(male or female, it doesn’t matter) who reserves the right to kill—in case one ever forgets He is the Law—and who hears all but generally remains silent about it; then let patriarchal transference take care of the rest. (Was Blish the first to note, in the essay already quoted from, what a “thoroughgoing Freudian” Heinlein was?)
The ease and energy about Glory Road suggest an author in a pleasant state vis-à-vis his own creative power. Heinlein mentioned to me, in the single conversation we have ever had (long distance, about a proposed motion for an SFWA business meeting at a forthcoming world SF convention in Phoenix, in 1978), that the Lady Vivamus is lovingly modeled after his own fencing sword. Bravery, the novel tells us, is facing what you’re afraid of—not what X, Y, or Z happens to fear. And a hero who functions in one kind of situation may be very out of place in any number of others—if not a real pain in the neck.
For the younger reader, the encounter with Heinlein’s vision of cultural pluralism (which, judging from the Shavian epigraph, is clearly one of the book’s major points) may still provide a certain kind of revelation. If it falls a little flat with the more sophisticated reader, it is only because so many other Heinlein novels (and Heinlein-inspired novels) have brought the message home with such richness.
There is a sort of underlying voice I hear all through Glory Road. What this voice has to say maintains my interest in the novel. It is not the voice of the hero—through which all the other voices of the novel as well as the narrative are presented. It is a voice that carries a high degree of joyous abandon, and must seduce anyone who wonders how such enterprises as SF novels get done. “Look!” it seems to say, if not sing. “This is no more serious than a feather, nor will it ever be! Now that is where all your real energy must go! All right, stand back! Now see the beautiful pattern the two together make! Note how delightful the play between them!” The writer in us (whom I equate, here, with the maker of formal patterns)—rather than the politician, the psychologist, the sociologist, or any other of those referential folk who must be there in the writer to make sure the formal patterns the writer comes up with do not resonate simply and solely with the less pleasing aspects of life and literature (these folks’ role is that of critical guide, not creator)—must be delighted before such joy.
Without the body of Heinlein’s work, Glory Road might have been more appreciated for this quality of joyous invention. We might have been able to see it as a “slight” work that was nevertheless endlessly fascinating for reasons that endlessly defied definition—rather the way we tend to regard the works of, say, Cordwainer Smith. Because, however, there is such a body of Heinlein work about which, whatever else one may say about it, “slight” is the last word that comes to mind, many readers would rather put the problem out of mind, I suspect, and ignore the book as an anomaly or dismiss it as simply “uncharacteristic.”
But the fascination remains, and through the years I have met a number of readers and writers who have found themselves its victim.
Finally, it is because the book so emphatically pitches its fascination at this level that it generated that ire in the first place. Orlando is acceptable from Virginia Woolf: the rest of her work is pretty rarefied, too. But would it be acceptable from George Eliot, Balzac, Charlotte Brontë…?
The novel after Glory Road was Farnham’s Freehold, in which Heinlein again took on the full load of topicality and referentiality—and it proved to be for many readers his most distressing novel. Glory Road produced ire and was finally ignored; Farnham’s Freehold has sustained an almost continual attack. This is not the place to examine that attack in detail. Suffice it to say that what distresses one about the Heinlein argument in general, when it is presented in narrative form, is that it so frequently takes the form of a gentlemanly assertion: “Just suppose the situation around X (war, race, what-have-you) were P, Q, and R; now under those conditions, wouldn’t behavior Y be logical and justified?”—where behavior Y just happens to be an extreme version of the most conservative, if not fascistic, program. Our argument is never with the truth value of Heinlein’s syllogism: Yes, if P, Q, and R were the case, then behavior Y would be pragmatically justifiable. Our argument is rather with the premises: Since P, Q, and R are not the situation of the present world, why continually pick fictional situations, bolstered by science-fictional distortions, to justify behavior that is patently inappropriate for the real world? And Heinlein’s unerring ability to see precisely how the real world would have to be changed to make such conservative behavior appropriate begins to suggest that his repeated use of science fiction to this end represents what existentialist critics used to call “bad faith.” One assumes Heinlein’s answer to this argument is simply that the science-fictional parts of the distortion, at any rate, are possible in the future, if not probable; we must be prepared.
Well, Marx’s favorite novelist was Balzac—an avowed Royalist. And Heinlein is one of mine. A basic tenet of Heinlein’s philosophy has been quoted by Damon Knight in his fine introduction to the “Future History” stories (“Future History” is Campbell’s term, not Heinlein’s) The Past Through Tomorrow; this is a good place to set it out because it contours a good deal of the quibbling one is likely to get into over Heinlein’s “politics”:
When any government, or any church for that matter, undertakes to say to its subjects, “This you may not read, this you must not see, this you are forbidden to know,” the end result is tyranny and oppression, no matter how holy the motives. Mighty little force is needed to control a man whose mind has been hoodwinked; contrariwise, no amount of force can control a free man, a man whose mind is free. No, not the rack, nor fission bombs, not anything—you can’t conquer a free man; the most you can do is kill him.
Heinlein and I might well quibble over what constitutes “hoodwinking,” or what one’s social responsibility to the “hoodwinked” is; still, if you put Heinlein’s statement up and asked me to sign, I would. Clearly, then, there is an agreement—a tribute to the man who, as much as any writer while I was growing up, taught me to argue with the accepted version.
The novel after Farnham’s Freehold was The Moon Is a Harsh Mistress, which once again won for Heinlein the approbation of the general readership: it also won him his fourth Science Fiction Achievement Award, more informally known as the “Hugo,” at the 1967 World Science Fiction Convention. In the dozen years since Moon appeared it has come to be regarded by many as the novel expressing best Heinlein’s most characteristic strengths. Passionate and iconoclastic, it balances social portraiture with didacticism and headlong narrative in about equal measures. If one had not read any Heinlein at all—and I suppose that’s still possible—Moon makes a very good introduction if one wishes to catch him in his major mode. My own feeling, however, is that to encounter Heinlein significantly, one must be prepared to take on the seven novels running from Double Star (1956) through The Moon Is a Harsh Mistress (1966), as well as all the shorter works contained in The Past Through Tomorrow (copyright 1967; it contains stories and novels written between 1939 and 1962). Only then will we have a proper acquaintance with the writerly concerns and patterns that will allow us to appreciate fully what is deeply serious in the dozen “juvenile” novels, what is profoundly inventive in some of his more ephemeral earlier works, or what is patently authentic in the more recent didactic ones. This seems to me the only way to cut up the sky (or the ocean) Heinlein’s work makes over (or around) the whole of contemporary science fiction.
And within it all, Glory Road maintains a delicacy, a bravura, and a joy that not only are notable, but clearly consign it to his heptology of major SF novels—central, in its time of writing, range of themes, and variety of narrative organization, to the continuing Heinlein enterprise.
NEW YORK, DECEMBER 1979
1. Later critical assessments by Alexei Panshin (in collaboration with his wife, Cory) are both more insightful and more lively. Heinlein in Dimension finally dies the death of plot synopsis after plot synopsis, coupled with a rather undergraduate insistence on explaining exactly what is illogical in the plot of each one. The essays on Heinlein contained in SF in Dimension are something quite else; the closing consideration, on (among other occasions) Heinlein’s