at a point some ten miles east of the British position. They were reported to be crossing the river at La Ferté, and Sir John French continued to fall back towards the Seine, moving after sundown, as the heat had been for some days very exhausting. The troops halted in the neighbourhood of Presles, and were cheered by the arrival of some small drafts, numbering about 2000, a first installment towards refilling the great gaps in the ranks, which at this date could not have been less than from 12,000 to 15,000 officers and men.
Here for a moment this narrative may be broken, since it has taken the Army to the farthest point of its retreat and reached that moment of advance for which every officer and man, from Sir John French to the drummer-boys, was eagerly waiting. With their left flank resting upon the extreme outer forts of Paris, the British troops had finally ended a retreat which will surely live in military history as a remarkable example of an army retaining its cohesion and courage in the presence of an overpowering adversary, who could never either cut them off or break in their rearguard. The British Army was a small force when compared with the giants of the Continent, but when tried by this supreme test it is not mere national complacency for us to claim that it lived up to its own highest traditions. “It was not to forts of steel and concrete that the Allies owed their strength,” said a German historian, writing of this phase of the war, “but to the magnificent qualities of the British Army.” We desire no compliments at the expense of our brothers-in-arms, nor would they be just, but at least so generous a sentence as this may be taken as an advance from that contemptuous view of the British Army with which the campaign had begun.
Before finally leaving the consideration of this historical retreat, where a small army successfully shook itself clear from the long and close pursuit of a remarkably gallant, mobile, and numerous enemy, it may be helpful to give a chronology of the events, that the reader may see their relation to each other.
1. The German cavalry were the Fourth Cavalry Division, including the 2nd Cuirassiers, 9th Uhlans, 17th and 18th Dragoons. They published in their losses for the “Combat of Néry” 643 casualties. This is not the complete loss, as the artillery does not seem to have been included.
| HAIG’S FIRST CORPS | SMITH-DORRIEN’S SECOND CORPS |
| August 22 | |
| Get into position to the east of Mons, covering the line Mons—Bray. | Get into position to the west of Mons, covering the line Mons—Condé. |
| August 23 | |
| Artillery engagement, but no severe attack. Ordered to retreat in conformity with Second Corps. | Strongly attacked by Von Kluck’s army. Ordered to abandon position and fall back. |
| August 24 | |
| Retreat with no serious molestation upon Bavai. Here the two Corps diverged and did not meet again till they reached Betz upon September 1. | Retreat followed up by the Germans. Severe rearguard actions at Dour, Wasmes, Frameries. Corps shook itself clear and fell back on Bavai. |
| August 25 | |
| Marching all day. Overtaken in evening at Landrecies and Maroilles by the German pursuit. Sharp fighting. | Marching all day. Reinforced by Fourth Division. Continual rearguard action becoming more serious towards evening, when Cambrai — Le Cateau line was reached. |
| August 26 | |
| Rearguard actions in morning. Marching south all day, halting at the Venerolles line. | Battle of Le Cateau. German pursuit stalled off at heavy cost of men and guns. Retreat on St. Quentin. |
| August 27 | |
| Rearguard action in which Munsters lost heavily. Marching south all day. | Marching south. Reach the line Nesle—Ham—Flavy. Battle of Le Cateau. |
| August 28 | |
| Cavalry actions to stop German pursuit. Marching south on La Fère. | Marching south, making for the line of the Oise near Noyon. Light rearguard skirmishes. |
| August 29, 30, and 31 | |
| Marching on the line of the Aisne, almost east and west. | Crossed Oise. Cavalry continually engaged. General direction through Crépy-en-Valois. |
| September 1 | |
| Sharp action at Néry with German vanguard. Later in the day considerable infantry action at Villars—Cotteret. Unite at Betz. | Retreat upon Paris continued. Late this night the two Corps unite once more at Betz. |
| September 2 | |
| Crossed the Marne and began to fall back on the Seine. Halted near Presles. | Crossed the Marne and began to fall back on the Seine. |
V. The Battle of the Marne
The general situation—“Die grosse Zeit” — The turn of the tide—The Battle of the Ourcq—The British advance—Cavalry fighting—The 1st Lincolns and the guns —6th Brigade’s action at Hautvesnes—9th Brigade’s capture of Germans at Vinly—The problem of the Aisne—Why the Marne is one of the great battles of all time
There are several problems connected with the strategical opening of the great war which will furnish food for debate among military critics for many years come. One of these, already alluded to, is the French offensive taken in Alsace and Lorraine. It ended in check in both cases, and yet its ultimate effects in confusing the German plans and deflecting German armies which might have been better used elsewhere may be held to justify the French in their strategy.
Another remarkable and questionable move now obtrudes itself, this time upon the part of the Germans. Very shortly after the outbreak of war, the Russians had pushed their covering armies over the frontier of East Prussia, and had defeated a German force at Gumbinnen, with a loss of prisoners and guns. A few days later the left wing of the widespread, and as yet only partially mobilised, Russian army struck heavily at the Austrians in the south near Lemberg, where after a week of fighting they gained a great victory, with prisoners, which amounted to over 70,000 men and a large booty of guns and supplies. Before this blow had befallen their cause, and influenced only by the fact that the Russian right wing was encroaching upon the sacred soil of the Fatherland, a considerable force was detached from the invading armies in France and dispatched to the Eastern front. These men were largely drawn from the Third (Saxon) Army of Von Haussen. Such a withdrawal at such a time could only mean that the German general staff considered that the situation in France was assured, and that they had still sufficient means to carry on a victorious invasion. Events were to show that they were utterly mistaken in their calculation. It is true that, aided by these reinforcements, Von Hindenburg succeeded on August 31 in inflicting a severe defeat upon the Russians at the battle of Tannenberg, but subsequent events proved that such a victory could have no decisive result, while the weakening of the armies in France may have had a permanent effect upon the whole course of the war. At the very moment that the Germans were withdrawing troops from their Western front the British and French