and judgement to do so. Again, this is reminiscent of Pufendorf: state sovereignty is emphasized, international lawlessness accepted as inevitable and political decisions are most likely a matter of reasons of state. Like some other representatives of the Enlightenment, Hume goes out of his way to argue for the European system of a balance of power. For him, it is a safeguard against the threat of a universal monarchy, checks the ambition of rulers such as Charles V and Louis XIV, maintains the independence of states and guarantees common security and relative stability.26
Hume endorses what could be labelled qualified, indirect or long-term economic cosmopolitanism. The upshot of his economic analysis is that trading partners naturally profit from commercial interaction, without directly intending this result. In other words,
while every man consults the good of his own community, we are sensible, that the general interest of mankind is better promoted, than by loose indeterminate views to the good of a species, whence no beneficial action could ever result, for want of a duly limited object, on which they could exert themselves.27
It is better to focus on specific objects or projects than on lofty ones, Hume asserts. Because of the law of unintended consequences, the more limited perspective inevitably promotes the broader ‘general interest of mankind’. It does not make sense to characterize Hume as either cosmopolitan or anti-cosmopolitan. To some extent, he is both: there is no doubt that the interests of one’s own state or community come first. However, assuming that interests converge if unintended consequences are operative, Hume can also claim that his version of economic cosmopolitanism is more efficient and thus better than direct, traditional natural law cosmopolitanism. He implies that only if societies or regions become trading partners and thus part of the economic market, do they qualify as members of this – either European or truly global – community.
Of the classical British authors, Adam Smith is the most original thinker. To some extent, Smith can be interpreted as a representative of political realism who follows a Hobbesian approach: he does not assume a natural harmony of interests across borders, his focus is on the state or commonwealth, he views international relations as anarchic, endorses the balance-of-power doctrine, and emphasizes the importance of defence.28 Smith combines a weak form of political realism with a state-centred and patriotic perspective and cosmopolitan ideas. On the one hand, he asserts that the love of humanity is too vague, that patriotism is more feasible and that Britain should be loved ‘for its own sake’. However, as in Hume, the great society is indirectly supported by efforts consciously focusing on the domestic sphere. Worldwide economic gains are an unintended by-product. Free trade would turn states into a sort of ‘provinces’ of one great empire: the idea of a monarchia universalis is transformed into the vision of a truly global free exchange of commodities, with overall beneficial results such as the end of local famines, and a situation where respect for rights is guaranteed by a roughly equal distribution of economic and military power. In addition, people with ‘enlarged and enlightened’ minds would overcome the passions of ‘savage patriotism’.29
Distinguishing between European politics and global international relations, Smith holds that the balance of power in Europe is efficient, with the overall result being ‘peace and tranquillity’ and the protection of the freedom and independence of the sovereign European states. The situation is different on a global scale. Since 1492, Europeans have enjoyed military superiority, which enabled them ‘to commit with impunity every sort of injustice’ wherever they wanted to.30 Smith speaks as an impartial spectator; he is not interested in defending or trivializing European atrocities, or constructing a teleological theory of possible benefits arising from these injustices. However, as in European politics, the global remedy is a system of power balance (the standard remedy of political realism). Smith speculates that perhaps in the future, European power will decline and that of non-European communities will increase, so that in the long run ‘the inhabitants of all the different quarters of the world may arrive at that equality of courage and force which, by inspiring mutual fear, can alone overawe the injustice of independent nations into some sort of respect for the rights of one another’. This equality of force can be established by worldwide commerce and the transfer of technology.31 In short, commerce reduces material inequalities among nations and parts of the globe, and contributes to peace and ‘respect for rights’ in the long run. A natural superiority of Europeans, or a right to civilize backward barbarians, is not implied.
Smith became famous for his elaborated version of the so-called four-stage theory. While his account is developmental and culminates in the commercial society, Smith avoids, and warns against, what he sees as civilizational self-deception: the belief that one’s own society or culture is superior to others. Smith’s moral balance-sheet of commercial society is much more nuanced than Hume’s, emphasizing the paradoxes, ambivalences and negative side-effects of commercial progress.32 In addition, Smith explains societal change in Europe, at least partially, with the help of material or physical factors, thus enabling him ‘to avoid the self-congratulatory note common in discussions attributing such developments to European’s special understanding of the values of freedom or political equality’.33
While Smith’s assessment of European achievements was mildly sceptical (and never enthusiastic), his treatment of non-European societies was quite tolerant and non-judgmental. The often arrogant and condescending tone of numerous nineteenth-century historians is missing. Practices and institutions of earlier forms of society are usually depicted as reasonable. Smith implicitly denies that Europeans are qualified to export their type of society to other continents; he warns that the ‘man of system’ is bound to neglect contexts, ‘interests’ and ‘prejudices’ when attempting to realize his ideal plan.34 Smith’s culturally sensitive judgements are rooted in his moral theory, which aims at what Kant would later call ‘enlarged thinking’ or erweiterte Denkungsart: we should see ourselves from the perspective of others, should reflect upon the cultural and social contexts of our judgements, should step beyond the narrow confines of our own group, should try to broaden the circle of comparison. Smith arrives at a delicate balance between a thin version of moral universalism (the traditional, but modified natural law element) and a contextual theory of moral judgements (the new element of history). Smith does not upset this balance in favour of fully fledged moral relativism, similar to Pufendorf, Wolff or Kant (see Chapters 2 and 4). The outcome is a ‘posture of humility in the evaluation of unfamiliar practices’ of non-Europeans, even if Smith sometimes does not refrain from criticism.35 These practices are usually understood as possibly reasonable responses to different contexts and circumstances.
Smith’s cosmopolitanism combines patriotism with indirect, long-term economic as well as natural law (or human rights) cosmopolitanism. Smith’s criticism of colonialism corresponds with these three elements: colonies are detrimental for the metropolitan state (they may lead to war, for instance); they contradict economic prudence because they are simply too expensive; they lead to destruction, oppression, abuse and arbitrary rule, as the case of the East India Company illustrates.36 As in Bentham (see below), there is a delicate balance between economic (or utilitarian) and moral arguments.
Born in England, Thomas Paine (1737–1809) pursued several occupations and finally emigrated to the American colonies in 1774, with a letter of introduction and recommendation by Benjamin Franklin in his pocket. His first major work and an immediate best-seller, Common Sense (1776), helped inspire the Declaration of Independence. It has been said that his work leaves us
with all the features of cosmopolitan thinking in international relations: Faith in reason and progress, the evils of authoritarian regimes, the democratic peace, the peaceful effect of trade, nonprovocative defense policies, open diplomacy, obsolescence of conquest, the universal respect for human rights, and the democratic propensity to engage in messianic interventionism.37
This generous use of the label ‘cosmopolitan thinking’ must be rejected: ‘cosmopolitan’ should not be mixed with ‘liberal’ or ‘liberal internationalist’. In the first place, Paine is a liberal thinker who criticizes monarchies, argues for republican and democratic