his way to the Chinese court asking for aid against Ko-gu-ryŭ. The Emperor could not comply but proposed three plans: first, that China stir up the Mal-gal tribes to harry the northern borders of Ko-gu-ryŭ and so relieve the strain on the south; second, that China give Sil-la a large number of red flags which she should use in battle. The Păk-je or Ko-gu-ryŭ forces, seeing these, would think that Sil-la had Chinese allies and would hasten to make peace; third, that China should send an expedition against Păk-je, which should unite with a Sil-la force and thus crush the Păk-je power once for all and join her territory to that of Sil-la. This would prepare the way for the subjugation of Ko-gu-ryŭ. But to this advice the Emperor added that so long as Sil-la had a woman on the throne she could not expect to undertake any large operations. She ought to put a man on the throne and then, after the war was over, restore the woman if she so wished. The Sil-la envoy pondered these three plans but could come to no decision. So the Emperor called him a fool and sent him away. We see behind each of these schemes a fear of Ko-gu-ryŭ. China was willing to do anything but meet the hardy soldiers of Ko-gu-ryŭ in the field.
We see that the Emperor had virtually decided in favor of Sil-la as against Păk-je and Ko-gu-ryŭ. The long expected event had at last occurred. Tacitly but really China had cast her vote for Sil-la and the future of the peninsula was decided for so long as the Tang dynasty should last. That the decision was a wise one a moment’s consideration will show. Ko-gu-ryŭ never could be depended upon for six months in advance and must be constantly watched; Păk-je, being really a mixture of the northern and southern elements, had neither the power of the one nornor the peaceful disposition of the other but was as unstable as a cloud. Sil-la on the other hand was purely southern, excepting for a strain of Chinese blood brought in by the refugees from the Tsin dynasty. Her temperament was even, her instincts peaceful, her tendencies toward improvement and reform. She was by all means the best ally China could have in the peninsula. And so the die was cast and henceforth the main drift of Chinese sympathy is to be Sil-la-ward.
The year 644 was a fateful one for Korea. The Emperor sent an envoy to Ko-gu-ryŭ and Păk-je commanding them to cease their depredations on Sil-la. Thus was the Chinese policy announced. Păk-je hastened to comply but Hap So-mun of Ko-gu-ryŭ replied that this wasthis was an ancient feud with Sil-la and could not be set aside until Ko-gu-ryŭ recovered 500 li of territory that she had been despoiled of. The Emperor in anger sent another envoy with the same demand, but Hap So-mun threw him into prison and defied China. When he heard however that the Emperor had determined upon an invasion of Ko-gu-ryŭ he changed his mind and sent a present of gold to the Chinese court. But he was too late. The gold was returned and the envoy thrown into prison.
There were many at the Chinese court who could remember the horrors of that retreat from P’yŭng-yang when China left 300,000 dead upon the hills of Ko-gu-ryŭ, and the Emperor was advised to move cautiously. He however felt that unless Ko-go-ryŭ was chastised she might develop an ambition towards imperialism and the throne of China itself might be endangered. He therefore began to collect provisions on the northern border, storing them at Tă-in Fortress. He called into his counsels the old general, Chöng Wŭn-do, who had been an eye-witness of the disasters of the late war with Ko-gu-ryŭ. This man gave healthful advice, saying that the subjugation of Ko-gu-ryŭ would be no easy task; first, because the way was so long; second, because of the difficulty of provisioning the army; third, because of the stubborn resistance of Ko-gu-ryŭ’s soldiers. He gave the enemy their due and did not minimize the difficulties of the situation.
The Emperor listened to and profittedprofitted by this advice, for during the events to be related his soldiers never suffered from over-confidence, but in their advances made sure of every step as they went along.
Active operations began by the sending of an army of 40,000 men in 501 boats to the harbor of Nă-ju where they were joined by land forces to the number of 60,000, besides large contingents from the wild tribes of the north. Large numbers of ladders and other engines of war had been constructed and were ready for use. Before crossing the Liao River the Emperor made proclamation far and wide saying “Hap So-mun has killed our vassal, King of Ko-gu-ryŭ, and we go to inquire into the matter. Let none of the prefects along the way waste their revenues in doing us useless honors. Let Sil-la, Păk-je and Kŭ-ran help us in this righteous war.”
Crossing the Liao without resistance the Chinese forces marched toward the fortress of Kön-an which soon fell into their hands. Some thousands of heads fell here to show the rest of Ko-gu-ryŭKo-gu-ryŭ what they might expect in case of contumacy. Then Ham-mo Fortress fell an easy victim. Not so the renowned fortress of Liao-tung. As the Emperor approached the place he found his way obstructed by a morass 200 li in length. He built a road through it and then when all his army had passed he destroyed the road behind him as Pizarro burnt his ships behind him when he landed on the shores of America to show his army that there was to be no retreat. Approaching the town he laid siege to it and after a hard fight, during which the Chinese soldiers lifted a man on the end of a long piece of timber until he could reach and set fire to the defences that surmounted the wall, an entrance was finally effected and the town taken. In this battle the Chinese were materially aided by armor which Păk-je had sent as a gift to the Chinese Emperor.
The Chinese were destined to find still greater difficulty in storming An-si Fortress which was to Ko-gu-ryŭ what Metz is to Germany. It was in command of the two generals, Ko Yŭn-su and Ko Hye-jin who had called to their aid 100,000 warriors of the Mal-gal tribes. At first the Emperor tried a ruse to draw the garrison out where he could give them battle. The wise heads among the Ko-gu-ryŭ garrison strongly opposed the sortie saying that it were better to await an opportunity to cut off the Chinese from their base of supplies, and so entrap them; but they were outvoted and the greater part of the Ko-gu-ryŭ and allied forces marched out to engage the enemy in the open field. The Emperor ascended an eminence where he could obtain a view of the enemy and he beheld the camp of the Mal-gal allies stretching out forty li, twelve miles. He determined to exercise the utmost caution. One of his generals, Wang Do-jong begged to be allowed to march on P‘yŭng-yang, which he deemed must be nearly bare of defenses, and so bring the war to a speedy close; but the Emperor, like Hannibal when begged by his generals to march straight into Rome, made the mistake of over-caution and so missed his great opportunity. To the Emperor this sounded too much like a similar attempt that had once cost China 300,000 men.
A messenger was sent to the Ko-gu-rŭ camp to say that China did not want to fight but had only come to inquire into the cause of the king’s death. As he intended, this put the Ko-gu-ryŭ forces off their guard and that night he surrounded the fortress and the forces which had come out to engage him. This was done in such a way that but few of the surrounding Chinese army were visible. Seeing these, the Ko-gu-ryŭ forces made a fierce onslaught anticipating an easy victory, instead of which they soon found themselves surrounded by the flower of the Chinese army and their retreat to the fortress cut off. It is said that in this fight 20,000 Ko-gu-ryŭ troops were cut down and three thousand of the Mal-gal allies, besides losing many through flight and capture. These were all released and sent back to Ko-gu-ryŭ excepting 3,500 noblemen whom the Emperor sent to China as hostages. This fight occurred outside the An-si Fortress and the Emperor supposed the gates would now be thrown open; but not so, for there was still a strong garrison within and plenty of provisions; so they barred the gates and still defied the Chinese. Upon hearing of the Chinese victory the neighboring Ko-gu-ryŭ fortresses Ho-whang and Eui capitulated, not knowing that An-si still held out against the victors.
Many of the Emperor’s advisers wanted him to ignore An-si and press on into Ko-gu-ryŭ leaving it in the rear, but this the wary Emperor would not consent to do, for he feared lest his retreat should be cut off. So the weary siege was continued. One day, hearing the lowing of cattle and the cackling of hens within the walls, the Emperor astutely surmised that a feast was being prepared preparatory to a sortie that was about to be made. Extra pickets were thrown out and the army was held in readiness for the attack. That very night the garrison came down the wall by means of ropes; but finding the besiegers ready for them they retired in confusion and suffered a severe defeat. The siege went on. The Chinese spent two months constructing a mound against the wall but the garrison rushed out and captured it. It is said that during this siege the Emperor lost an eye by an arrow wound, but the Chinese histories do not mention it. The cold blasts of late autumn were now