lessons taught. In effect, Spiritism exhibits a very large number of the ritual and symbolic traits which are generally regarded as typical of religion – at least, in its traditional format. However, when asked whether Spiritism is a ‘religion’, Spiritists vehemently resist the application of this term to their practices and beliefs. Continuing to define itself over and against established traditions such as Christianity, and despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, Spiritism refuses to regard itself as a ‘religion’. Although more dissimilar to traditional religious repertoires than Spiritism, the refusal of many new age (such as Transcendental Meditation) and non-mainstream (such as Wicca) groups to own the label ‘religion’ is further indication of the negative connotations which this term has for certain practitioners.
Not so, however, for Scientology. The Church of Scientology was founded in the early 1950s by L. Ron Hubbard (1911–86). Heavily influenced by the human potential movement, Hubbard developed Scientology as the institutional channel through which his programme of spiritual enlightenment (‘Dianetics’) would be delivered to the world. Although recognized in various parts of the world as a legitimate religious organization, and despite the work of high-profile adepts such as Tom Cruise and John Travolta, Scientology has still to achieve unanimous acknowledgement of its claims to be defined as a bona fide religion rather than a ‘cult’ (see Chapter 7). Unlike Spiritism and Transcendental Meditation, for Scientology the application of the word ‘religion’ to its beliefs and practices is something very much sought after. Scientology’s public response to the ongoing refusal of certain countries (for example Germany) to recognize it as a religion is to argue that the suspicion with which it is treated serves only to hamper its mission and inhibit individual religious freedoms. Unofficially, of course, the continued denial of the label ‘religion’ renders Scientology ineligible to access the legal protections, political privileges and financial benefits which established, mainstream religions have traditionally enjoyed. Scientology’s campaign to be accorded the title ‘religion’ is as much motivated by strategic savvy as it is by evangelistic zeal.
Polythetic definitions
In contrast to Spiritism and certain other non-mainstream movements, Scientology is keen to be labelled a ‘religion’. Not necessarily wishing to become involved in the ongoing legal-political machinations in respect of this desire, the majority of sociologists who work in this area nevertheless tend towards the view that Scientology, like Spiritism, exhibits a sufficient range of typical characteristics to justify its academic recognition as ‘religion’ (Lewis, J., 2009). While both substantive and functional definitions of religion are brought to bear in cases such as Scientology (Beckford, 1980; Frigerio, 1996), social scientists are increasingly using what are termed ‘polythetic’ or ‘multi-factorial’ approaches. I have already used this type of approach when arguing above that Spiritism, irrespective of what its adherents claim, should be regarded as religion on the grounds that it exhibits a sufficient number of characteristics which are taken to be typical of what we understand a religion to be and do.
Also known as the ‘family resemblance’ model, the polythetic (literally, ‘many attributes or themes’) approach to defining religion starts from the premise that no single definition can adequately capture what is, in its actual manifestations, a highly varied phenomenon. As no single concept or theory is able to capture sufficiently the variegated character of religion, polythetic approaches attempt to define religion through an inventory of its most commonly occurring characteristics. Those phenomena adjudged to have a sufficient number of these characteristics (share an adequate number of ‘family resemblances’) are thereby acknowledged to belong to the category of ‘religion’. Alston, for example, includes nine ‘religion-making characteristics’ in his definition of religion (1967, pp. 140–7), while Southwold lists twelve such ‘attributes’ (1978, pp. 362–79).
According to Southwold, for example, ‘the word “religion” designates cultural systems which have at least some of these attributes’:
(1) A central concern with godlike beings and men’s relations with them. (2) A dichotomization of elements of the world into sacred and profane, and a central concern with the sacred. (3) An orientation towards salvation from the ordinary conditions of worldly existence. (4) Ritual practices. (5) Beliefs which are neither logically nor empirically demonstrable or highly probable, but must be held on the basis of faiths . . . (6) An ethical code, supported by such beliefs. (7) Supernatural sanctions on infringements of that code. (8) A mythology. (9) A body of scriptures, or similarly exalted oral traditions. (10) A priesthood, or similar specialist religious elite. (11) Association with a moral community, a church (in Durkheim’s sense . . .) (12) Association with an ethnic or similar group. (1978, pp. 370–1)
The strength of the polythetic model resides in its ability to offer an inclusive definition of religion which readily reflects the actual variety of religious belief and practice evident across the globe. Provided the list of characteristics/resemblances is not allowed to become too long, the inclusivity offered by this approach need not come at the expense of the analytical precision required of all definitions; that is, they should indicate not only what a thing is but also what it is not.
What polythetic approaches such as those of Alston and Southwold do not do, however, is indicate just how many of the characteristics listed should be identified before any particular set of practices and beliefs can be classified as ‘religion’. Presumably this number should not be so low as to suffer from the same weaknesses of singular definitions such as Tylor’s, but nor should it be so high as to become too demanding and thereby too exclusive. Nor do Alston and Southwold say if any of these characteristics are more important than any of the others and thereby carry more weight in the definitional stakes. For example, and in reference to Southwold’s list, does a particular set of beliefs and practices in possession of characteristics 1, 4 and 10 enjoy a more secure categorization as ‘religion’ than one exhibiting numbers 3, 5 and 12? Finally, and as with every other attempt to define religion to date, polythetic approaches offer only a superficial (‘thin’) description of the subject at hand. Although covering more ground by virtue of their inclusive approaches, the lists of Alston and Southwold still leave undefined just what is meant by terms such as ‘religious feelings’ and ‘ritual’ – terms which make sense only when fleshed out with detailed (‘thick’) descriptions of actual processes which occur in particular socio-cultural contexts. While a fact of life rather than a technical failing, the need to define further the constituent parts of lists such as these serves to underline that no matter how seemingly inclusive a definition appears, it still requires an element of interpretation; interpretation which is, by its nature, always a view from a particular socio-cultural point.
Approaching religion
Debates about how religion should be defined are directly related with arguments about how religion should be approached in practice. In addition to influencing where one looks for a particular phenomenon, definitions of that phenomenon (in our case, religion) directly impact upon how it is looked for. Talk of method and where it is to be applied is thereby inextricably bound to the issue of definition (Riis, 2008, pp. 229–44).
Academic approaches
A question related to method in the sociology of religion concerns the relationship between the academic researcher and the religious claims made by those individuals and groups being studied. Writing at the beginning of mainstream sociology’s reawakening interest in religion, Berger maintained that sociologists should not concern themselves with ‘the ultimate status of religious definitions of reality’ (1967, p. 180). Defining his approach as one of ‘methodological atheism’, Berger argued that questions relating to the truth or falsity of religious claims should be set to one side (‘bracketed’). Uncomfortable with the theoretical implications of the term ‘atheism’, others have chosen instead to talk of ‘methodological agnosticism’ (Smart, 1973, p. 54). The following quote by Beckford shows methodological atheism/agnosticism in action.
Regardless of whether religious beliefs and experiences actually relate to supernatural, superempirical or noumenal realities, religion is expressed