that intercourse.” The decision was important because it was an example of the U.S. Supreme Court broadly defining Congress’s Commerce Clause powers.
CourtSpeak: Gibbons v. Ogden Interstate Commerce Case (1824)
Chief Justice John Marshall (on navigation as a form of commerce): “If commerce does not include navigation, the government of the Union has no direct power over that subject, and can make no law prescribing what shall constitute American vessels, or requiring that they shall be navigated by American seamen. Yet this power has been exercised from the commencement of the government, has been exercised with the consent of all, and has been understood by all to be a commercial regulation. All America understands, and has uniformly understood, the word ‘commerce,’ to comprehend navigation. It was so understood, and must have been so understood, when the constitution was framed. The power over commerce, including navigation, was one of the primary objects for which the people of America adopted their government, and must have been contemplated in forming it. The convention must have used the word in that sense, because all have understood it in that sense; and the attempt to restrict it comes too late.”
Marshall (on the broad scope of Congress’s commerce powers): “We are now arrived at the inquiry—What is this power? It is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution. These are expressed in plain terms, and do not affect the questions which arise in this case, or which have been discussed at the bar. If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of Congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects, the power over commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single government, having in its constitution the same restrictions on the exercise of the power as are found in the constitution of the United States. The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many other instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure them from its abuse. They are the restraints on which the people must often they solely, in all representative governments.
“The power of Congress, then, comprehends navigation, within the limits of every State in the Union; so far as that navigation may be, in any manner, connected with ‘commerce with foreign nations, or among the several States, or with the Indian tribes.’ It may, of consequence, pass the jurisdictional line of New York, and act upon the very waters to which the prohibition now under consideration applies.”
What was the impact of the Gibbons v. Ogden decision?
The decision was significant because it further established the power of the federal government over the states. It also spurred the national economy by ensuring that Congress had broad Commerce Clause powers and by eliminating certain state-centered monopolies that negatively impacted interstate commerce.
How personal was the conflict between Gibbons and Ogden?
The two men and former partners had a heated personal conflict. Gibbons went so far as to challenge Ogden to a duel. Ogden refused and later sued Gibbons for trespassing, winning a court judgment of $5,000.
What political positions did Ogden hold?
Ogden had a long and illustrious career in politics. He served as governor of New Jersey and as a U.S. senator. He also was a presidential elector in the 1796 election.
Besides both being involved in the steamboat business, what occupation did Gibbons and Odgen share?
Both Ogden and Gibbons were trained lawyers but only dabbled in the practice of law.
What famous case involving the selling of lottery tickets established the power of federal courts to review state laws?
The case that resolved an important question of the power and jurisdiction of federal courts was Cohens v. Virginia (1821), a case involving the selling of lottery tickets. Jacob Cohen started Cohen’s Lottery and Exchange Office of Baltimore and brothers Philip and Mendes Cohen managed the Norfolk branch. The Cohen brothers sold national lottery tickets, an activity approved by the federal government and administered by officials from the District of Columbia.
The problem was that the state of Virginia wanted to promote its own lottery. The state passed a law in 1820 that prohibited the sale of out-of-state lottery tickets. State officials charged the Cohens with violating this law because they were selling District of Columbia lottery tickets. While the Cohens were only fined $100, the case was important to them because it affected the vitality of their business. The case is important historically because it involved an important question of federal judicial power.
Convicted in a local state court, the Cohens appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, contending that the national lottery was a federal institution that the states could not regulate. The state of Virginia argued that the U.S. Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal in this state court conviction under a state law. The state of Virginia also argued that the Supreme Court could not hear the case because of the Eleventh Amendment, which generally provides for state immunity from lawsuits by private individuals. Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinion established the supremacy of the federal judiciary. He ruled that the Eleventh Amendment had no application and that Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 gave the U.S. Supreme Court the jurisdiction to review state laws alleged to be repugnant to the U.S. Constitution.
CourtSpeak: Supremacy of the Federal Judiciary In Cohens v. Virginia (1821)
Chief Justice John Marshall: “The constitution and laws of a state so far as they are repugnant to the constitution and laws of the United States, are absolutely void. These States are constituent parts of the United States. They are members of one great empire—for some purposes sovereign, for some purposes subordinate. In a government so constituted, is it unreasonable that the judicial power should be competent to give efficacy to the constitutional laws of the legislature? That department can decide on the validity of the Constitution or law of a State, if it be repugnant to the Constitution or to a law of the United States. Is it unreasonable that it should also be empowered to decide on the judgment of a State tribunal enforcing such unconstitutional law? Is it so very unreasonable as to furnish a justification for controlling the words of the Constitution?
“We think it is not. We think that, in a government acknowledgedly supreme, with respect to objects of vital interest to the nation, there is nothing inconsistent with sound reason, nothing incompatible with the nature of government, in making all its departments supreme so far as respects those objects and so far as is necessary to their attainment. The exercise of the appellate power over those judgments of the State tribunals which may contravene the Constitution or laws of the United States is, we believe, essential to the attainment of those objects.”
In what decision did the Marshall Court rule that the president has the ultimate authority to call out the militia and such orders cannot be reviewed by the judiciary?
The Marshall Court ruled unanimously in Martin v. Mott (1827) that Jacob Mott could not challenge his punishment for a court martial for refusing to join the militia when called during the War of 1812. Mott had been fined $96 and faced a one-year imprisonment. The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Joseph Story, said there could be no judicial review of the decision to call out the militia and determine whether it was the proper course of action. “While subordinate officers or soldiers are pausing to consider whether they ought to obey, or are scrupulously weighing the evidence of the facts upon which the commander in chief exercises the right to demand their services, the hostile enterprise may be accomplished without the means of resistance,” Story wrote.
CourtSpeak: Martin v. Mott