makes committing iniquities more difficult, of course; but, more interestingly, it also sometimes hinders just causes, such as material and technical progress, economic and social efficiency, or public utility. And this hindering, obstructive, and paralyzing effect, which often accompanies dignity and which makes us stop and consider, opens our eyes to the dignitas of precisely those who are a hindrance, because they are no longer useful, they are left over, always threatened by a history that would advance more quickly without them. So, if to begin with, dignity resembled a luminous aura surrounding only perfection, its meaning is now widened to include the dignity of imperfection in all its forms, which are often even more powerfully and visually noticeable.
The transition from a state of nature to one of civilization is manifest in a social organization that gives preference to the residual, the surplus, dignity’s favorites; that preference might be exemplified, in our daily urban experience, by an expensive car that has been driving at speed but has to pull up and stop because of a distracted child or an awkward old person slowly walking over a crosswalk. In the world of nature, the struggle to survive is won by the strongest or the best adapted. Humankind enters that combat in better conditions because it has substituted ferocious teeth and sharpened claws for symbolic language and technology, which have worked the miracle of adapting nature to its needs and of dominating the other species. Having reached a certain level of social evolution, without any apparent evolutionary advantage, the human species, allowing themselves a luxury, which apparently only they can enjoy, raises up a humanitarian ideal that overturns the law of the survival of the fittest prevailing in the natural world and puts in its place a new and revolutionary law of the survival of the weakest.
Perhaps the first vestige in history of recognizably human behavior was found only a couple of decades ago in the excavations at Dmanisi (Georgia): the fossilized remains of hominids who lived in the area 1.8 million years ago. Among them was a jawbone, which exhibited the peculiarity of not having any teeth. It must have belonged to an old person who was unable to feed themself and needed the cooperation of the group to ingest a mash of prechewed meat. There is no other record of a prior fossilized hominid with such a great loss of teeth and remodeling of the jaw. There is no information either regarding primates with a similar degree of tooth loss. Before the Dmanisi discovery, there were no known cases of longevity either in hominids or chimpanzees, which in any event never outlived the postreproductive period. Once the basic biological function to ensure the perpetuation of the species had been accomplished – reproduction with transmission of the genetic heritage – the individual was headed towards a quick death. Why prolong life? Evolution is blind in respect of old age, a sheer biological absurdity.
Dmanisi certifies the birth of group cooperation, which was antievolutionary, antinatural, and antiutilitarian – in other words, genuinely human. The old fellow served no useful purpose, and in spite of that, the group considered him worthy of care and protection. The first flashing glory of dignity occurred at Dmanisi.
Egalitarian Dignity
In premodern tradition, full dignity was still reserved for those who deserved it. In fact, the concept survived without any significant conflict in a highly hierarchal society in which there were different dignities and abundant discrimination. But, as I have already suggested, the concept bore within itself the seeds of its own improvement. Sure enough, the twentieth century brought about a mutation of its essence, which did not occur, as usually happens, through the influence of the teachings of a renowned philosopher or of a prestigious school of thought inspiring a program of political action; it occurred, in the absence of the learned, through ordinary people and the force of events.
This mutation of essence implied, in the first place, the substitution of the old distinction of aristocracy and an extension to include all the members of the human race – something in the nature of an aristocracy of the masses. All people, for the sole reason that they belong to the human race, possess it equally and forever. Furthermore, this egalitarian dignity is now perceived as self-grounded, not depending on another authority that acts as its foundation (reason, freedom, morality); full from the outset and not needing any later improvement, nor subject to loss, wastage, or depletion through possible misuse by the bearer; absolute and not relative to others, men or animals; and finally centered, not on the duties that it imposes on the bearer, but on his right to demand it be universally respected by others – all of which prepare the ground for the doctrine of universal rights.
Democratic dignity is received at birth and entitles the bearer to rights without any moral virtue on his part, rights that are valid even if the original dignity is belied by the odious indignity of a subject’s life.
Dignity is inalienable, indefeasible, and inviolable; though it is undeserved, it is nonetheless worthy of respect and, in a certain way, places the rest of humanity in a position of owing.
It is unique, universal, anonymous, and abstract. And, consequently, it is also cosmopolitan; in other words, it is the same for all human beings on the planet.
An idea such as this, in spite of appearing to be a truism, is neither “natural” nor “normal,” which is demonstrated by the fact that no one seems to have missed it in the course of previous millennia. It has to be understood rather as if it were an exceedingly difficult lesson to be learned collectively, a lesson that is not written in a revealed book or in the book of nature. It is, as it were, a moral truth that has recently established itself with the majority as a result of recent historic events of unspeakable inhumanity, which have created a consensus, in negative terms, that such events should never, under any circumstances, be repeated.
Something that is evident is perceived, as such, by those whose senses are trained to perceive it – which is what happens in the perception of artistic perfection or philosophical or scientific truth. Therefore, the reason for people’s dignity depends on their education. Kant’s distinction between dignity and price is again useful to encapsulate the multiple objectives of education into two: training professionals and training citizens.
A professional is a person who has learned the rules of a trade and applies them with competence in order to make a living by supplying a product or a service for which the market is prepared to pay a price. A country with competent professionals has the stamp of a truly modern country. Together, with the training of professionals, the second objective is to educate that same individual to become a citizen, which means someone who is aware of their dignity. A rounded education not only becomes the source of practical and profitable skills but also prompts the citizen to be aware of their own dignity and instills self-respect into themselves, to avoid what Kant describes as “to find himself, on self-examination, worthless and contemptible in his own eyes” (Kant 1898, p. 259).
The ancients, at the times when they were not engaged in negotium, recommended the cultivation of otium cum dignitate, a complacency in that intimate feeling about the value of each individual, subject neither to price nor the rationality of the marketplace. Price and dignity are not locked in irreconcilable antagonism, but there is certainly a tension between them, which has no definitive solution. And, if there is a conflict, dignity prevails, because, both in chronologic and anthropologic terms, we are citizens first and professionals second.
Inviolable but Violated a Thousand Times
A common criticism leveled at dignity and repeated by its adversaries is that it cannot be objectively and rationally explained and that it is, therefore, indemonstrable.
There is no doubt that dignity is the postulate of a value, not an empirical fact observable by the senses. It does not resemble, for example, an identifiable object, or a logical deduction, or a juridical law. Its essence is of the moral realities, like bravery, decency, compassion, which are not apprehended by scientific reasoning but which are recognized by feelings, even before they can be defined. Whatever dignity may be is learnt, not in the logical definition of scholarly treatises, but in the direct intuition of its essence, which is revealed by a specific example.
The law requires that something should be done and, if it is not obeyed, the law imposes it coactively. But in the realm of morality,