to the introduction of a new species of oppression, but is in itself such as cannot be ratified without injury to the honour of this great assembly.
In examining the bill, my lords, I think it not necessary to dwell upon the more minute and trivial defects of the orthography and expression, though they are such as might justly give occasion for suspecting that they by whom it was written, were no less strangers to our language than to our constitution. There are errours or falsehoods which it more nearly concerns us to detect, and to which we cannot give any sanction, without an evident diminution of our own authority.
It declares, my lords, that there is now an inquiry depending before the senate, an assertion evidently false, for the inquiry is only before the commons. Whether this was inserted by mistake or design, whether it was intended to insinuate that the whole senatorial power was comprised in the house of commons, or to persuade the nation that your lordships concurred with them in this inquiry, it is not possible to determine; but since it is false in either sense, it ought not to receive our confirmation.
If we should pass the bill in its present state, we should not only declare our approbation of the measures hitherto pursued by the commons, by which it has been already proved, by the noble and learned lord who spoke first against the bill, that they have not only violated the law, but invaded the privileges of this house. We should not only establish for ever in a committee of the house of commons, the power of examining upon oath, by an elusive and equivocatory expedient, but we should in effect vote away our own existence, give up at once all authority in the government, and grant them an unlimited power, by acknowledging them the senate, an acknowledgment which might, in a very short time, be quoted against us, and from which it would not be easy for us to extricate ourselves.
It has, indeed, been remarked, that there is a large sum of money disbursed without account, and the publick is represented as apparently injured, either by fraud or negligence; but it is not remembered that none but his majesty has a right to inquire into the distribution of the revenue appropriated to the support of his family and dignity, and the payment of his servants, and which, therefore, cannot, in any degree, be called publick money, or fall under the cognizance of those whom it concerns to inspect the national accounts. Either the civil list must be exempt from inquiries, or his majesty must be reduced to a state below that of the meanest of his subjects; he can enjoy neither freedom nor property, and must be debarred for ever from those blessings which he is incessantly labouring to secure to others.
There is, likewise, another consideration, which my regard for the honour of this assembly suggested to me, and of which I doubt not but that all your lordships will allow the importance. The noble person who is pointed out in this bill as a publick criminal, and whom all the villains of the kingdom are invited to accuse, is invested with the same honours as ourselves, and has a son who has for many years possessed a seat amongst us; let us not, therefore, concur with the commons to load our own house with infamy, and to propagate reproach, which will at last fix upon ourselves.
Innumerable are the objections, my lords, which might yet be urged, and urged without any possibility of reply; but as I have already been heard with so much patience, I think what has been already mentioned sufficient to determine the question: and as I doubt not but the other defects and absurdities will be observed, if it be necessary, by some other lords, I shall presume only to add, that as the bill appears to me contrary to the laws of this nation, to the common justice of society, and to the general reason of mankind, as it must naturally establish a precedent of oppression, and confirm a species of authority in the other house which was either never claimed before, or always denied; as I think the most notorious and publick criminal ought not to be deprived of that method of defence which the established customs of our country allow him, and believe the person mentioned in this bill to deserve rather applauses and rewards, than censures and punishments, I think myself obliged to oppose it, and hope to find your lordships unanimous in the same opinion.
Then the duke of ARGYLE answered, in substance as follows:—My lords, whatever may be the fate of this question, I have little hope that it will be unanimously decided, because I have reason to fear that some lords have conceived prejudices against the bill, which hinder them from discovering either its reasonableness or its necessity; and am convinced that others who approve the bill, can support their opinion by arguments from which, as they cannot be confuted, they never will recede.
Those arguments which have influenced my opinion, I will lay before your lordships, and doubt not of showing that I am very far from giving way to personal malice, or the prejudices of opposition; and that I regard only the voice of reason, and the call of the nation.
Calmness and impartiality, my lords, have been, with great propriety, recommended to us by the noble lord who spoke first in this debate; and I hope he will discover by the moderation with which I shall deliver my sentiments on this occasion, how much I reverence his precepts, and how willingly I yield to his authority.
I am at least certain, that I have hitherto listened to the arguments that have been offered on either side with an attention void of prejudice; I have repressed no motions of conviction, nor abstracted my mind from any difficulty, to avoid the labour of solving it: I have been solicitous to survey every position in its whole extent, and trace it to its remotest consequences; I have assisted the arguments against the bill by favourable suppositions, and imaginary circumstances, and have endeavoured to divest my own opinion of some appendant and accidental advantages, that I might view it in a state less likely to attract regard; and yet I cannot find any reason by which I could justify myself to my country or my conscience, if I should concur in rejecting this bill, or should not endeavour to promote it. I am not unacquainted, my lords, with the difficulties that obstruct the knowledge of our own hearts, and cannot deny that inclination may be sometimes mistaken for conviction; and men even wise and honest, may imagine themselves to believe what, in reality, they only wish: but this, my lords, can only happen for want of attention, or on sudden emergencies, when it is necessary to determine with little consideration, while the passions have not yet time to subside, and reason is yet struggling with the emotions of desire.
In other circumstances, my lords, I am convinced that no man imposes on himself without conniving at the fraud, without consciousness that he admits an opinion which he has not well examined, and without consulting indolence rather than reason; and, therefore, my lords, I can with confidence affirm, that I now declare my real opinion, and that if I err, I err only for want of abilities to discover the truth; and hope it will appear to your lordships, that I have been misled at least by specious arguments, and deceived by fallacious appearances, which it is no reproach not to have been able to detect.
It will, my lords, be granted, I suppose, without hesitation, that the law is consistent with itself; that it never at the same time commands and prohibits the same action; that it cannot be at once violated and observed. From thence it will inevitably follow, that where the circumstances of any transaction are such, that the principles of that law by which it is cognizable are opposite to each other, some expedients may be found by which these circumstances may be altered. Otherwise a subtle or powerful delinquent will always find shelter in ambiguities, and the law will remain inactive, like a balance loaded equally on each side.
On the present occasion, my lords, I pronounce with the utmost confidence, as a maxim of indubitable certainty, that the publick has a claim to every man's evidence, and that no man can plead exemption from this duty to his country. But those whom false gratitude, or contracted notions of their own interest, or fear of being entangled in the snares of examination, prompt to disappoint the justice of the publick, urge with equal vehemence, and, indeed, with equal truth, that no man is obliged to accuse himself, and that the constitution of Britain allows no man's evidence to be extorted from him to his own destruction.
Thus, my lords, two of the first principles of the British law, though maxims equally important, equally certain, and equally to be preserved from the least appearance of violation, are contradictory to each other, and neither can be obeyed, because neither can be infringed.
How then, my lords, is this contradiction to be reconciled, and the necessity avoided of breaking the law on one side or the other, but by the method now proposed, of setting those whose evidence is required, free from the danger which they may incur by giving it.
The end of the law is the redress of