerable insult. For this reason, investigate the complaints of the slaves of the household of Julius Sabinus who fled and took refuge at my statue. If you find that they have been treated more harshly than is fair or subjected to infamous insult, order that they be sold on the condition that they may not come back under the power (potestas) of their present master. And if he should fraudulently evade my decision, he should know that I will pursue the punishment of this offence more severely.” Also, the divine (emperor) Hadrian ordered the banishment from Rome for a five-year period of one Umbricia, a married woman of good family, because she had treated her female slaves in the most savage way for extremely trivial reasons.
What powers do masters have to punish their slaves? Cf. 5.1.
How did Roman emperors limit the masters’ right to punishment?
How is this limitation justified?
How did the slaves of Julius Sabinus attempt to escape their cruel master? Cf. 6.14–5.
1.24 Libanius, Orations, 47.21: Greek Epideictic Oratory (Fourth Century CE)
Libanius uses an analogy in order to persuade the emperor of the need to prevent tenants of agricultural land around Antioch in Syria from requesting help from people other than the owners of the land they cultivate.
Nor is it right that a slave who demands justice for wrongs he has suffered should look to someone else and present himself before someone who has no proper authority over him and beg for that man’s help, thereby bypassing his master. For he would no longer belong to his master entirely but would surrender a large share of himself – both of his goodwill and his labor – to the person who assisted him. It is indeed right that he receive justice, but he should receive it through his master. The result of a slave’s securing justice through someone else is often that the master could be deprived of his slave, becoming the object of the slave’s contempt because of the other man’s assistance.
Why should slaves ask only their masters for help?
What was the danger if they asked other people for help? How