territories; Kalanga-speaking groups by contrast formed small ‘headmanships’ scattered throughout the northeast of present-day Botswana.20 In the Tswana manner of expansion, these settlements were incorporated into the Ngwato morafe in the latter part of the nineteenth century as a result of refugee movement and conquest.21 They thus came under the rule of the Ngwato kgosi Khama III (r. 1872/5–1923), who accommodated them peacefully for a long period of time (van Binsbergen 1994: 675) and included their leaders in his government.
A major shift came with the regency of Tshekedi (r. 1926–1949). Whereas Kgosi Khama III had allowed the Kalanga a measure of self-government, Tshekedi installed his own retainers as governors of the region and diminished significantly the existing Kalanga authority figures. This move initiated a protracted struggle, during which the Bangwato ruling group used considerable violence in their efforts to subjugate the Kalanga. Indeed, their treatment of the Kalanga was so harsh that at times British support was given only reluctantly (see Ramsay 1987: 77ff.). The British saw all too well that continued resistance by the substantial Kalanga minority22 within the Bangwato-controlled morafe threatened the interests of the colonial state and, especially, their practice of indirect rule.
The shift by the Tswana ruling groups to exercise more coercion while under British protection, engendered resentment among many subject communities. The vast majority, however, were too small and weak to react by resistance.23 Even the larger ones reluctantly submitted to Tswana rule – for example the BaKaa, who were located in the ‘native reserve’ ruled by the Tswana community of BaKgatla (baga-Kgafela). Kooijman (1978: 13–14) explains that ‘[a]lthough they felt resentment, the Kaa feared the consequences of ignoring the Kgatla chief's call too much to demur openly’, except on one occasion in 1927 when a young man, Phesudi, was installed as their leader. During the ceremony he wore a leopard skin, a true symbol of supreme authority, and expressed his intent of claiming ‘full independence from the BaKgatla’. However, shortly afterwards Phesudi died, and this was perceived as an occult attack effected by the personal involvement of the BaKgatla kgosi: ‘to the Kaa it was a stern warning that they were to obey Kgatla authority or otherwise suffer consequences of dire misfortune’ (Kooijman 1978: 15).
These events substantiate the growing strength of the ruling Tswana communities during the colonial era. Calls for British intervention were required only in a few special cases such as the Kalanga-Ngwato conflict mentioned above. Another such case involved the BaKgatla-baga-Mmanaana in the Bangwaketse ‘native reserve’. This large Kgatla community had moved around the region for many decades without being able to gain control of a separate territory. Finally they were taken in by the Bangwaketse and installed at Moshupa some fifty kilometres north of the Bangwaketse royal town (Kanye). A series of conflicts between their leader and Kgosi Bathoen II of the Bangwaketse, initiated in the early 1900s, culminated with the senior section of the Bakgatla ruling dynasty and many followers being exiled in 1933 to the neighbouring Kwena ‘native reserve’ when the British intervened with physical force (see Schapera 1942a: 21 and 25, cf. 1942b; Tselaesele 1978: 35). This particular intervention was no doubt due to the tenacity of the Kgatla leader at the time. However, the progressive polarization that brought the relationship to the brink of physical violence (Tselaesele 1978: 40) also reflects a growing tendency towards authoritarianism among Tswana rulers (see the following chapter).
A third case is that of the Babirwa whose leader tried, in the 1920s, to challenge the authority of Kgosi Khama III to remove them from their area, the background being that Khama had given this area to the British for sale of land to white farmers. The Babirwa resisted, only to experience that a Bangwato regiment (mophato) forced them out of their area and put fire to their houses. Their subsequent efforts to bring the case to court were jeopardized by the British who cooperated closely with Khama in a process that was concluded with the Babirwa leader being banished from the protectorate (see Ramsay 1987: 64ff.). This case illuminates that the British were quick to support the dikgosi when harsh physical violence was seen necessary, but there were very few occasions of this kind.
The dikgosi's heavy-handed behaviour was not only a matter of imposing their will on the subject communities within the merafe. It also owed a great deal to the authoritarian style and structure of the colonial state, which made the dikgosi responsible for extracting taxes and enforcing British rules and regulations. These were responsibilities they willingly took on since they were given a percentage of the tax collected. Imposed colonial state rules and regulation only reinforced their dominant position in relation to subject communities (see following chapter). Although these measures, perceived as oppressive, originated from the colonial state, subject communities reacted against the dikgosi rather than the British. In fact, the Bakgatla-baga-Mmanaana, the Bakaa, the Bayee and others wanted to eliminate Tswana kgosi domination by obtaining a direct relationship with the colonial power. The British always refused to accept such requests.
In conclusion, under the circumstances of the colonial state, the repressive character of the dominant Tswana intensified. Despite subject communities' resistance, the Tswana rulers prevailed because they could always appeal for British support and were provided violent measures if required. A multitude of – often tacit – repressive practices that developed during colonial times have, as we shall see in Chapter 5, been sustained in important respects under postcolonial conditions and have become integral to the modern state structures of social control. However, under these circumstances, I shall explain, major conflicts are emanating from contradictions of, on the one hand, Tswana domination and repressive practices in relation to minority communities, and, on the other hand, the modern state's virtues of equality and liberalism.
Reinforcing of the Tswana Merafe within the Colonial State
That the domination of the Tswana merafe triggered minority protest as late as some thirty years after independence, I take as an indication of how forcefully Tswana hegemony has been working at all times. The ways in which these protests manifested and were countered by agents of the state are a major issue of Chapter 5. Here I am concerned with the ways in which the dominant position of the ruling communities of the Tswana merafe recognized by the British was reinforced during colonial times by virtue of extensive delegation of power. The British had after all promised at the inception of the protectorate that the selected Tswana dikgosi 'might be left to govern their own tribes in their own fashion'.24
Always wanting to run the protectorate at minimal cost, the British established a very small colonial administration, headed by a resident commissioner whose office was in fact located outside the country – in the township of Mafeking, some twenty kilometres beyond the South African border. (The resident commissioner was referring to the British High Commissioner residing in Cape Town.) This meant that the day-to-day government of much of the country was left with the dikgosi and their respective ‘tribal administration’. The British authorized, I recall, the dikgosi to govern all the peoples (except Europeans) in their ‘reserves’. Moreover, in several official statements (see Schapera 1970: 51–52) the British asserted from the outset that the colonial administration should ‘respect any native laws or customs’ regulating ‘civil relations’. The secretary of state actually instructed the high commissioner to ‘confine the exercise of authority and the application of law, as far as possible, to whites, leaving Native Chiefs and those living under their tribal authority almost entirely alone’ (Schapera 1970: 52, italics added). When the colonial administration wanted to establish laws and other regulations, the high commissioner had the power of doing so in the form of ‘Proclamations’. Crucially, however, the British rather preferred to encourage the dikgosi to frame laws for their subjects (see Schapera 1943b: 9; 1970: 53). It is true, as we shall see in the following chapter, that around 1930 the British took a more active and critical line in relation to the dikgosi, being worried about their ostensibly ever-more-autocratic style of rule. Nevertheless, throughout the colonial era the British depended much upon the executive power of the dikgosi in relation to the population within their respective ‘reserves’ and continued to feature as authorities with wide-ranging executive powers.
The