This shows the ground of the Kantian explanation of matter, that it is “that which is movable in space,” for motion consists simply in the union of space and time.
9
Not, as Kant holds, from the knowledge of time, as will be explained in the Appendix.
2
The Hegelian Philosophy.
5
Kant is the only writer who has confused this idea of reason, and in this connection I refer the reader to the Appendix, and also to my “Grundprobleme der Ethik”: Grundl. dd. Moral. § 6, pp. 148-154, first and second editions.
6
Mira in quibusdam rebus verborum proprietas est, et consuetudo sermonis antiqui quædam efficacissimis notis signat. Seneca, epist. 81.
7
It is shown in the Appendix that matter and substance are one.
8
This shows the ground of the Kantian explanation of matter, that it is “that which is movable in space,” for motion consists simply in the union of space and time.
9
Not, as Kant holds, from the knowledge of time, as will be explained in the Appendix.
10
On this see “The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason,” § 49.
11
The first four chapters of the first of the supplementary books belong to these seven paragraphs.
12
Compare with this paragraph §§ 26 and 27 of the third edition of the essay on the principle of sufficient reason.
13
Cf. Ch. 5 and 6 of the Supplement.
14
Cf. Ch. 9 and 10 of the Supplement.
15
Cf. Ch. 11 of Supplement.
16
I am therefore of opinion that a science of physiognomy cannot, with certainty, go further than to lay down a few quite general rules. For example, the intellectual qualities are to be read in the forehead and the eyes; the moral qualities, the expression of will, in the mouth and lower part of the face. The forehead and the eyes interpret each other; either of them seen alone can only be half understood. Genius is never without a high, broad, finely-arched brow; but such a brow often occurs where there is no genius. A clever-looking person may the more certainly be judged to be so the uglier the face is; and a stupid-looking person may the more certainly be judged to be stupid the more beautiful the face is; for beauty, as the approximation to the type of humanity, carries in and for itself the expression of mental clearness; the opposite is the case with ugliness, and so forth.
17
Cf. Ch. 7 of the Supplement.
18
Cf. Ch. 8 of Supplement.
19
Suarez, Disput. Metaphysicæ, disp. iii. sect. 3, tit. 3.
20
Cf. Ch. 12 of Supplement.
21
The reader must not think here of Kant's misuse of these Greek terms, which is condemned in the Appendix.
22
Spinoza, who always boasts that he proceeds more geometrico, has actually done so more than he himself was aware. For what he knew with certainty and decision from the immediate, perceptive apprehension of the nature of the world, he seeks to demonstrate logically without reference to this knowledge. He only arrives at the intended and predetermined result by starting from arbitrary concepts framed by himself (substantia causa sui, &c.), and in the demonstrations he allows himself all the freedom of choice for which the nature of the wide concept-spheres afford such convenient opportunity. That his doctrine is true and excellent is therefore in his case, as in that of geometry, quite independent of the demonstrations of it. Cf. ch. 13 of supplementary volume.
23
Cf. Ch. 17 of Supplement.
24
Omnes perturbationes judicio censent fieri et opinione. Cic. Tusc., 4, 6. Ταρασσει τους ανθρωπους ου τα πραγματα, αλλα τα περι των πραγματων δογματα (Perturbant homines non res ipsæ, sed de rebus opiniones). Epictet., c. v.
25
Τουτο γαρ εστι το αιτιον τοις ανθρωποις παντων των κακων, το τας προληψεις τας κοινας μη δυνασθαι εφαρμοξειν ταις επι μερους (Hæc est causa mortalibus omnium malorum, non posse communes notiones aptare singularibus). Epict. dissert., ii., 26.
