asked whether the creation of the new government was an abuse of power, Lebrun answered, “If you say so.”86
The next witness was General Paul André Doyen, director of the French Armistice Commission that formally ended hostilities between Nazi Germany and France in 1940. His testimony was emphatic: Laval’s policy of collaboration in 1940 helped Germany in its fight against England and its allies, and constituted a political crime that dismembered and destroyed France.87 Laval’s rebuttal to this evidence came at the end of the proceeding when he pointed out in a written submission that Doyen had not resigned from the chairmanship of the Armistice Commission until June 1941. Laval then asked how Doyen could have participated so long in a policy he condemned so harshly in his testimony.88
Following General Doyen, the prosecution called Henri de Lapommeraye, a former secretary of the dissolved French Senate, who testified that in the fall of 1940, Laval, referring to the new regime, said that “this is how one reverses the Republic.”89 De Lapommeraye, however, did not give Mornet everything he wanted. He described conversations during the same period in which Laval said that France was beaten like never before, England would be brought to her knees in six weeks, and to avoid more brutal treatment, it would be necessary to adapt to German institutions.90 When the prosecutor asked Mornet whether Laval used the term “national socialism,” the witness responded emphatically: “No, Mr. Laval never used that term in front of me.”91
The prosecution then called Maurice Beauchamp, secretary-general to the National Federation of Deported Workers. He represented 400,000 of the 750,000 workers drafted for work in Germany, including 50,000 who had not returned and were presumed dead. Beauchamp described the brutal conditions French workers faced in Germany: they were underfed, underclothed, and exposed to Allied bombardment. Mornet placed into evidence circulars Beauchamp brought with him soliciting workers for work in Germany, signed by Laval.92 Upon completion of Beauchamp’s brief testimony, the prosecution once again ran out of witnesses. It then read a deposition into evidence, resulting in the gradual withdrawal of the spectators.93
The prosecution continued its case by reading into evidence questions put to Laval during the investigative stage and his answers. Laval had responded to most of the questions by deferring his answer to what he thought would be a later stage in the proceeding, which, of course, never came. Nevertheless, by placing into evidence even these truncated exchanges, the prosecution put some of Laval’s more inflammatory statements made during the war before the court. Given Laval’s failure to deny the facts explicit in the questions, this process had some evidentiary value.
1. Why was he on list of possible ministers for Pétain? Because he had been in many ministries before and had been Prime Minister several times.94
2. Wasn’t the creation of the new government with extraordinary powers delegated to Pétain an abuse of power? Deferred answer.95
3. Did he stop France from instituting a real government abroad by intrigue and threats? Deferred answer.96
4. Explain his discharge from the cabinet and subsequent arrest after the meeting with Hitler at Montoire and why he was known as “the Germans’ man.” Deferred answer.97
5. Why did he return to the government in 1942 after his humiliating dismissal in 1940? Deferred answer, except to note that he wasn’t humiliated, only those who squeezed him out were.98
6. Why did Marshal Pétain send a telegram to the Germans congratulating them on their success in repelling a British raid at Dieppe in August 1942? Answer: He (Laval) had nothing to do with telegram.99
7. In the summer of 1942, in an infamous radio address, Laval had said he wished for a German victory.100 Why did he say that, especially since the United States had joined the war at that point, allied with England, and with the Soviet Union also fighting against Germany? Did he really think Germany would win as he wished? Deferred answer.101
8. Later in 1942, did he not say that Germany would win the war, that England had stolen colonies from France, and that the real menace was Bolshevism, and it should not come wrapped in the fur of England and the United States to destroy French civilization? Deferred answer.102
9. In a December 1942, press conference, had he not said that France had to choose sides without equivocation and that he wanted the victory of Germany103 and not that of Bolshevism; and that Roosevelt carried in his baggage the double triumph of the Jews and communists and he must break them at all costs? Deferred answer.104
10. Had he not thanked the French volunteers on the German side of the eastern front for fighting with Germany against the Soviet Union in the interests of France, their sacrifices complementing the efforts of the many French citizens working in Germany? Deferred answer.105
11. Had he not threatened doctors who provided false certificates to persons facing the draft to work in Germany and also threatened their parents? Deferred answer.106
12. Had he not placed the French police at the service of the Gestapo in the arrest of 25,000 Jews in Paris, the nights of July 15 and 16, 1943? Deferred answer.107
In elaborating on his deferrals in the interrogatories, Laval added that had he not used the words attributed to him, he would not have been able to resist certain German demands, and, as a result, his actions benefited France.108 The reading into evidence of Laval’s answers to the interrogatories consumed the balance of the October 8 session. The next-to-last interrogatory asked him to explain why he had signed a law on December 12, 1942, requiring Jews, both French nationals and others, to carry cards identifying themselves as Jews. Laval’s response was that he had been questioned since 9:00 a.m. with a three-hour break; it was now 5:45 p.m. and he was tired. He again noted his astonishment that the preliminary phase of the case was brusquely closed and demanded that it be continued so that he could defend himself, a right given to all accused. The question posed to him went unanswered.109
On October 9, the last day of the trial, the prosecution called Leon Noel, the French ambassador to Poland from 1935 to 1939. Noel noted that his early statements in opposition to the Vichy regime had prematurely ended his diplomatic carrier. In Laval’s favor, he noted that Laval had helped Noel secure the freedom of a friend who had been a member of the Resistance and was under arrest. Noel then took a principled position, which precluded any assistance to the prosecution. Since Laval was not present to listen to Noel’s testimony, ask him questions, or offer rebuttal, Noel stated he could not in good conscience continue to testify and asked to be excused. The court granted his request.110
The case then proceeded to closing arguments, or more accurately, to one closing argument, since Laval and his lawyers were not present. The prosecutor summarized the evidence and asked for the death penalty.111 Laval, for his part, had submitted a three-and-a-half-page statement, dealing largely with the credibility of prosecution witnesses. The document did not even closely resemble a closing argument. The court then recessed.
The court resumed later in the day. After noting the charges,112 the court found Laval guilty on both charges, sentenced him to death, and directed that his property be confiscated.
Three days later, on October 12, Laval’s three lawyers met with General de Gaulle. They did not ask for a commutation of the death sentence, but rather for a new trial. Defense counsel Albert Naud pointed out that, as a member of the Resistance, he had absolutely nothing in common with Laval. Nevertheless, Naud argued that the trial was conducted in a scandalous fashion and that the execution of a former prime minister after such a trial would be disgraceful and set a dangerous precedent. The three defense lawyers also provided details as to the deficiencies of the trial.
Earlier, Paul-Henri Teitgen, minister of justice in the de Gaulle cabinet, agreed with the defense lawyers on the indefensible nature of the proceedings. However, when later consulted by de Gaulle, Teitgen said that events which took place during the trial were regrettable but that Laval had provoked them.113
Unbeknownst to Laval’s lawyers, de Gaulle was comparably duplicitous.