conversus, salvere Gitona jubet."
Birmingham.
ABUSES OF HACKNEY COACHES
[The following proclamation on this subject is of interest at the present moment.]
A Proclamation to restrain the Abuses of Hackney Coaches in the Cities of London and Westminster, and the Suburbs thereof.
Charles R.
Whereas the excessive number of Hackney Coaches, and Coach Horses, in and about the Cities of London and Westminster, and the Suburbs thereof, are found to be a common nuisance to the Publique Damage of Our People by reason of their rude and disorderly standing and passing to and fro, in and about our said Cities and Suburbs, the Streets and Highways being thereby pestred and made impassable, the Pavements broken up, and the Common Passages obstructed and become dangerous, Our Peace violated, and sundry other mischiefs and evils occasioned:
We, taking into Our Princely consideration these apparent Inconveniences, and resolving that a speedy remedy be applied to meet with, and redress them for the future, do, by and with the advice of our Privy Council, publish Our Royal Will and Pleasure to be, and we do by this Our Proclamation expressly charge and command, That no Person or Persons, of what Estate, Degree, or Quality whatsoever, keeping or using any Hackney Coaches, or Coach Horses, do, from and after the Sixth day of November next, permit or suffer the said Coaches and Horses, or any of them, to stand or remain in any the Streets or Passages in or about Our said Cities either of London or Westminster, or the Suburbs belonging to either of them, to be there hired; but that they and every of them keep their said Coaches and Horses within their respective Coach-houses, Stables, and Yards (whither such Persons as desire to hire the same may resort for that purpose), upon pain of Our high displeasure, and such Forfeitures, Pains, and Penalties as may be inflicted for the Contempt of Our Royal Commands in the Premises, whereof we shall expect a strict Accompt.
And for the due execution of Our Pleasure herein, We do further charge and command the Lord Mayor and Aldermen of Our City of London, That they in their several Wards, and Our Justices of Peace within Our said Cities of London and Westminster, and the Liberties and Suburbs thereof, and all other Our Officers and Ministers of Justice, to whom it appertaineth, do take especial care in their respective Limits that this Our Command be duly observed, and that they from time to time return the names of all those who shall wilfully offend in the Premises, to Our Privy Council, and to the end they may be proceeded against by Indictments and Presentments for the Nuisance, and otherwise according to the severity of the Law and Demerits of the Offenders.
Given at Our Court at Whitehall the 18th day of October in the 12th year of Our Reign.
London: Printed by John Bell and Christopher Barker, Printers to the King's most Excellent Majesty, 1660.
Pepys, in his Diary, vol. i. p. 152., under date 8th November, 1660, says:
"To Mr. Fox, who was very civil to me. Notwithstanding this was the first day of the King's proclamation against hackney coaches coming into the streets to stand to be hired, yet I got one to carry me home."
SHAKSPEARE CORRESPONDENCE
Passage in "The Tempest," Act I. Sc. 2.—
"The sky, it seems, would pour down stinking pitch,
But that the sea, mounting to the welkin's cheek,
Dashes the fire out."
"The manuscript corrector of the folio 1632," Mr. Collier informs us, "has substituted heat for 'cheek,' which is not an unlikely corruption, a person writing only by the ear."
I should say very unlikely: but if heat had been actually printed in the folios, without speculating as to the probability that the press-copy was written from dictation, I should have had no hesitation in altering it to cheek. To this I should have been directed by a parallel passage in Richard II., Act III. Sc. 3., which has been overlooked by Mr. Collier:
"Methinks, King Richard and myself should meet
With no less terror than the elements
Of fire and water, when their thundering shock
At meeting tears the cloudy cheeks of heaven."
Commentary here is almost useless. Every one who has any capacity for Shakspearian criticism must feel assured that Shakspeare wrote cheek, and not heat.
The passage I have cited from Richard II. strongly reminds me of an old lady whom I met last autumn on a tour through the Lakes of Cumberland, &c.; and who, during a severe thunderstorm, expressed to me her surprise at the pertinacity of the lightning, adding, "I should think, Sir, that so much water in the heavens would have put all the fire out."
Birmingham.
The Case referred to by Shakspeare in Hamlet (Vol. vii., p. 550.).—
"If the water come to the man."—Shakspeare.
The argument Shakspeare referred to was that contained in Plowden's Report of the case of Hales v. Petit, heard in the Court of Common Pleas in the fifth year of the reign of Queen Elizabeth. It was held that though the wife of Sir James Hale, whose husband was felo-de-se, became by survivorship the holder of a joint term for years, yet, on office found, it should be forfeited on account of the act of the deceased husband. The learned serjeants who were counsel for the defendant, alleged that the forfeiture should have relation to the act done in the party's lifetime, which was the cause of his death. "And upon this," they said, "the parts of the act are to be considered." And Serjeant Walsh said:
"The act consists of three parts. The first is the imagination, which is a reflection or meditation of the mind, whether or no it is convenient for him to destroy himself, and what way it can be done. The second is the resolution, which is the determination of the mind to destroy himself, and to do it in this or that particular way. The third is the perfection, which is the execution of what the mind has resolved to do. And this perfection consists of two parts, viz. the beginning and the end. The beginning is the doing of the act which causes the death; and the end is the death, which is only the sequel to the act. And of all the parts, the doing of the act is the greatest in the judgment of our law, and it is, in effect, the whole and the only part the law looks upon to be material. For the imagination of the mind to do wrong, without an act done, is not punishable in our law; neither is the resolution to do that wrong which he does not, punishable; but the doing of the act is the only point the law regards, for until the act is done it cannot be an offence to the world, and when the act is done it is punishable. Then, here, the act done by Sir James Hale, which is evil and the cause of his death, is the throwing of himself into the water, and death is but a sequel thereof, and this evil act ought some way to be punished. And if the forfeiture shall not have relation to the doing of the act, then the act shall not be punished at all, for inasmuch as the person who did the act is dead, his person cannot be punished, and therefore there is no way else to punish him but by the forfeiture of those things which were his own at the time of the act done; and the act was done in his lifetime, and therefore the forfeiture shall have relation to his lifetime, namely, to that time of his life in which he did the act which took away his life."
And the judges, viz. Weston, Anthony Brown, and Lord Dyer, said:
"That the forfeiture shall have relation to the time of the original offence committed, which was the cause of the death, and that was, the throwing himself into the water, which was done in his lifetime, and this act was felony."–"So that the felony is attributed to the act, which act is always done by a living man and in his lifetime," as Brown said; for he said, "Sir James Hale was dead, and how came he to his death? It may be answered, By drowning. And who drowned him? Sir James Hale. And when did he drown him? In his lifetime. So that Sir James Hale being alive, caused Sir James Hale to die; and the act of the living man was the death of the dead man. And then for this offence it is