which were intrusted to Seward and managed by him.
August 2, 1864: Stanton dislikes to meet Blair in council, knowing that B. dislikes and really despises him. Seward and Stanton move together in all matters…. Both mouse about the President, who, in his intense curiosity, interest and inquisitiveness, spends much of his time at the War Department, watching the telegraph. Of course, opportunities like these are not lost by Stanton.
II
Pessimism pervaded Washington, and much of the Union, as 1862 neared its end. The war effort seemed to be stalled. Then on December 13th, the Army of the Potomac suffered a devastating defeat at Fredericksburg, Virginia, sustaining some 12,600 casualties to the Confederates’ approximately 5300. A perception was widespread that the Lincoln administration lacked energy and a sense of direction and was so riven by internal strife as to be virtually paralyzed. Treasury Secretary Chase had done much to foster this perception by privately telling various Republican senators that the administration was weak and confused, that Lincoln rarely consulted the cabinet about important issues, and that the cabinet was too divided to agree on important policy questions. Chase placed most of the blame on Seward, portraying him as only halfhearted in his support of the war effort and as a conservative who was hostile to emancipation and exercised an excessive, even controlling influence on Lincoln. It was against this backdrop that the cabinet crisis of December 1862 played out. Welles’s diary entries for December 19th through the 23rd provide a detailed, generally accurate account of the crisis. They also reveal the help Welles gave Lincoln in resolving the crisis.
This episode was a critical moment in Lincoln’s presidency. If the caucus of Republican senators had succeeded in forcing him to remove Seward, it would have made him appear weak in the eyes of supporters and opponents alike, encouraged additional legislative encroachments on his executive authority, and upset the balance in the cabinet between conservative, moderate, and radical Republicans.
December 19, 1862: Soon after reaching the Department this A.M., I received a note from Nicolay, the President’s secretary, requesting me to attend a special Cabinet meeting at half-past ten. All the members were punctually there except Seward.
The President desired that what he had to communicate should not be the subject of conversation elsewhere, and proceeded to inform us that on Wednesday evening [December 17th], about six o’clock, Senator Preston King [of New York] and F. W. Seward [Seward’s son, who was the assistant secretary of state] came into his room, each bearing a communication. That which Mr. King presented was the resignation of the Secretary of State, and Mr. F. W. Seward handed in his own. Mr. King then informed the President that at a Republican caucus held that day a pointed and positive opposition had shown itself against the Secretary of State, which terminated in a unanimous expression, with one exception, against him and a wish for his removal. The feeling finally shaped itself into resolutions of a general character, and the appointment of a committee of nine to bear them to the President, and to communicate to him the sentiments of the Republican Senators. Mr. King, the former colleague and the friend of Mr. Seward, being also from the same State, felt it to be a duty to inform the Secretary at once of what had occurred. On receiving this information, Mr. Seward immediately tendered his resignation. Mr. King suggested it would be well for the committee to wait upon the President at an early moment, and, the President agreeing with him, Mr. King on Wednesday morning notified Judge [Jacob] Collamer [senator from Vermont], the chairman, who sent word to the President that they would call at the Executive Mansion at any hour after six that evening, and the President sent word he would receive them at seven.5
The committee came at the time specified, and the President says the evening was spent in a pretty free and animated conversation. No opposition was manifested towards any other member of the Cabinet than Mr. Seward. Some not very friendly feelings were shown towards one or two others, but no wish that any one should leave but the Secretary of State. Him they charged, if not with infidelity, with indifference, with want of earnestness in the War, with want of sympathy with the country in this great struggle, and with many things objectionable, and especially with a too great ascendency and control of the President and measures of administration. This, he said, was the point and pith of their complaint.
The President in reply to the committee stated how this movement shocked and grieved him; that the Cabinet he had selected in view of impending difficulties and of all the responsibilities upon him; that the members and himself had gone on harmoniously, whatever had been their previous party feelings and associations; that there had never been serious disagreements, though there had been differences; that in the overwhelming troubles of the country, which had borne heavily upon him, he had been sustained and consoled by the good feeling and the mutual and unselfish confidence and zeal that pervaded the Cabinet….
[Lincoln] said this movement was uncalled for, that there was no such charge, admitting all that was said, as should break up or overthrow a Cabinet, nor was it possible for him to go on with a total abandonment of old friends….
The President requested that we should, with him, meet the committee. This did not receive the approval of Mr. Chase, who said he had no knowledge whatever of the movement, or the resignation, until since he had entered the room. Mr. Bates knew of no good that would come of an interview. I stated that I could see no harm in it, and if the President wished it, I thought it a duty for us to attend. Mr. Blair thought it would be well for us to be present, and finally all acquiesced. The President named half-past seven this evening.
December 20, 1862: At the meeting last evening there were present of the committee Senators Collamer, Fessenden, Harris, Trumbull, Grimes, Howard, Sumner, and Pomeroy. Wade was absent. The President and all the Cabinet but Seward were present. The subject was opened by the President, who read the [Senate caucus’s] resolutions and stated the substance of his interviews with the committee – their object and purpose. He spoke of the unity of his Cabinet, and how, though they could not be expected to think and speak alike on all subjects, all had acquiesced in measures when once decided. The necessities of the times, he said, had prevented frequent and long sessions of the Cabinet, and the submission of every question at the meetings.
Secretary Chase indorsed the President’s statement fully and entirely, but regretted that there was not a more full and thorough consideration and canvass of every important measure in open Cabinet.6
Senator Collamer … succeeded the President and calmly and fairly presented the views of the committee and of those whom they represented. They wanted united counsels, combined wisdom, and energetic action. If there is truth in the maxim that in a multitude of counselors there is safety, it might be well that those advisers who were near the President and selected by him, and all of whom were more or less responsible, should be consulted on the great questions which affected the national welfare, and that the ear of the Executive should be open to all and that he should have the minds of all.
Senator Fessenden [of Maine] was skillful but not a little tart; felt, it could be seen, more than he cared to say; wanted the whole Cabinet to consider and decide great questions, and that no one should absorb the whole Executive. Spoke of a remark which he had heard from J.Q. Adams on the floor of Congress in regard to a measure of his administration. Mr. Adams said the measure was adopted against his wishes and opinion, but he was outvoted by Mr. Clay and others [in his cabinet]. He wished an administration so conducted.
Grimes [of Iowa], Sumner [of Massachusetts], and Trumbull [of Illinois] were pointed, emphatic, and unequivocal in their hostility to Mr. Seward; each was unrelenting and unforgiving. Blair spoke earnestly and well. Sustained the President, and dissented most decidedly from the idea of a plural Executive; claimed that the President was accountable for his administration, might ask opinions or not of either and as many as he pleased, of all or none, of his Cabinet. Mr. Bates took much the same view.
The President managed his own case, speaking freely, and showed great tact and ability, provided such a subject were a proper one for such a meeting and discussion. I have no doubt he considered it most judicious to conciliate the Senators with respectful deference, whatever may have been his opinion of their interference. When he closed his remarks, he said it would be a gratification to him if each member of the committee would state whether