describe the central argument of our book: “The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present.” We are living through a revolution in military affairs as fundamental as the emergence of vast armies and mass-produced arms in Lincoln’s time. Military cyber units—the U.S. recently elevated its cyber command to a par with its regional combatant commanders—launch viruses to harm an enemy’s military capacity and disrupt its economic and communications networks. Unmanned robots patrol the skies hunting for individual terrorist leaders with air-to-ground missiles. Massive computing power, instant communications, and precise satellite reconnaissance bring any location on earth within one hour of a global strike missile. Much discussion of military affairs is now constrained by anachronistic understandings of the “law of war,” as much as Napoleonic approaches initially infected early thinking about the Civil War. We want to expand the debate over war today by rethinking the prevailing dogmas. As our case is new, we must think anew and act anew. We must disenthrall ourselves.
This chapter begins our analysis of war and technology with the changing nature of conflict in the twenty-first century. Even as technology in commerce and war is beginning to make revolutionary strides, the threat of major war is receding. The risks of great power conflict have declined since the massive destruction wrought by European nations in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Mankind is currently living through the longest period without a significant interstate war since the birth of the modern international system in 1648.1 In the last seventy years, deaths from interstate wars have fallen by an entire order of magnitude from the rate of centuries before.2
But we are not entering utopia. Armed conflict remains a persistent feature of the human condition. Conventional or nuclear war between the great powers remains a considerable threat. After seizing part of Georgia in 2008 and annexing Crimea in 2014, Russia continues to destabilize Ukraine and harass NATO’s eastern borders.3 In the midst of a military modernization drive, China is building artificial islands to support its claims to all of the South China Sea, through which $5.3 trillion in trade passes every year. After eight years of retrenchment and withdrawal, the United States may well embark under President Donald Trump on a military buildup and a reinvigorated foreign policy.
In the past, some wars between great powers were almost amicable. Regular armies could settle the dispute on the battlefield, far from civilian population centers, almost in the manner of a duel. In 1866, for example, Prussia provoked a war with the neighboring Habsburg Empire. Prussian forces quickly prevailed at the Battle of Koniggratz. Chancellor Otto von Bismarck restrained Prussian generals from trying to capture Vienna, and instead negotiated peace terms that limited Austrian losses.4 Within a dozen years, the two powers entered into an enduring alliance. When war was not absolute and surrender was not unconditional, conflict focused on disabling military capacities until one nation accepted the political goals of the other.
Of course, some conflicts followed a very different pattern. In the Second World War, Germany did not surrender until Allied armies had seized every one of its major cities, sometimes only after grinding urban combat. Allied armies had to prove beyond dispute that they could assert control over all parts of Germany. But victory does not always go to the side with more troops or better weapons. A guerrilla war can become a contest of willpower rather than weaponry. After eight years of struggle, the French abandoned Algeria in 1962, not because of the incapacity of the French army, but because the French public would no longer support the military effort.5 Eight years of struggle was not too much for the leaders of the Arab National Liberation Front, but it was too much for France.
Other challenges to peace come not from Soviet tanks pouring into West Germany, but from regional revanchists, authoritarian regimes, and terrorist groups. In this new century, civil wars, such as the one that has killed or displaced millions in Syria and Iraq, or conflicts in lands where the West has few interests, such as those in Sudan or Congo, have caused enormous death and suffering. Future killing may come at the hands of rogue nations, such as North Korea or Iran, that come into possession of weapons of mass destruction. Or deaths will flow from terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda or ISIS, which operate with global reach and can wield violence once only in the hands of nations.
In this new world of security threats, the great powers will not need agreements to ban their latest weapons. They are likely to deter each other from destructive attacks, just as mutually assured destruction kept the Cold War from turning hot. Instead, the greater threat is that the great nations will be loath to intervene against rogue nations or terrorist groups, who employ unconventional methods to coerce the West. The United States and its allies will never be able to match these enemies in their willingness to descend into barbarism. Instead, we must exploit our advantages in cyber and robotics, our control of the air, seas, and space, and our ability to integrate information processing, computers, and soldiers. Drones, cyber weapons, and precision-guided missiles could give the West the ability to kill terrorist leaders, cripple an authoritarian regime’s infrastructure, or destroy clandestine WMD research facilities. These technologies and skills could allow the great powers to use force more precisely and swiftly to prevent the rising threats of the twenty-first century from upending the international order.
Critics worry that the spread of these new weapons will lower the barriers to war. If launching a drone or activating a cyber weapon becomes too cheap and easy, they warn, nations will resort to force far more readily than today. But this earlier, more precise use of force could prevent threats from metastasizing into far worse dangers. It could even have a salutary effect in further dampening the risks of great power war. As we will show, war often breaks out between nations because they cannot overcome the informational and commitment obstacles to bargaining. Because of the anarchic state of the world, nations in a dispute cannot gather credible information about the capabilities and desires of their rivals and they cannot trust them to keep their promises. Cyber and robotic weapons give nations not only greater ability to coerce each other, but also more means to communicate their intentions in war and their reliability in peace. With these weapons available, we should see nations settle more disputes by negotiation, rather than by escalation.
We do not mean to argue that more advanced technologies will now transform the battlefield and ensure that future conflicts will always be won by the side with the better weapons. In the early twentieth century, for example, air-power enthusiasts argued that bombing could replace ground assaults. Colonial powers used air attacks in the interwar period, notably the British in Iraq and Spanish forces in Morocco. But command of the air did not ensure French victory in Algeria in the 1950s, nor Soviet victory against Afghan guerrillas in the 1980s. War is unpredictable because, in the end, it is a contest between human hearts and brains, not a duel of gadgets. The side with the more advanced weapons may not be the side with the most commitment in a long struggle.
This chapter proceeds in three parts. Part I will describe the new security challenges of the twenty-first century. It will explain that the nature of these civil wars, rogue states, and terrorist groups requires more widespread, albeit less destructive, uses of force to police them. Part II will explore how new weapons technologies, and a modern understanding of the tactics and strategy to take advantage of them, can lead to less rather than more conflict between the major powers. Part III will criticize the current rules of the U.N. Charter, which might deter states from using new weapons to confront these new threats. While the twentieth century’s threats are receding, the instability and disorder of the twenty-first may require the great powers to use force more often, not less.
New Security Challenges for the Twenty-First Century
In August of 2013, the White House acknowledged clear evidence that the Syrian army had used chemical weapons, despite firm warnings from President Barack Obama against using such munitions.6 The White House tried to mobilize support for retaliatory military action by western countries, including France and Great Britain. In the ensuing