wants to hear, be loyal to your own power base and seek to augment its position, and remember the political shibboleths – remember 1918!
Hitler, unlike Stalin, was not a good manager, and did not follow up his own decisions, which, sometimes impossible to obey or contradictory, were quietly and fearfully ignored.14 He seemed unable to delegate responsibility. He nevertheless browbeat and insulted his generals. The following extracts from the notes of field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel (1882-1946), Hitler’s chief military advisor and head of the OKW, will serve as an illustration:
Fuehrer’s general H.Q., 8th October, 1941.
Keitel to Hitler:
“Mein Fuehrer!
I have already submitted, through General Jodl, the results of my investigations concerning the employment of shells based on the ‘hollow charge’ principle. However, in this respect I report personally as follows.
The idea of the ‘hollow charge’ principle came to my attention purely by chance during the spring of this year. I did not, however, expect it to have any practical application during the campaign in the east or for the remainder of this year. When you, my Fuehrer, first drew my attention to the importance of this invention (the work of an SA man) the idea of an early or premature application of this idea never came to my mind. Nor do I recall having received instructions from you, my Fuehrer, to take precautionary steps to prevent the premature use of the invention. I realise, however, that there is no excuse or evasion of responsibility possible for me in this respect and that it was my duty to keep myself informed at all times about future developments in this case. If I had done so, I should have been aware that the use of this invention dates back to May of this year. I am fully aware of the consequences that might arise from the discovery and use of the weapon by the enemy and of their influence on the prosecution of the war.
I believe from your statements and attitude in this matter that your confidence in me has been severely shaken, and I therefore beg you to receive me and to let me know your decision.
Heil mein Fuehrer,
signed Keitel, Generalfeldmarschall”
Pencilled note by Keitel:
“The Fuehrer granted me an audience, immediately, on the 8th October. After a long dissertation about the worst of all mistakes being to employ new weapons before our own defence against these weapons had been developed (this was a criminal neglect of the German high command in the last war), the Fuehrer condemned the present high command in the strongest fashion and claimed that it was guilty of equally criminal actions and even was guilty of stealing the invention itself. He stated that he was personally separated by an abyss from this institution of incompetence, including the high command’s general staff, which has selected the worst of all personnel for the top positions. To my suggestion that he should accept my resignation he answered that obviously he could not replace the general staff because nothing better was available.
As regards myself personally, the Fuehrer insisted that I did not obey his order to prevent the use of the ‘hollow charge’ invention. After several questions about his confidence in me, which the Fuehrer consistently sidestepped, I finally put to him the direct question as to whether he wanted to work with me or not?
Finally the Fuehrer shook my hand and gave an affirmative answer.”15
In September 1940 the rocket had been reduced in priority to lb, which by a strange shorthand placed it third, ‘S’ (for Sealion, the planned invasion of Britain) being top, and la second. By October, Dornberger had managed to wrestle this up to la, after finding that nothing could be accomplished on lb. But the steel restrictions stayed.16
Dornberger now tried another ploy, suggesting in a memorandum that the enemy, particularly the United States, might take the lead in the development of this decisive weapon.17 By March 1941 the development of the rocket was again at top priority, with production second. But Dornberger, finding difficulty getting machine tools on second priority had, in a memorandum for a meeting between von Brauchitsch and von Leeb, alluded to the accuracy of his terror weapon, against which no defence could avail.18 However, Fritz Todt, the armaments minister, in a letter to Fromm (Commander in Chief of the Reserve Army and Chief of Armament) had noted the lavish scale of the social, as well as research, amenities at Peenemunde. He cut 8.5 million reichsmarks from the budget.19 Dornberger, in a memorandum to Hitler, now mentioned the damage to morale that the rocket could inflict, even if air superiority had been lost.20
Hitler, the old soldier, had seen and felt the effects of a ruined morale in November 1918, and he was always alert to a mention of attacking the enemy’s will. With his air legions now deeply deployed in Russia, the dictator must have been considerably influenced by Dornberger’s timely comment, for he met him and von Braun on 29th August, and now apparently believing the rocket to have revolutionised warfare, demanded ‘hundreds of thousands’.21 But he declined to order mass production until the missile had been properly developed – it must be remembered that, at this stage, not one had left the lauch pad.
Hitler’s demand for hundreds of thousands was mistaken, but is perhaps not so ludicrous as it might appear. Certainly, this quantity could not be produced – at their eventual projected price of 50,000 reichsmarks each, just 200,000 rockets would cost 10 billion (10,000,000,000) reichsmarks, which, considering that the total military expenditure of the Reich in 1941 was 68.4 Bn RM,22 was plainly out of the question. If financial limitation, in a totalitarian state which could direct labour where needed, is felt to be an unreliable guide to industrial capacity, then another calculation could have been made: if it took 60 man months to make each rocket23, then 200,000 would require the labour of 12 million man months, or one million man years. The total labour force available to the Third Reich, including prisoners, was some 36 million.24
In the insulting homily so assiduously recorded by field Marshal Keitel, it will be remembered that Hitler had stressed the folly of a too early introduction of a new weapon, which an enemy might copy and use before full advantage had been gained. Dornberger had already stressed the possibility of enemy development in his attempts to gain priority. Hitler’s request, therefore, was not one which should have surprised anybody; once its impossibility had been pointed out to him, a better appraisal of the possibilities of rocket warfare would have been available to the German leader. But it was not pointed out. Like the mice in the ancient story, the sober military leaders who were present at that meeting may all have felt it sensible to place a bell on the cat, but considerations of a more personal strategy made each disinclined to carry out the task himself. It was not what the Fuehrer desired to hear.
But when the German Fuehrer was next found talking A4 rocket quantities, in early March 1942, it was a request for Speer to investigate the raw materials requirements for a quantity of 3000 per month.25
But in April 1942 came Dornberger’s suggestion for 5000 rockets per annum which, it will be remembered, would require all of Germany’s alcohol production and more than all of her current production of liquid oxygen. What effect did that have on Hitler? He had seen the rocket supply scaled down since August 1941 from ‘hundreds of thousands’ to 5000. How many rockets did he think were necessary to have a decisive effect?
From one point of view, it really was necessary to deploy hundreds of thousands of rockets. London was the ideal ‘terror’ target. It was the capital of the people who had themselves launched terror raids on Germany, and the need for vengeance would be satisfied.