democratic government represents the majority, but what about individuals and minorities who have not chosen that particular government, whom it does not represent, and to whom it might be hostile, or those minorities or individuals whose opinions are at odds with the majority in society? It is necessary to safeguard their rights against the tyranny of the majority. And (Mill argues) such tyranny does not necessarily take the form of political oppression by government itself. It may be social tyranny, involving the use of public opinion to coerce nonconformists into acceptance of majority views and modes of behaviour.
So, where should the boundary between individual freedom and society’s legitimate interference with individual conduct be drawn? Mill proposes what he calls ‘one very simple principle’ to regulate society’s control over the individual: that the only purpose for which society may exercise power over one of its members, against his will, is where his conduct may harm others or their interests. In matters affecting only himself or his interests, the individual (children and those incapable of managing their affairs being excepted) must have absolute independence.
Of course, this principle of individual liberty is less simple to apply than to state. Opinions will vary as to whether or not certain actions harm others, or, even if this is agreed, whether or not they should be banned or tolerated. But Mill’s point is that, unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary, and the behaviour in question is clearly harming others or their interests, individual freedom should always be preferred to social control. As Mill explains, a range of historical, religious, cultural and social factors determine the values of a particular society, from religious beliefs, through the interests of a particular social class, to a society’s ‘likings and dislikings’. However much importance it places on its values, society, or the majority in it, should not impose them on dissentient individuals and minorities, and thus restrict their freedom, unless their actions involve harm to others.
For example, until after the middle of the twentieth century, society in Britain disapproved of homosexuality, and homosexual relationships were against the law, even though what took place between two consenting adults could not harm others or their interests. Today, in Britain, fox-hunting is banned, even though it is hard to see how those who pursue this minority sport can cause harm to others. Of course, it is true that many people had or have strong moral or religious objections to both. But would either the former ban on homosexual relationships, or the current ban on fox-hunting, pass the test of Mill’s very simple principle? Were, or are, the restrictions on personal liberty they involve justified by the standard he proposes?
Mill maintains that all matters relating to conscience and the expression and publication of opinion, including press freedom, fall within the ‘region of human liberty’, and no restrictions should be placed on them. This is consistent with his principle of individual liberty, but he argues that, quite apart from the matter of individual freedom, there are practical reasons why censorship harms society, including those in it who disagree with certain opinions, and want to suppress them. Most human opinions and conduct are rational because they can be corrected through discussion. Indeed, truth is usually arrived at through a combining and reconciling of opposite points of view. For this to be possible, people need to be able hear a wide range of different points of view on a subject and, even when an opinion has become the majority one, it should continue to be scrutinized and debated. A suppressed opinion on a particular matter may be the true one, or it may contain an important (but neglected) part of the truth, which the generally accepted opinion lacks. Mill uses the example of Christian morality. Some claim that it provides a complete system of morality, but (in his view) it needs to be supplemented by Greek and Roman morality, with their greater emphasis on the ideas of duty and public obligation. Further, even if the majority opinion is true, unless it is challenged it will be held as a mere dogma, not a belief that has ‘living power’. He considers that this had happened to Christianity. It was no longer a dynamic, growing religion because its beliefs and values were generally accepted, so its followers no longer had to defend them against challenge and criticism.
In a democratic society, few would challenge Mill’s argument for freedom of expression. But can it always be the paramount consideration, or are there occasions when, even in a democratic society, it needs to be curbed, because the views being expressed may lead to incitement of hatred against individuals or groups, or even be directed at destruction of the democratic society itself? As Mill acknowledges, it is one thing to denounce corn-dealers as starvers of the poor in the press, but another to do so to an excited mob, in front of a corn-dealer’s house.
Mill has little patience with the view that the proponents of controversial or minority opinions should express them with restraint, to minimize offence, and even less with any suggestion that there should be legislation to regulate the matter. People with strong views often express them with a passion that opponents find objectionable, but this is in the nature of public debate. What he does deplore is any attempt, particularly by the supporters of the majority view, to represent their opponents as bad or immoral, simply because of their views, which can deter them from making their case. Mill’s insistence on mutual fairness and tolerance in public debate seems particularly relevant today, when, in the political world, ‘spin’, misrepresentation of opponents’ views and assaults on their integrity have become commonplace.
But individual freedom is not just about people’s views and how they are expressed; it is also about how they lead their lives. Although Mill accepts that actions, where the potential for harm to others is greater, cannot be as free as opinions, he felt that nineteenth-century European society, which was increasingly dominated by mass public opinion, as reflected in mass circulation newspapers, discouraged individuality and originality, thus impoverishing human life. Afraid to be different, people were too ready to let society decide how they should live, rather than choosing for themselves. The consequence was that many people were unable to achieve their full potential, and lead fulfilled and happy lives, because they felt compelled to conform to the approved standard of conduct, while society was denied the benefit of the new ideas that unconventional lifestyle choices might generate, as these only occur in conditions of freedom and individuality.
Mill maintains that, with democratic governments increasingly pandering to the demands of the masses that elected them, the general trend in society was towards acceptance of the ‘despotism of custom’, making progress difficult. He makes a plea for the cultivation of individuality. Society needs eccentrics, who will flout mass opinion, and live unconventional lives, and whose value lies less in their being right than in their refusal to bend the knee to custom, which sets an example to others.
It could be argued that Mill adopts too extreme a position here. While individuals often lead the way in political and social reform, his view that all wise and noble things come from individuals, and that no democratic government can rise above the level of the mediocre seems exaggerated and elitist. It was proved wrong by, for example, the important reforms introduced by William Gladstone’s 1868–74 Liberal government which, following the 1867 Reform Act, was elected on a much more democratic franchise than its predecessors. But Mill is also pointing out a danger that democratic governments face. They are elected by the people, and must represent their interests, but this does not mean they should allow their voters to do their thinking for them. They must provide leadership, not follow the dictates of public opinion. Mill also makes the perceptive point that the rule of custom, although it impedes progress, does not necessarily rule out change, provided the change applies to, or is accepted by, everyone. So a proposed reform may be resisted, but once it is introduced, it immediately becomes the new orthodoxy, which everyone must accept. Any continuing opponents of the reform will be regarded as being as eccentric as its proponents were previously.
In Chapter IV of On Liberty, Mill explores the question of where the boundary between what he calls ‘self-regarding’ actions (those that affect only the individual) and actions that affect others (with which society is entitled to interfere) should be drawn. Society is entitled to punish those who harm others, whether by law or public opinion, but, although it may encourage people to cultivate self-regarding virtues, point out their mistakes to them, and, if they do not change their ways, shun them, it is not entitled to interfere with conduct, however foolish, that affects only the individual himself. The evil of compelling an individual to act against his wishes, even for his own good,