he can, and to instruct his neighbor.
9. If revelation were universal, in extent and degree, different understandings, educations, tempers, length of lives, and outward advantages, would soon make the knowledge of it as different as it is at present.
First. That the evidence of religion is not such as unavoidably to convince all, may be part of our probation.
1. It gives scope for a wise or vicious use of our understanding. Just as is the case in common affairs.
2. Intellectual inattention to so serious a matter, is as immoral, as disobedience after conviction of the truth.
Secondly. If the evidence is really doubtful, it puts us on probation.
1. If a man were in doubt whether a certain person had done him the greatest favor, or whether his whole temporal interest depended on him, he ought not to regard that person as he would if there were no reason to think so.
2. So if there is only reason to apprehend that Christianity may be true, we are as much bound to examine, &c. as we would be bound to obey, if we knew it was true.
3. Considering the infinite importance of religion, there is not much difference as to what ought to be the mode of life of those who are convinced and those who doubt its truth. Their hopes and fears are the same in kind, though not in degree; and so their obligations are much the same.
4. Doubts presuppose some evidence, belief more, and certainty more still. Each state should influence our conduct, and does so, in common things.
5. It shows a mental defect not to see evidence unless it is glaring; and a corrupt heart not to be influenced by it unless overpowering.
Thirdly. Difficulties as to believing religion, are no more a ground of complaint, than difficulties in practising it.
1. They constitute a wholesome discipline.
1.) In allowing an unfair mind to deceive itself.
2.) In requiring belief and the practice of virtue under some uncertainties.
2. In the case of some minds, speculative difficulties as to the evidence of religion is the principal trial. A full conviction of its truth would constrain some to obedience.
Fourthly. The difficulties may be in the objector rather than in the religion.
1. Not sufficiently in earnest to be informed.
2. Secretly wishes religion not to be true.
3. Looks at objections rather than replies.
4. Treats the subject ludicrously.
Fifthly. The proof of Christianity is level to common men.
1. They are capable of being convinced of the existence of God, and of their moral accountability.
2. And they can understand the evidence of miracles, and the fulfilment of prophecy.
3. If they are capable of seeing the difficulty, they are capable of understanding the proof.
4. If they pick up objections from hearsay, and will not or cannot examine them thoroughly, they must remain ignorant, just as they do as to the sciences.
Objec. Our directions should be too plain to admit of doubt; like those of an earthly master.
Ans. The earthly master only wants his work done, and is careless as to the state of the heart; but as the whole of morality consists in the state of the heart, the cases are not parallel.
Finally. The credibility of our being in a state of probation is just as great as the credibility of there being any religion. Our probation may be whether we choose to inform ourselves as to our duty, and then whether we choose to do it.
Such is exactly the case as to temporal matters. To discern what is best often requires difficult consideration, and yet leaves doubts: and not reflecting carefully, or not acting even when there may be doubt, is often fatal.
Having considered the objections both to the general scheme of Christianity, and to particular doctrines in it, it only remains to consider the positive evidence of its truth; i. e. what analogy teaches with regard to that evidence.
There are many evidences of Christianity, beside those from miracles or prophecy, which are the principal; embracing a great variety of proofs, direct and collateral, and reaching through all past time. We shall now consider the proofs from MIRACLES and PROPHECY.
1. Bible history gives the same evidence for the miracles described, as for common events.
1.) The miracles are evidently not put in for ornament, as speeches are by historians and poets put into the mouths of heroes.
2.) The accounts of them have been quoted as genuine, by various writers, from that day to this.
3.) These accounts are confirmed by subsequent events; and the miracles alone, can account for those events.
4.) The only fair way of accounting for these statements, and their reception in the world, is that the things really happened.
5.) The statements should be admitted till disproved, even if doubtful.
2. Paul’s Epistles have evidences of genuineness, beyond what can attach to mere history.
1.) Additional. His evidence is quite detached. He received the gospel not in common with the other apostles, but separately, and direct from Christ, after his ascension.
2.) Peculiar. He speaks of Christ’s miracles and those of others incidentally, as familiar facts, fully believed by those to whom he wrote.
3. Christianity demands credence on the ground of its miracles, and was so received by great numbers, at the time and on the spot; which is the case with no other religion.
1.) Its first converts embraced it on this ground.
2.) It is not conceivable that they would have done so, at such fearful sacrifice, unless fully satisfied of the truth of these miracles.
3.) Such a profession and sacrifices furnish the same kind of evidence as if they had testified to the truth of the miracles in writing.
4.) It is real evidence, for they had full opportunity to inform themselves.
5.) It is a sort of evidence distinct from direct history, though of the same nature.
6.) Men are suspicious as well as credulous, and slow to believe against their interests, as these did.
4. It lies upon unbelievers to show why all this array of proof is to be rejected; but in such an important concern we shall proceed to notice some possible objections.
Objec. 1. Enthusiasts make similar sacrifices for idle follies.
Ans. 1. This objection ignores the distinction between opinions and facts. Suffering for an opinion is no proof of its truth; but in attestation of observed facts, it is proof.
2. Enthusiasm weakens testimony, it is true, even as to facts; and so does disease, in particular instances. But when great numbers, not weak, nor negligent, affirm that they saw and heard certain things, it is the fullest evidence.
3. To reject testimony on the ground of enthusiasm, requires that the things testified be incredible; which has not been shown, as to religion, but the contrary.
4. Religion is not the only thing in regard to which witnesses are liable to enthusiasm. In common matters, we get at the truth through witnesses, though influenced by party spirit, custom, humor, romance,