majority of other delegates could not agree more. They “did not consider the Prerogatives of the British Monarch as a proper guide in defining the Executive powers,”22 and worked to ensure that “America’s president would wield a less threatening kind of executive power than Britain’s king.”23 As the delegates debated how to accomplish this goal, the heat of their passions filled the room—quite literally, since the windows remained shut and the heavy green drapes drawn in order to maintain secrecy.
To these patriots, one of the most dangerous of the president’s powers was his command of the military. After all, the Americans had just fought a bloody war against the British Crown’s abuse of his military power. The Declaration of Independence, which listed their justifications for rebellion a few years earlier, clearly stated:
[King George III] has kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies without the Consent of our legislatures. He has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil Power . . . : For quartering large bodies of armed troops among us: For protecting them, by a mock Trial from punishment for any Murders which they should commit on the Inhabitants of these States . . .24
The British monarch’s use of his commander-in-chief power had led to the bloody war. And a repeat was to be avoided at all costs.25
At the outbreak of the Revolution in 1775, the king’s example certainly had a profound impact on Americans’ understanding of the term “commander in chief.”26 Many of the states had previously modeled their respective governors’ military powers around British precedent, and the Founders had looked to them as a starting point of reference at the beginning of the war. But as the Revolution escalated, the king’s powers—and even some of the governors’—were increasingly rejected. Americans feared that if they merely followed the British example, they would wind up having their liberties quashed all over again. The patriots sought to build their own commander from the ground up.
Luckily, by the time of the Constitutional Convention twelve years later, Americans had an intellectual antidote to the evils of the British example. To find a model for the new American commander in chief, the delegates and the citizenry at large had to look no farther than the statuesque man sitting quietly at the front of the room. “As Americans in 1787 tried to envision a republican head of state who could protect them against old King George without becoming a new King George, they did have a particular George in mind.”27
Washington afforded the nation “an example of the national leader par excellence.”28 While America had seen other commanders in chief,29 it was Washington who distilled these precedents into a distinctive, American version. He had overcome many of the evils of the old ways and introduced new meaning to the term commander in chief amid the bloodshed of war. Thus, when it came time to contemplate how to allocate military powers within the new government, the Americans looked to the decorated war hero whom many considered “the greatest man in the world.”30
While the delegates originally considered spreading the commander-in-chief powers among multiple persons, that notion changed when they appealed to their memories of the “situation during the late war.”31 The memories of Washington’s actions as revolutionary commander convinced the delegates that “[f]rom the nature of the thing, the command of armies ought to be delegated to one person only. The secrecy, dispatch, and decision, which are necessary in military operations can only be expected from one person.”32
And with Washington in mind, the delegates scrapped the idea of dividing up the commander-in-chief role. Instead they determined “that the sword ought to be put in the hands of the representatives of the people.”33 That person would be the president of the United States.
With a vote, the delegates bestowed the full set of commander-in-chief powers on the president. But they did not elaborate on what exactly those powers were. They did not need to. When the delegates described the new presidency’s military power with the amazingly few words, “The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,” they were not being cagey. On the contrary, they needed no further description because it was so evident to the voters what they meant: the same powers that General Washington had exercised in the war to protect them.1
“When men spoke of the great national representative, of the guardian of the people” that the proposed president would become, “they were thinking in terms of the Father of His Country.”2 As the only American commander in chief, Washington had forged the meaning of presidential war powers in the heat of battle. He taught America “how to govern a nation at war”3 and showed firsthand that the country needed a strong commander to survive. While his military authority was sweeping, he used it virtuously. This convinced the delegates and the broader populace that the new American commander in chief, based on Washington’s precedents, could be powerful without trampling liberty.
One delegate warned, “The Executive will have great opportunitys of abusing his power; particularly in time of war when the military force, and in some respects the public money will be in his hands.”4 But Washington’s example assuaged their fears. Another delegate explained that the powers allocated to the president in the Constitution were “greater than [he] was disposed to make them,” and he believed those powers would not “have been so great had not many of the members cast their eyes towards General Washington . . . and shaped their Ideas of the Powers to be given to a President, by their opinions of his Virtue.”5
The patriots were confident in knowing that their paradigm for the new presidency’s military powers was the man who was pivotal to the birth of the United States. Washington had served as “the great protector of the Mass of the people,” and now the president would continue that role.6 Surely, lesser men would eventually occupy the office. But if they ever questioned what it meant to be the American commander in chief, the country needed only to look back to the righteous precedents that Washington had set during the Revolution. With this in mind, they finalized the Constitution.
After an entire summer of vigorous argument and difficult compromise, the great republic began with a sacrificial lamb. The lamb’s skin was soaked in water for one day and then placed in an alkaline vat of liquor and lime. Stirred at least twice daily with a long wooden pole, the lambskin sat for about a week before it was hung to dry on a stretching frame. A craftsman painstakingly scraped the skin with a blade, turning it into a fine parchment. Once prepared, it was shipped to Philadelphia, where the fledgling nation’s anxious political leaders transcribed onto it the concise words of the new Constitution.
Washington’s exalted example and unfailing perseverance had guided the delegates through long cantankerous days and nights to agree on a mere four pages of parchment that would create the new American government. In addition to naming the president as commander in chief, the Constitution outlined his nonmilitary powers, as well as the powers of Congress and the Supreme Court. On September 17, 1787, the thirty-nine exhausted delegates who had not abandoned the effort signed the parchment. Few were completely satisfied with the new Constitution. Washington certainly was not, but he conceded that it was the best they could do. He wrote, “That the Government, though not absolutely perfect, is one of the best in the world, I have little doubt.”7
After the convention, a woman asked Benjamin Franklin whether this Constitution would create a monarchy or a republic. Franklin dryly replied, “A republic, if you can keep it.” Our Founders provide guidance on how we might do so.
When the Constitution went before the states for ratification, it faced a barrage of criticism. Many believed it would be rejected. The voters feared relinquishing